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T he Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM) was established to pursue two objec-tives: first, to improve our understanding of the 
interrelated challenges facing the EU and its member 
states in the areas of asylum, migration, and mobility; 
and second, to engage European policy makers and civil 
society in a broad and open debate about comprehensive, 
implementable solutions to these challenges. MEDAM 
is a joint project carried out by three academic research 
centers and think tanks – the Centre for European Pol-
icy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, the Kiel Institute for the 
World Economy (IfW), and the Migration Policy Cen-
tre (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI) in 
Florence – with generous support from Stiftung Mercator.
This 2017 MEDAM Assessment Report on Asy-
lum and Migration Policies in Europe is the first in an 
annual series. Its authors lay the groundwork for fur-
ther research and policy dialogue in MEDAM in the 
coming years. They emphasize that the challenges that 
asylum and migration policy makers need to address 
are best understood as the outcome of decisions that 
migrants, or potential migrants, make in interconnected 
settings: from assessing their prospects in their coun-
tries of origin through navigating asylum and immigra-
tion regimes and irregular migration routes to investing 
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Preface
in their economic and social integration in their desti-
nation countries. This dual emphasis on the agency of 
migrants and on the linkages between seemingly dis-
parate policy areas is a distinguishing feature of the 
MEDAM project.
A recurring theme in this report is that migration 
must be governed, if it is to deliver benefits for migrants, 
countries of origin, and countries of destination. Regard-
ing the global governance of refugee protection, the 1951 
Refugee Convention provides guidance on ways in which 
host countries and the international community might 
share responsibility for protecting refugees, especially 
through financial burden sharing. Similar considerations 
apply to the sharing of responsibility within the EU. 
Regarding labor migration, legal employment opportu-
nities in the EU for non-EU citizens might be expanded 
if safeguards are put in place to steer immigrants into the 
labor market, rather than towards the welfare state.
We present this 2017 MEDAM Assessment Report to 
the policy making community and to the wider public 
in the hope that it will stimulate and inform a construc-
tive debate. Our ultimate aim is to arrive at ways to more 
effectively address the needs of refugees and to harness 
labor migration to the benefit of migrants, host societies, 
and those who remain in their countries of origin.
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Challenges to asylum and migration policies 
in Europe
T hroughout the EU, policy makers and voters are uncertain about the best way forward for policies on asylum, immigration, and immigrant integra-
tion. The number of asylum seekers who enter the EU 
irregularly has declined sharply from its peak in late 2015, 
offering a much-needed respite to over-stretched recep-
tion systems in the few EU countries that have received 
most asylum seekers. However, the policies that brought 
about this reduction – mainly, the EU’s agreement with 
Turkey to curb irregular migration and the closure of land 
borders in the Western Balkans to irregular migrants – 
will be difficult to sustain. It is not clear how the human-
itarian emergencies that currently afflict migrants in 
Greece and the Western Balkans can be addressed with-
out encouraging a resurgence of irregular immigration. It 
will also be difficult to implement similar measures along 
the central Mediterranean migrant route from Libya to 
Italy, where the number of new arrivals has been roughly 
constant for several years, and there is no other country 
on that route that could conceivably host refugees to the 
extent that Turkey does. Finally, there is no viable reform 
in sight for the EU asylum system (the ‘Dublin’ regula-
tions) to ensure that EU member states share responsibil-
ity for hosting refugees more equitably.
Apart from the reception of new immigrants, EU mem-
ber states also face challenges related to the economic and 
social integration of immigrants who already live in the 
EU. In most EU member states, immigrants (defined as 
individuals born abroad) are less likely to be employed 
than native individuals. Immigrants also tend to earn 
less. The gaps in employment rates and income are most 
pronounced for immigrant women and immigrants from 
outside the EU. Immigrants who come to the EU pri-
marily to seek protection face an especially lengthy route 
toward labor market integration – particularly in those 
member states where refugees receive significant income 
support until they find formal employment. With lower 
employment rates and incomes, immigrants as a group 
tend to pay less tax and lower social contributions and 
receive more social transfers than the host population. 
While the net fiscal impact due to the presence of immi-
grants is usually small (even when it is negative), more 
immigration will not invariably increase the real incomes 
and welfare of residents. 
In many EU member states, some individuals in the 
host society harbor very negative attitudes toward immi-
grants and immigration, complicating the economic and 
social integration of immigrants. Negative attitudes are 
often associated with ethnicity-based identities and dis-
seminated by social and other media, and have little to 
do with the economic impact of immigration on a given 
individual. Still, successful integration depends crucially 
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on how much immigrants are willing to invest in destina-
tion-specific human capital (learning the local language 
and acquiring country-specific vocational qualifications). 
The incentives to invest are diminished if immigrants face 
negative attitudes, public hostility, or even hate crimes, 
and therefore must be uncertain about their long-term 
prospects in the destination country. 
Simplistic views about the drivers of migration to the 
EU further confuse the public debate on asylum and 
migration policies. A large gap in the level of economic 
development (hence, in real income and living standards) 
between an individual’s home country and the EU is often 
(rightly) identified as an incentive to migrate. Thus, it is 
argued further, development assistance should be rein-
vented to combat the root causes of migration – low 
incomes in developing countries, bad governance, and 
lack of respect for human rights. Yet, development assis-
tance has pursued exactly these objectives for the last half 
century, to limited avail. It is clear from this experience 
that economic and social development is a complex pro-
cess that cannot easily be set in motion through outside 
intervention, however well-intentioned. A deeper under-
standing of the way potential migrants decide whether to 
migrate is necessary to appreciate the opportunities and 
risks of possible policy interventions. 
Core messages of this Assessment Report
Together, these diverse challenges bear upon the effec-
tiveness of policies on asylum, immigration, and integra-
tion in the EU and its member states. The complexity of 
the challenges and the linkages between the policies help 
to explain the widely perceived uncertainty about the 
best way forward. Against this background, we pursue 
two main objectives with this 2017 MEDAM Assessment 
Report on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe. 
First, we analyze key challenges in three broad areas: i) 
the global governance of refugee protection, the EU asy-
lum system, and external border management; ii) the eco-
nomic and social integration of immigrants and public 
attitudes to immigration among destination-country res-
idents; and iii) the determinants of migration decisions 
among potential migrants, how development assistance 
affects migration, and how countries of origin benefit 
from migration. We emphasize the agency of migrants 
throughout the process of migration and explain how the 
various challenges are mutually interdependent.
Sharing responsibility for refugees more equitably
Second, we propose guidelines for comprehensive, imple-
mentable solutions to these interlocking challenges. 
These guidelines will be the starting point for MEDAM 
researchers to engage with policy makers and civil soci-
ety through a variety of formats to develop proposals for 
specific reforms and policy interventions. In this report, 
we put forward two broad policy messages. In the first 
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of these, we emphasize that responsibility for protecting 
refugees should be shared more equitably across coun-
tries along parallel dimensions: i) globally, between host 
countries and the international community, including 
the EU; and ii) within the EU, between countries of first 
arrival and other member states. 
In both dimensions, a meaningful start can be made 
through more financial burden sharing, which would go a 
long way toward equitable burden sharing overall. In return 
for substantially higher, and more predictable financial sup-
port, non-EU host countries should be encouraged to grant 
a firm legal status to refugees and facilitate their economic 
and social integration in the host country. The EU and its 
member states should help by better linking humanitarian 
to development assistance to ensure that public services and 
infrastructure are adequate even in the face of protracted 
refugee situations. 
On a voluntary basis, EU member states should comple-
ment financial burden sharing with the resettling of a lim-
ited number of refugees, both from outside the EU to EU 
member states, and within the EU, from member states on 
the external EU border to other member states. 
Expanding legal immigration from non-EU countries 
to EU member states
In our second policy message, we encourage EU mem-
ber states to expand legal employment opportunities for 
non-EU citizens at the same time that the EU and its mem-
ber states are working to curb irregular immigration. At 
present, many irregular immigrants to the EU apply for asy-
lum not because they require protection, but because this is 
the only way for them to enter the labor markets of EU mem-
ber states. Although many such immigrants never receive 
refugee status, only a few ever return to their countries of 
origin.
To curb such irregular immigration, we believe it will not 
be sufficient to try to close the ‘back door’ of irregular travel 
to the EU through better external border security and agree-
ments with countries of origin and transit along the major 
migrant routes. Too many potential migrants face the choice 
of either putting up with limited economic opportunities 
at home or emigrating irregularly, at high cost and consid-
erable risk. Economic conditions in many low- and mid-
dle-income countries will not improve overnight, even if 
development assistance is increased. Meanwhile, established 
people-smuggling networks as well as existing migrant dia-
sporas will continue to make irregular migration a viable 
choice for many, however much border security is tightened 
along migrant routes.
Therefore, we think it will be important to offer poten-
tial irregular migrants an alternative that works for them 
as well as for countries of origin and destination, by open-
ing the ‘front door’ of regular employment in EU member 
states to those who are willing to acquire the necessary lan-
guage skills and vocational qualifications. Within the EU, it 
is the individual member states that decide on labor market 
access for non-EU nationals. While it will be important to 
extend labor market access beyond very highly skilled (uni-
versity-educated) individuals who frequently enjoy access 
even today, member states may apply differential condition-
ality to ensure that the new arrivals have good prospects 
for labor market and social integration. Such conditional-
ity typically revolves around age, language skills, vocational 
qualifications (either based on specific labor market needs or 
broadly defined skill levels to reflect long-term employment 
prospects), an employment contract, or family relations. 
To facilitate access to language and vocational training in 
developing countries, including for low-skilled individuals, 
EU member states should make such training part of their 
development assistance.
A large body of empirical research suggests that, in des-
tination countries, the aggregate economic impact of such 
additional immigration into the labor market is usually 
small. Firms would gain access to a larger pool of qual-
ified workers and the effects of population ageing might 
be eased. At the same time, migrants would benefit from 
distinctly higher incomes, some of which would find their 
way to countries of origin through remittances. Since the 
chance of obtaining legal employment in EU member 
states would increase with educational attainment and 
vocational qualifications, the expected returns to invest-
ment in human capital would increase, again benefitting 
the country of origin. Through their development assis-
tance, the EU and its member states may usefully support 
such language and vocational training.
Thus, in our view, a sustainable asylum and migration 
policy needs both ingredients – ‘closing the back door’ of 
irregular immigration and ‘opening the front door’ of reg-
ular migration into labor markets. In addition to shift-
ing the incentives of potential migrants toward invest-
ment in human capital and waiting for their chance of 
regular migration, a comprehensive approach along these 
lines may also garner the support of the governments of 
countries of origin whose full cooperation is crucial for 
addressing irregular migration.
Immigration and diversity in the EU 
(chapter 1)
We begin this Assessment Report by placing recent migrant 
flows in the context of Europe‘s experience with migration 
over the last half century (chapter 1). In the old EU mem-
ber states (EU-15), the prevalence of immigration (the share 
of individuals born abroad in the resident population) has 
increased sharply since 1960, with most immigrants com-
ing from outside the EU (section 1.1). Today, immigrants 
make up 10 to 15 percent of the resident population in most 
EU-15 countries. They are also far more diverse in terms of 
their countries of origin than half a century ago. During the 
same period, traditional high-emigration countries among 
the EU-15 (Greece, Ireland, and Italy) saw the number of 
emigrants decline significantly relative to their resident 
population. 
Among the new EU member states, the picture is starkly 
different. Several countries saw their emigration ratios shoot 
up when labor market access was granted by the EU-15. The 
emigration ratio is now approaching 20 percent for both 
Romania and Bulgaria. By contrast, there is little immigra-
tion in most new EU member states. 
We go on to document important dimensions of migrant 
heterogeneity (section 1.2). Apart from historical legacies 
(e.g. former Soviet citizens in the Baltic countries), non-EU 
immigrants are concentrated in highly industrialized and 
13
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
urbanized regions. Notably, immigrants from the EU tend 
to be more evenly dispersed. Most immigrants have come to 
EU countries to work or to join family members who already 
live there. Those seeking international protection or political 
asylum played only a small role in 2014, accounting for more 
than 10 percent of non-EU immigrants only in Austria, Bel-
gium, Germany, and Sweden. While there are more refu-
gees in the EU today, they still live mostly in the same coun-
tries and their numbers are still small compared with those 
immigrants who came for work or family reasons.
In the EU-28, immigration prevalence was the same for 
male and female immigrants from the new member states 
(EU-13) in 2010. By comparison, among immigrants from 
EU-15 countries and from outside the EU, immigration 
prevalence was slightly higher for men than for women, 
although these gender gaps had declined significantly 
during the previous three decades. The share of university 
graduates among immigrants remained small in EU mem-
ber states, particularly when measured against those OECD 
countries (such as Australia and Canada) that actively 
attract highly skilled immigrants.
Integration and return: Bosnian refugees 
during the 1990s
We complement this review of broad trends in immigra-
tion with a comparative case study of Bosnian refugees 
from the 1992–95 Balkan war in five EU member states 
(section 1.3). The legal framework for labor market inte-
gration differed sharply across these member states: from 
early labor market access and permanent residence a few 
years later in Austria, to little access and enforced return 
after the war in Germany. Encouragingly, in all coun-
tries that did not oblige Bosnians to return after the war, 
integration outcomes are very favorable in terms of cur-
rent labor market participation, irrespective of how long 
it took Bosnians to gain labor market access. Even more 
importantly, perhaps, the educational attainment of the 
second generation (i.e. children born to Bosnian parents 
who arrived as refugees) is in line with children born to 
native parents. 
The experience of returnees to Bosnia after the Day-
ton peace accord is mixed. Many Bosnians from ethnic 
minority areas found it difficult to return to their homes 
because of continuing ethnic divisions. Overall, return-
ees struggle economically as much as the rest of the popu-
lation. With high unemployment in Bosnia, there is little 
evidence that returnees have brought home scarce human 
resources. Substantial remittances from the large Bos-
nian diaspora benefit not only their direct recipients, but 
also lead to more demand for local goods and services 
and higher real wages in Bosnia. In turn, they benefit all 
households with labor income. As a result, by hosting 
Bosnian immigrants, EU member states help to sustain a 
struggling economy where living conditions would other-
wise be far more difficult.
Global governance of refugee protection 
and challenges to the EU asylum system 
(chapter 2)
The surge in the number of asylum seekers who arrived in 
Europe in 2015 has highlighted the shortcomings of both 
the current international governance of refugee protec-
tion and the EU asylum system. Since early 2016, policy 
makers in the EU and several member states have imple-
mented a combination of measures – the closure of the 
Western Balkans migrant route and the EU agreement 
with Turkey to prevent irregular migration to Greece – 
that have brought down the number of new arrivals in 
Europe. However, the difficult situation in Turkey and the 
humanitarian emergencies along the central Mediterra-
nean migrant route, through which a persistently high 
number of asylum seekers arrive in Italy, raise the ques-
tion of whether the current policies are sustainable and 
sufficient. 
Irregular migrant routes to the EU are now firmly 
established from as far as West Africa, the Middle East, 
and Afghanistan. Irregular immigrants are driven by a 
wide range of motives, including violence and persecution 
at home as well as the quest to earn a higher income. In 
developing a response to irregular immigration, one start-
ing point must therefore be the international governance 
of refugee protection and the resulting obligations of the 
EU and its member states (section 2.1).
Global governance of refugee protection: 
The EU’s contribution
Refugee protection is governed by the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention, which grants protection in signatory states to 
individuals who are “persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion.” Those seeking protection must not be 
penalized for illegally entering the host country; nor must 
they be returned to a country where they would be at risk. 
This implies that persecuted individuals will be hosted in 
the first safe country that they physically manage to reach. 
The Convention recognizes that host countries may be 
over-burdened if they receive too many refugees, and calls 
on signatory states to share responsibility in this case. This 
is particularly relevant when refugees are hosted by low- 
and middle-income countries (as are most refugees world-
wide). There is a significant degree of financial burden 
sharing through the humanitarian assistance provided 
mainly by UN organizations (the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
World Food Programme), funded by high-income coun-
try governments.
However, available funds from national donors often 
fall short of needs and funding fluctuates even when avail-
able. Thus, we argue that the EU and its member states 
should contribute more to these humanitarian efforts. 
Furthermore, they should make their support more pre-
dictable and allow more flexibility so it can be used where 
the need is greatest. Apart from meeting a humanitar-
ian obligation, more – and more predictable – funding for 
humanitarian assistance would also help to avoid second-
ary movements of refugees in response to unbearable liv-
ing conditions in poor host countries. 
Beyond financial assistance, we also argue that EU 
member states should share responsibility with the coun-
tries of first asylum by receiving more refugees through 
‘third-country resettlement’ mediated by UNHCR, or by 
issuing humanitarian visas so that refugees can travel to 
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Europe safely. Given the decline in the number of irregu-
lar immigrants and asylum seekers in 2016, there should 
be room for member state initiatives along these lines. For 
refugees who cannot reach safe countries, EU member 
states should explore the provision of humanitarian visas.
The EU asylum system: Challenges
Responsibility sharing for refugees is a challenge not 
only globally, but also within the EU. The current asylum 
regime in the EU, embodied in successive Dublin regu-
lations, places most responsibility on the member state 
where a refugee arrives – usually irregularly, because no 
member state will currently issue an entry visa to an indi-
vidual who comes to apply for asylum. As developments 
in Greece and Italy demonstrate, this arrangement may 
be neither fair nor sustainable. That said, two fundamen-
tal challenges arise in devising a ‘better’ asylum regime 
for the EU.
First, the protection of refugees is a public good because 
most people value the fact that refugees have a right to 
protection (the 1951 Refugee Convention has been signed 
by 140 countries, representing most of the world’s peo-
ple). At the same time, most people prefer refugees to be 
hosted elsewhere and for someone else to bear the cost. 
At the global level, we deal with the public good nature 
of refugee protection by suggesting that the EU and its 
member states step up ‘voluntarily’ and contribute in line 
with the EU’s role as a major global player, even while 
there is no formal mechanism for responsibility shar-
ing. Within the EU, however, those countries that have 
received most of the recent wave of asylum seekers have 
made it clear that they consider their capacity to host ref-
ugees exhausted – be it by closing their border to refu-
gees (Sweden) or closing the Western Balkans migrant 
route and establishing the EU-Turkey agreement (Austria 
and Germany). Hence, a voluntary approach may not be 
sufficient.
Second, the asylum regime involves many policy 
areas that are closely interdependent: external human-
itarian assistance, EU external border security (includ-
ing through agreements with third countries), external 
border management, search and rescue missions in the 
Mediterranean, reception and registration of irregular 
immigrants, the processing of asylum applications, the 
economic and social integration of refugees, return of 
those whose application for asylum is rejected, and legal 
employment opportunities for immigrants that also ben-
efit refugees (section 2.2). Suboptimal efforts in one area 
– for example, too little humanitarian assistance for ref-
ugees outside the EU – frequently lead to higher costs in 
another area – for example, more irregular immigration 
and more applications for asylum. 
Apart from external humanitarian assistance, the Dub-
lin system leaves responsibility for all these policies with 
the member state of first arrival. Arguably, this is not 
equitable if one considers refugee protection a respon-
sibility to be borne by all EU member states according to 
their means. In practice, it is also not workable because 
there are strong incentives for countries of first arrival 
and immigrants to collude in undermining the arrange-
ment and shift costs onto other member states. 
For instance, if the country of first arrival fails to regis-
ter (in practice, fingerprint) irregular immigrants and does 
not provide for their subsistence, these immigrants may 
attempt to take advantage of the absence of border controls 
within the Schengen area and move to another EU mem-
ber state that provides better reception conditions. In the 
absence of a coordinated approach, the main destination 
countries may feel compelled to adopt unilateral measures 
to control the migration flows. Thus, a race to the bottom 
among member states in terms of the reception conditions 
for asylum seekers may follow. As it happened, several 
member states (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Austria) 
reintroduced ID checks on their Schengen borders along 
the migrant routes to discourage irregular crossings and 
Hungary fortified its non-Schengen borders with several 
neighbors.
The EU asylum system: Pathways for reform
Therefore, a sustainable asylum system in the EU will have 
to be built on i) a strong set of common rules (to ensure opti-
mal efforts in all linked policy areas); ii) as needed, effec-
tive monitoring and enforcement by the European Com-
mission to ensure that member states play their assigned 
roles; and iii) substantially more financial burden sharing 
along with administrative and logistical support for mem-
ber states of first arrival (section 2.3). Since legal wrangling 
is seldom helpful in achieving the genuine cooperation 
that is needed for a functional EU asylum system, much 
will depend on designing rules that are incentive-compat-
ible for all actors, rather than relying excessively on top-
down enforcement by the European Commission.
At present, there is a common set of rules that cover 
many aspects of the asylum regime. Yet, enforcement of 
member state obligations has often been weak, such as 
when member states of first entry have failed to register 
newly arriving asylum seekers properly or when ‘inland’ 
member states have refused to participate in the limited, 
agreed-upon redistribution of asylum seekers from mem-
ber states of first entry. 
Financial and logistical burden sharing within the EU 
is far from adequate. In the EU budget, funds to support 
member states that receive many asylum seekers are quite 
small relative to the costs incurred by those member states. 
Achieving a satisfactory level of funding that would allow 
the EU to offset a seriously disproportionate burden on 
an individual member state would require a substantial 
increase in EU resources. Technically, this may not even be 
possible before the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
starts in 2021. Politically, it would require a unanimous 
decision by EU member states, rather than a qualified 
majority like the existing reallocation schemes for asy-
lum seekers from Greece and Italy. As such, a fundamental 
reform of the EU asylum system will require wide-ranging 
policy discussions that engage all member states construc-
tively, including those that have so far hesitated to become 
more involved in protecting refugees. In the meantime, 
more financial and logistical support from less affected 
member states to those on the external border may need to 
be provided on an ad hoc basis. 
The EU has recently begun to negotiate agreements 
with neighborhood countries (including Turkey) and 
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African countries along the irregular migrant routes to 
Europe on a set of measures to curb irregular immigra-
tion. In the case of Turkey, the EU provides substantial 
humanitarian assistance for the refugees Turkey is already 
hosting. In addition, there is limited resettlement for ref-
ugees from Turkey to EU member states, in exchange for 
Turkey curbing the activities of people smugglers and tak-
ing back irregular migrants from Greece who went there 
from Turkey. Cooperation with countries in the neighbor-
hood is essential to improving security along a maritime 
border where irregular migrants cannot be stopped phys-
ically without putting their lives at risk. In extending this 
approach to more countries of transit and asylum, there 
is a need to be clearer about the conditions under which a 
partner country can be considered safe for returning asy-
lum seekers, and about the legal status of such agreements 
and the possible involvement of the European Parliament 
in concluding them.
The European Commission has additionally proposed 
a new mandatory scheme to redistribute asylum seekers 
systematically from countries of first entry to other EU 
member states. While this scheme is intended as a major 
step toward more equitable responsibility sharing, there 
appears to be little support from member states. This may 
not only reflect an unwillingness to address an unpop-
ular issue; the Commission proposal also largely fails to 
address spillovers from other policy areas and incentive 
issues. For example, inland member states would have lit-
tle effective control over whether ‘enough’ effort is made 
to limit irregular immigration by working with neighbor-
hood countries to secure the external EU border and com-
bat people-smuggling. At the same time, member states 
on the external border would still be expected to receive 
and host all asylum seekers until some (those with a high 
chance of recognition as refugees) are redistributed to 
other member states. 
A two-step approach may help to resolve this impasse. 
First, financial and logistical support for member states 
on the external border may be increased to ease their bur-
den. In particular, the existing ‘hotspot’ approach may be 
extended to include EU-operated reception centers where 
asylum seekers would remain until recognized as refu-
gees (or obliged to return to their countries of origin). Sec-
ond, inland member states may be encouraged to volun-
tarily resettle some recognized refugees directly from the 
hotspots. 
Immigrant integration in the EU (chapter 3)
A large body of empirical economic research demon-
strates that the economic effects of immigration on the 
resident population in the destination country are usu-
ally small on aggregate. The underlying economic logic 
is that the wages earned by working immigrants reflect 
the extra output of the economy. If immigrants compete 
in the labor market with particular groups of residents 
(such as earlier immigrants), these groups may experience 
lower wages and worse employment opportunities (while 
other groups likely benefit). If immigrants do not work 
but receive social transfers, there may be a negative fis-
cal effect on the host society. While this effect is typically 
found to be small for immigrants overall, it may become 
significant for groups with unfavorable socioeconomic 
characteristics for labor market integration or if many 
immigrants enter a destination country in a short time 
(such as asylum seekers in Austria, Germany, and Swe-
den in late 2015 and early 2016). It is also conceivable that 
scarce local resources (e.g. housing, natural and environ-
mental resources) could experience excess demand so that 
their quality deteriorates permanently, although there is 
little evidence that this is occurring at the prevailing lev-
els of international migration.
Given the positive effects of immigration on migrants 
themselves (otherwise, they would not migrate in the first 
place) and on their countries of origin (through financial 
and other remittances), we take it as given in this Assess-
ment Report that immigration is normally beneficial over-
all if immigrants join the labor force rather than the wel-
fare state. With this in mind, we concentrate on the labor 
market integration of immigrants. We begin by review-
ing broad trends across the EU and then focus on the early 
experiences of recently arrived refugees in Germany and 
the associated lessons. 
Labor market integration
In most EU member states, there is a gap in employment 
rates and income between immigrants and the native pop-
ulation of prime working age (25 to 54 years old; section 
3.1). This gap cannot be explained by differences in edu-
cational attainments or age composition; it is most prom-
inent among immigrants from outside the EU, especially 
women. The reason for immigration plays a large role: 
those who come for family reunification or international 
protection represent the most vulnerable group.  
The employment and income gaps reflect a similar gap 
in education for the first generation of immigrants: the 
share of the tertiary-educated is much lower than for the 
majority population, especially among women. Encourag-
ingly, the second generation catches up with the majority 
population in most EU member states.
Labor market integration takes much longer for refu-
gees than for those immigrants who first come to the des-
tination country to work or study (section 3.3). Whereas 
the latter reach their long-term employment level (which 
may still be lower than for the majority population) after 
at most a few years, refugees take around 10 years to catch 
up with other immigrants.
We identify several major reasons for the slow transition 
of refugees into employment. For a start, many refugees 
leave their homes suddenly because of persecution or vio-
lence and are hence unprepared for the destination country 
in terms of language and vocational skills. In addition, many 
refugees must wait several months or even years for their 
legal status to be recognized. In the meantime, they have few 
incentives to invest in country-specific human capital as they 
might be asked to leave the destination country. Also, they 
may not have access to relevant courses until their legal sta-
tus is confirmed. Moreover, even when there are suitable jobs 
on offer and there are refugees willing and qualified to take 
them, ‘matching frictions’ between refugees and the local 
firms complicate the job search and hiring process. 
We report evidence from a field experiment in Munich 
that strongly suggests that matching frictions matter for 
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the job search process of refugees. Providing support 
through personal counselling and facilitating the exchange 
of information between candidates and potential employ-
ers may considerably shorten the time required to find a 
job. Furthermore, rapid asylum procedures to establish 
legal certainty as well as early access to language classes 
and vocational training are helpful. It is also worth explor-
ing whether successful labor market integration should 
enable an asylum seeker to remain in the country of des-
tination for good even if his or her application for asylum 
is rejected. 
Residents’ attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration
Successful integration depends not only on the socioeco-
nomic characteristics of immigrants, but also on residents’ 
attitudes toward immigrants and immigration (section 3.2). 
As voters, residents determine immigration policies; as 
members of the host society who interact with immigrants 
in manifold ways, residents influence the labor market and 
social integration of immigrants. 
Most individuals who are skeptical about immigration or 
immigrants are not primarily concerned about a negative 
economic impact that they might suffer themselves. Rather, 
many skeptics are concerned about how their ‘peers’ are 
affected – whom they define on an ethnic, rather than civic 
basis while adopting a national, rather than European per-
spective. While such collective identities and worldviews are 
sticky, they are not inalterable: they are affected by social 
interactions across the borders of ‘in groups,’ and ethnici-
ty-based collective identities become less prevalent as edu-
cational attainment increases. Importantly, they can be 
‘activated’ or ‘mediated’ by political discourse and media 
reporting on immigrants.
We derive three guidelines from this analysis for respon-
sible societal conversation on immigration. First, it is helpful 
to provide the public with nuanced factual knowledge. While 
attitudes are driven by people’s beliefs, beliefs are informed 
by public debates. Second, policy makers are always well-ad-
vised to take the concerns of the public seriously, but if con-
cerns are little more than ethnicity-based identity talk, then 
such talk should be exposed for what it is, namely essentially 
racist, and should be dealt with like other extremist utter-
ances. Third, policy makers should promote opportunities 
for positive contact between immigrants and the majority 
population, because such contact has been shown to lead to 
more balanced and positive views about the ‘other.’
Migration and development (chapter 4)
The migration flows we observe are the outcome of decisions 
by millions of individuals and their families on whether to 
migrate (and if so, where), remain in the country of ori-
gin, or (after migration) return home. Potential migrants 
weigh multiple tangible and intangible benefits of migration 
against the costs (section 4.1). Similarly, migrants and their 
families decide how much time and money to invest in tan-
gible and intangible assets specific to their host and home 
countries, affecting their economic and social integration in 
the countries of destination.
Depending on the context, complications may arise 
in the process of making decisions about migration and 
return. Potential migrants often have only limited infor-
mation about travel risks (say, current conditions in Libya) 
or what their lives would be like in possible countries of 
destination, including their likely incomes and cost of 
living. The available information from media or visiting 
migrants may also be distorted. In the case of refugees, the 
original decision to leave home is typically driven by the 
experience of persecution or violence, but the subsequent 
decision to move on from the first country of asylum (for 
example, to the EU) is subject to a similar cost–benefit cal-
culus as most other migration decisions. 
While many individuals from low-income countries 
would like to migrate to high-income countries, there are 
large differences in migration intentions between similarly 
poor countries: fewer individuals want to migrate when 
a country’s prospects for economic growth and social 
development are perceived as better. Combined with the 
intangible costs of migration (for instance, being sepa-
rated from family and friends), this explains why observed 
emigration prevalence starts to decline when per-capita 
income is only approximately a third of the level of poten-
tial, rich destination countries. For those who decide to 
migrate, it is a life-changing decision. Several recent ini-
tiatives to fortify borders physically through walls and 
fences will make irregular migration costlier, but will not 
– on their own – change the calculus of migrants suffi-
ciently to reduce irregular migrant flows to a significant 
extent. 
In the ongoing public debate, there are demands to 
reinvent development assistance to eliminate the causes 
of irregular migration from poor countries, presumably 
including poverty and bad governance. However, the rela-
tionship between development assistance and migration 
is complex (section 4.2). Like other international financial 
flows, development assistance creates linkages between 
donors and recipients, reducing international transac-
tion costs and, potentially, the costs of irregular migra-
tion. Still, if development assistance succeeds in rais-
ing real incomes and improving economic prospects, it 
may reduce the incentive to migrate – though only if real 
income surpasses a critical threshold (see above). 
Finally, many migrants maintain close ties with fam-
ily and friends in countries of origin even while their eco-
nomic and social integration is progressing well in their 
host countries. Having close economic and social ties in 
two societies has been characterized as migrant trans-
nationalism. Apart from financial remittances to family 
and friends, transnationalism may also lead to “cultural, 
social, and political remittances”: the transfer of values 
that migrants acquire in their host countries to family, 
friends, and society at large in their countries of origin 
(section 4.3).
While in the past the empirical evidence on social 
remittances consisted mainly of a well-supported narra-
tive about how migrants transfer values back home, more 
solid quantitative relationships are now also reported. The 
emerging research literature shows that migration can 
affect fertility behavior, the social status of women, and 
political attitudes in migrants’ countries of origin. Empir-
ical papers often focus on countries of origin with emi-
grants in different destination countries that have differ-
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ent value systems. For example, fertility rates in Turkey 
were higher in those regions with high emigration preva-
lence toward the Gulf region (rather than toward Western 
Europe). In Moldova, municipalities with high migration 
prevalence toward Western Europe (rather than Russia) 
saw a higher vote share for political parties that support 
the EU.
Insights to guide the design of policies 
 related to asylum and migration 
Our analysis demonstrates, above all, that a systemic 
approach is required to design effective policies for asy-
lum and migration in the EU and beyond. It is true that 
refugee protection and labor migration differ conceptu-
ally and in the way they are governed. Nevertheless, labor 
migrants from many parts of the world enter the EU irreg-
ularly and apply for asylum in the hope of gaining access 
to the labor market, while individuals threatened by per-
secution or violence may migrate to safety with a work 
visa. The effects of much-discussed policy interventions 
such as fortified borders or innovative forms of develop-
ment assistance depend on myriad factors that relate to 
the way potential migrants decide whether to migrate and 
when, as well as economic conditions in the countries of 
origin and destination. 
Furthermore, migration needs to be governed and reg-
ulated. If asylum seekers were free to choose their host 
country, potential destination countries would probably 
offer progressively worse reception conditions, resulting 
in a race to the bottom. If many immigrants arrive in a 
country within a short time span, they may overstretch 
limited local resources, such as housing, infrastructure, 
education systems, and welfare state services. Curbing 
irregular migration through better border enforcement 
while protecting refugees will require the enforcement 
of rules in close cooperation between countries of ori-
gin, transit, and destination. Destination countries need 
to have confidence that they can effectively control immi-
gration before they will consider expanding legal immi-
gration opportunities even for individuals who possess 
the necessary language and vocational skills to succeed in 
the labor market (and not become dependent on the wel-
fare state). 
In addition, new forms of international governance and 
cooperation need to be developed around the notion of 
joint, but differentiated, solidarity. For example, part-
nerships for refugees in non-EU countries would bring 
together high-income countries that provide substantially 
higher and more predictable funding for humanitarian 
and development assistance, and developing host coun-
tries that grant refugees a firm legal status and facilitate 
their economic and social integration in ways that can 
be monitored and verified. The countries involved would 
share a commitment to protecting refugees globally, but 
contribute in different ways according to what they con-
sider financially, logistically, and politically feasible. 
Similarly, the functioning of the EU asylum sys-
tem needs to be improved. Yet, in the short to medium 
run, there is unlikely to be a grand new scheme with key 
tasks centralized at the EU level, additional EU tax rev-
enue, and mandatary quotas for member states to host 
refugees. Rather, the present Dublin system will remain 
the point of reference, backed up by a credible threat of 
Schengen area and other borders being closed to irregu-
lar migrants. Under these circumstances, inland member 
states can effectively share the burden of member states of 
first arrival by helping to operate reception centers for asy-
lum seekers, with each member state contributing accord-
ing to its means (financially, by providing staff, by reset-
tling recognized refugees within the EU, by offering work 
visas to individuals who might otherwise apply for asy-
lum, etc.). As with other forms of joint but differentiated 
solidarity, it would be helpful to have a review mechanism 
to assess the contributions of all participants and a forum 
where participants can engage in a constructive conver-
sation on how to develop responsibility sharing further.
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L arge-scale immigration from culturally diverse coun-tries of origin, even when successful in economic terms, may affect a society’s social capital and the 
host population’s sense of cultural and national identity 
along with their attitudes to immigrants and immigration 
policy. The process of adopting new collective identities 
that incorporate diversity and multiculturalism may prove 
challenging – particularly when large-scale immigration 
occurs in the absence of a well-defined policy on immigra-
tion and integration, as it did in much of Western Europe 
during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. 
In this chapter, we recall the far-reaching changes in 
emigration and immigration in Western Europe during 
the last half century. Thus, we provide a historical perspec-
tive on the challenges that European societies now face as 
they address ethnic and cultural diversity and develop col-
1. Immigration and diversity 
in the EU in perspective
E U member states have had diverse experiences with migration over the course of the last century. Some, including France and the U.K., have seen immigra-
tion early on because of their colonial histories; others 
have pursued strategies of isolation or employed immi-
gration only intermittently as a labor market policy 
instrument (Germany comes to mind); yet others have 
always been ethnically diverse because of their geograph-
ical location (Austria). However, in the face of growing 
migration in Europe and across the globe, even coun-
tries previously unaccustomed to large immigration (e.g. 
Spain) have recently experienced rising inflows of for-
eigners and will therefore need comprehensive policies 
to address the resulting challenges. In order to assess the 
current prevalence of emigration and immigration in the 
EU and put it into historical perspective, this section pro-
vides a statistical overview of past and present patterns 
of migration. 
An empirical analysis of migration starts out with the 
challenge of identifying adequate data. As migration sta-
tistics are usually collected by individual destination 
1.1 Immigration and 
emigration in Western Europe 
since 1960 Lead author: David Benček
countries that do not necessarily apply the same classi-
fications and definitions, inconsistencies arise between 
different sources of data. That is especially an issue when 
comparing statistics across countries and over time. One 
dataset that was created to overcome this lack of con-
tinuity and harmonization is the World Bank’s Global 
Bilateral Migration Database (Özden et al. 2011). In its 
current version, it consists of decennial matrices from 
1960 to 2010 plus data for 2013. In addition to harmo-
nizing a large number of population records, this dataset 
is also nearly unique in offering bilateral data between 
pairs of origin and destination countries worldwide. 
This allows for the kind of disaggregated analyses and 
close-up examinations of migration patterns that are 
necessary to assess the EU’s prominence in an age of 
global migration.
According to World Bank data, by 2013 the global 
stock of migrants had increased by a factor of more than 
2.6 since 1960 and amounted to about 247 million peo-
ple. While large parts of this increase must be attributed 
to intraregional migration, especially between devel-
lective identities fit for the 21st century. We highlight the 
diminishing importance of Western European diasporas, 
mainly in the U.S., and the emergence of new migration 
corridors, both within Europe and into Western Europe 
from other continents (section 1.1). We also highlight the 
heterogeneity of immigration motives among immigrants 
in Western Europe, including work, study, family unifica-
tion, and protection from persecution (section 1.2). 
Lastly, we take a close look at one immigrant commu-
nity – Bosnians who fled from the war at home during the 
early 1990s and received protection in Western Europe. 
Their contrasting experiences with labor market integra-
tion in several EU countries and return to Bosnia after 
the war (voluntary or enforced) serve as points of refer-
ence for many current debates in the field of asylum- 
related policies.
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Figure 1.1 Immigration and emigration stocks in EU member states 1960–2013 
percentage of population by country and origin/destination
Source: Own calculations based on data from the World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database and World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix 2010/2013.
oping countries, Western Europe experienced a simi-
lar rise in immigrant numbers: the total migrant stock 
of EU-15 countries increased from 28 million in 1960 to 
62 million in 2013 (for EU-28 countries, from 37 million 
to 70 million). In addition, the bilateral migration links 
of EU-15 countries with the rest of the world have grown 
more diverse in the past 60 years. 
These highly aggregated figures illustrate the central 
role that Western Europe has acquired in global migra-
tion networks. In the process, numerous EU member 
states have turned from net emigration countries into 
net immigration countries (Figure 1.1). For instance, 
Belgium registered a high and further growing share of 
immigrants early on during the 1960s, especially from 
the EU-15. At the same time, due to decolonization, Bel-
gium saw a sharp drop in the number of emigrants rela-
tive to its resident population. Other countries, such as 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain or the United King-
dom, have similarly become net immigration countries, 
with immigrants mainly from outside the EU-15. Follow-
ing their accession to the EU during the early 2000s, most 
new member states in Central and Eastern Europe have 
experienced a steady increase in the number of emigrants 
departing for the EU-15.
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Overall, the prevalence of migration within Europe is 
higher than ever and this trend is accompanied by increas-
ing numbers of immigrants from the rest of the world. 
Due to its bilateral (country-pair) nature, the World Bank 
data allow for a more detailed look at the distinct migra-
tion corridors that have developed during the last half 
century. In order to focus on the most important corri-
dors, we limit our analysis in two ways: 
•  We look only at the migrant relationships of EU-15 
countries: The EU-15 are responsible for about 88 
percent of the entire EU’s migrant stock (emigrants 
and immigrants combined) and are therefore part of 
most major migration channels in the EU-28.
•  We limit the number of bilateral migrant stocks to 
ensure analytical tractability: We include the largest 
bilateral migrant stocks that cover 50 percent of total 
migrants in each year. The distribution of bilateral 
migration stocks is rather skewed such that a small 
number of bilateral corridors account for a large pro-
portion of the overall migrant stock (Figure 1.2). For 
example, the largest 1 percent of bilateral migrant 
stocks covers 63 percent of migrants to and from the 
EU-15 in 1960 and 38 percent in 2013. Thus, while 
migrant stocks are still heavily concentrated, the 
degree of concentration has declined over time. 
The chord diagrams in Figure 1.3 depict the main migra-
tion corridors in which EU-15 countries are involved, as 
well as their evolution over the last half century. In 1960, 
2000 2013
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Figure 1.2 Distribution of bilateral migrant stocks 
for EU15 countries, by decreasing size and year
Source: Own calculations based on data from the World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database and World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix 2010/2013.
historic emigration to the ‘New World’ (North and South 
America, Australia) still showed up through high num-
bers of emigrants there from EU-15 countries (3.9 mil-
lion in the U.S. alone). Within Europe, the consequences 
of population displacements in the aftermath of World 
War II and the beginnings of decolonization were appar-
ent. While about 750,000 Belgians still lived in their soon-
to-be former colony of the Congo, emigrants from Alge-
ria had started to move to France. Among the German 
population, the largest foreign-born groups came from 
Poland and the Czech Republic – mostly, expellees of Ger-
man origin.1
By 1980, new migration corridors had been created 
through ‘guest worker’ programs in Europe, which had 
run until the mid-1970s, and subsequent immigration 
by family members. Prominently, there were 1.7 million 
Turkish immigrants in Germany. Smaller bilateral stocks 
reflected migrant communities from southern Europe 
(Portugal, Spain, and Italy) in northern Europe (Germany 
and France). Ireland experienced strong emigration from 
1960 to 1980, particularly to the United Kingdom and the 
U.S. 
In 2000, the effects of the Balkan wars became vis-
ible from significant numbers of Croatian and Bosnian 
migrants in Germany and Austria. The collapse of the iso-
lationist regime in Albania led to the emergence of Alba-
nian migrant communities in Italy, Greece, and Germany. 
By 2013, several additional large corridors had emerged. 
Spain became an important destination during a macro-
economic and construction boom that lasted until 2008, 
with large immigrant communities from Morocco, South 
1 The inclusion of ethnic Ger-
man expellees in this migration 
dataset demonstrates the chal-
lenges that Özden et al. (2011) 
faced when harmonizing many 
data sources over several deca-
des amid shifting country bor-
ders as well as the dissolution 
and creation of entire states. 
Generally, the data refer to the 
countries as they exist today, 
even though their borders 
may have shifted substantially 
or they may not have existed 
before the Balkan wars or the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Irrespective of shifts in the poli-
tical landscape, data from geo-
graphical regions are mapped 
onto today’s countries to allow 
for comparisons over time and 
avoid the artificial creation of 
‘new’ migrant stocks at politi-
cal junctures.

























































1960: 14 million migrants

























































1980: 18.2 million migrants









































































2000: 22.6 million migrants


















































































2013: 30.5 million migrants
Figure 1.3 Bilateral Migrant Stocks 1960–2013
Source: Own calculations based on data from the World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database and World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix 2010/2013.
America, and Romania. Historical legacies were behind 
the large number of mostly ethnic German immigrants 
from Kazakhstan and Russia.
Overall, the prevalence of immigration has increased 
substantially in Western Europe and immigrants come 
from increasingly diverse countries of origin. However, 
due to their different migration histories, EU member 
states are still experiencing the latest wave of immigra-
tion at different levels. While some member states have 
become major destinations for several countries of ori-
gin and more than 1 in 10 residents are immigrants, other 
member states, especially in Eastern Europe, remain only 
mildly affected. Such regional differences extend not only 
to the prevalence of immigration and emigration, but also 
to migrants’ countries of origin.
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D uring the last half century, the number of immi-grants in the old EU member states (the EU-15) has grown sharply. At the same time, immigrants 
have also become much more diverse not only in terms 
of their countries of origin (section 1.1), but also in other 
respects. While most immigrants face the same broad 
challenges – learning the local language, finding work 
commensurate with their skills, securing a good educa-
tion for their children – how they manage them depends 
on their socioeconomic characteristics along with the 
sociological, political, and economic factors that brought 
them to their host country. In this section, we highlight 
the diversity of immigrants and immigration experiences 
in key dimensions as a background particularly for inte-
gration experiences and popular attitudes to immigrants 
and immigration in chapter 3.
Across the EU, there is a divide between the old mem-
ber states (EU-15) with a high prevalence of immigration 
and the new member states (EU-13) where immigration 
1.2 Diversity of immigrants  
and immigration experiences
 
 Lead authors: Mehtap Akgüç and David Benček
Figure 1.4 Non-EU Migrants 2011  
percentage of population born outside the EU, by NUTS-2 region
Source: Eurostat, cens_11cobe_r2; GISCO - Eurostat (European Commission); Administrative boundaries: 
© EuroGeographics, UN-FAO, Turkstat; own calculations.
is mostly a recent phenomenon and still at a much lower 
level (see Figure 1.1 above). However, regional disparities 
in immigration prevalence exist not only across countries. 
Immigrants from outside the EU are also strongly con-
centrated even within countries at the level of NUTS 2 
regions (Figure 1.4). Apart from the fact that there are pro-
nounced differences across regions, the pattern of regional 
concentrations represents many factors, including histor-
ical legacies: East Germany (with almost no foreign-born 
residents) vs West Germany (with immigration from Tur-
key and former Yugoslavia since the 1960s); the Baltic 
States, with many individuals born in other former Soviet 
republics; and the South of France, with many return-
ees following the decolonization of North Africa. Lega-
cies apart, foreign-born residents from outside the EU are 
especially prominent in highly urbanized and industrial-
ized regions, including London and the Midlands, Paris, 
Frankfurt, Oslo, and Stockholm. 
By contrast, the prevalence of immigration within the 
EU is much more even across regions, at least within 
countries (Figure 1.5). It is also lower, overall, which may 
be surprising because there are no restrictions on labor 
mobility within the EU.2 Again, historical legacies mat-
ter. In Germany, the high prevalence of immigration 
reflects both post-World War II expellees from Poland 
and the Czech Republic (throughout Germany) and labor 
migrants from southern Europe since the 1960s (see Fig-
ure 1.3). Also, the European institutions in Luxembourg 
and Brussels have clearly left their marks on the com-
position of the local population. Switzerland became an 
attractive destination for emigrants from many EU coun-
tries, including high-income ones like Germany, after it 
opened its labor market to EU-15 citizens in 2007. Ireland 
and Iceland attracted many migrants from the EU, includ-
ing from the new member states, during the economic 
boom that preceded their 2008 financial crises. Overall, 
these patterns suggest that immigration in the EU is still 
largely driven by income differences between countries of 
origin and destination, rather than the result of integrated 
labor markets between countries at similar income levels. 
Among the latter, presumably, migration costs (in terms 
of languages, legal frameworks, tax and social insurance 
issues) are still so large as to outweigh any benefits from 
access to a larger market.
Immigrants’ original motivations do not differ much 
across destination countries in the EU, nor between 
immigrants from the rest of the EU vs the rest of the 
world (Figure 1.6). Among working-age immigrants in 
the EU family reasons predominate throughout, although 
they are particularly prominent among immigrants from 
non-EU countries (where this is the only migration chan-
nel open to many citizens). For citizens of many non-EU 
countries with diasporas in Europe, family unification has 
2 Citizens of some new mem-
ber states (among the EU-13) 
were still subject to transitory 
restrictions on their mobility 
for work in some old member 
states in 2011.
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Figure 1.5 EU Migrants 2011 
percentage of population born in another EU country, by NUTS-2 region
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat (cens_11cobe_r2 and the Geographic Information System of the Commission – GISCO); administrative 
boundaries derived from EuroGeographics (© EuroGeographics), UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and Turkstat.
long been the main migration channel to Europe. Often it 
involves marriage with a spouse of a similar ethnic back-
ground who already lives in the EU. Many of these immi-
grants have found social and economic integration in the 
EU challenging as their knowledge of the local language 
tends to be limited and they have few educational or voca-
tional qualifications that would be useful in the labor mar-
ket of the destination country. Those who have originally 
come to seek protection are from outside the EU (natu-
rally) and live mostly in a few EU member states (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, and Sweden). More immigrants from 
within than outside the EU had already found a job before 
migrating. Although most new EU member states have 
seen little immigration so far (Figures 1.4 and 1.5), the 
prevalence of emigration from the EU-13 has increased 
substantially since 1990, when Communist regimes col-
lapsed and citizens became free to emigrate (Figure 1.7 
below). The increase accelerated from 2000 until 2010, as 
growing numbers of EU-13 citizens gradually benefitted 
from free labor mobility within the EU. While the emigra-
tion rates for men were higher than for women until 2000, 
women had nearly caught up with men in 2010, reflect-
ing similar trends in other world regions (Gabaccia 2016). 
By contrast, emigration rates for the EU-15 countries 
have been similar for men and women since 1990 and prac-
tically stagnant at between 4 and 5 percent.3 With emigra-
tion rates of approximately 6 percent in 2010 in the EU-13, 
the decision of whether to emigrate or not has become one 
that many individuals in EU-13 countries take at least once 
in their lives. While one might expect that benefitting from 
free labor mobility may cause Eastern Europeans to adopt a 
positive attitude not only towards the EU, but also towards 
immigrants and immigration, the latter does not seem to 
be the case, at least for young people (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2017). We discuss the extent and drivers of popular support 
for EU-wide asylum policies further in chapter 2. 
3 Emigration rates across coun-
tries in the rest of the world 
vary widely, with very low rates 
in populous countries such 
as China and India depressing 
the average for the group as 
a whole.
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Other Work, job found before migrating
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Figure 1.6 Motivation to migrate 
percentage of total foreign-born migrants aged 15-64 by reason, origin and destination
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, ad hoc module 2014 (Migration and Labour Market).
When we consider the gender balance of immigrants in 
the EU-28, a similar trend emerges (Figure 1.8). The shares 
of female immigrants from the rest of the world as well as 
from the EU-13 caught up with the corresponding shares 
of male immigrants around 2000 and have been almost 
identical since then. Growing employment of immigrant 
women from Romania and Ukraine in care-giving, espe-
cially in southern Europe, has probably helped to sustain 
that trend.
Finally, the skill composition of immigrants, measured 
by educational attainment, varies substantially across EU 
member states (Figure 1.9). We rely on the IAB (Institute 
for Employment Research) brain-drain data (Brücker, 
Capuano, and Marfouk 2013), which distinguish three 
levels of education: low-skilled (no schooling, primary, 
and lower secondary education); medium-skilled (upper 
secondary education with a high school leaving certificate 
or equivalent) and high-skilled (tertiary education with 
higher than a high school leaving certificate or equiva-
lent). Not surprisingly, OECD countries that have pur-
sued an active, selective immigration policy, such as Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S., have attracted 
high numbers of high-skilled migrants, both relative to 
their resident populations and to total immigration. By 
contrast, the share of high-skilled immigrants in the res-
ident population is small in many EU member states on 
the European Continent, such as Austria, France, the 
Netherlands, and Germany. These destination coun-
tries set themselves on a path for predominantly low- and 
medium-skilled immigration when they targeted those 
groups in their controlled labor migration schemes (e.g. 
 guest-worker programs) from the early 1960s until the 
mid-1970s. Although these programs were halted when 
labor markets deteriorated after 1973, subsequent fam-
ily unification brought in more immigrants with similar 
education levels.
Thus, although most immigrants face some broadly sim-
ilar challenges, their immigration and integration experi-
ences (see section 3.1) as well as their economic impact on 
their destination countries are diverse. In this report, we 
address pressing issues in EU asylum and immigration 
policies that relate to important groups of immigrants and 
residents. While we aim at relevance, we will also seek to 
be clear about the limits of where our analyses apply.
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Figure 1.8 Immigrant Stock in EU28 1980–2010 
percentage of total population aged 25 or older,  
by broad qroup of origin an gender
Source: Own calculations based on IAB brain-drain data (Brücker et al. 2013) and UN Popula-
tion Division Statistics.
Source: Own calculations based on IAB brain-drain data (Brücker et al. 2013) and UN Popula-
tion Division Statistics.
Figure 1.9 Immigrant Stock 1980–2010  
percentage of population aged 25 or older by skill level
Source: Own calculations based on Brücker et al. (2013) and UN Population Division Statistics. 
Figure 1.7 Emigration Rates 1980–2010  
population-weighted average proportion of migrants over the 
pre-migration population by gender and broad group of origin
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W hile the number of refugees on the move within the EU in 2015 may well have been the highest since World War II, European countries have 
experienced similar episodes in the recent past. 
The refugee inflow of 2015 in many ways resembled what 
a number of countries experienced at the beginning of the 
1990s when the collapse of communist Yugoslavia led to a 
series of regional wars. Over the course of a brief period, 
1.2 million Bosnians fled their country as war refugees and 
more than half a million sought refuge in Western Europe, 
a situation similar to today’s (Valenta and Ramet 2011; 
Valenta and Strabac 2013). Moreover, both refugee waves 
affected the same set of countries: Austria, Denmark, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and Sweden all saw a large abso-
lute and relative influx of refugees in 2015 and between 
1992 and 1995, when most Bosnians arrived in Western 
Europe (Table 1.1).
Furthermore, not only the scale of refugee flows, but 
also the policy debates at the time resemble the present 
situation: prominent issues included international bur-
den sharing (then mostly among European countries) and 
1.3 Displacement, integration, 
and return: Lessons from  
Bosnian refugees in the 1990s
 
 Lead authors: Mikkel Barslund and Lars Ludolph
what level of support and integration to provide to refu-
gees in reception countries.
In a recent comparative study, Barslund et al. (2016)4 
trace the integration experience of Bosnian refugees in 
the five main host countries to draw lessons for the cur-
rent wave of refugees. Arguably, integration is inherently a 
slow-moving process. Looking closely at Bosnian refugees 
two decades after the end of the Bosnian war allows for a 
more long-term view on integration outcomes.
The five host countries make for a particularly interest-
ing comparison because they differed in important ways 
when the Bosnians arrived (Figure 1.10).
Sweden had just entered what would turn out to be a 
prolonged economic crisis. Unemployment was high in 
Denmark too, but the subsequent path was one of falling 
unemployment rates and high growth for the following 
decade. The Netherlands as well as Austria were running 
at or close to full employment, while Germany was enter-
ing the period of being labelled ‘the sick man of Europe’.
This situation was reflected to some extent in the 
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Figure 1.10 Unemployment rates at the time of the Bosnian war  
in percent 
Source: Own elaboration based the IMF World Economic Outlook.
4 This study which was con-
ducted within the framework 
of the MEDAM project forms 
the basis of section 1.3.






Austria Denmark Netherlands Sweden
Immigrants <1993 Immigrants 1993-1998 Natives
Table 1.1 Overview of registered refugees from Bosnia  
and Herzegovina, 1992–95
Sources: Barslund et al. (2016), Valenta and Ramet (2011) and the OECD population database; population data 
from 1992.
Sources: Own elaboration based on Angrist and Kugler (2003) and the Eurostat Labor Force Survey. 
Receiving country Number of registered refugees from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Number of refugees from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as a share of the 




The Netherlands 22,00 0.1
Denmark 17,00 0.3
nian war. Refugees only received temporary protection at 
the time of their arrival in all Western European coun-
tries. This was mainly a political compromise (Black and 
Koser 1999). For host countries, it was the only way of 
dealing with the large influx of refugees without amend-
ing or overburdening their asylum systems. 
At the same time, the UNHCR wanted to push the issue 
of burden sharing of refugees across Europe. Tempo-
rary protection left the door open to involve those West-
ern countries that had not initially experienced an influx 
of refugees displaced from former Yugoslavia. This strat-
egy turned out to be largely unsuccessful and no reallo-
cation mechanism was agreed upon. An additional con-
cern was whether granting refugees permanent residency 
upon arrival would institutionalize the widespread ethnic 
cleansing going on in parts of Bosnia.  
Although all host countries initially provided only tem-
porary protection, there were large differences in the legal 
and institutional approach to dealing with the influx of 
Bosnian refugees. Three broad categories emerged among 
the five countries studied in Barslund et al. (2016). Sweden 
granted refugees permanent residency and labour market 
access shortly after arrival and any repatriation was vol-
untary. Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands converted 
the initial temporary asylum (with limited labor market 
access) into permanent residency with full labour market 
Figure 1.11 Employment rate of immigrants from former Yugoslavia and host population in 
1998 in various host countries  
in percent
access after a few years. In these countries, although there 
was some coercion initially, repatriation policies in prac-
tice focused on support for voluntary returnees (Valenta 
and Strabac 2013). Finally, Germany never intended to 
host Bosnian refugees permanently and repatriated the 
vast majority of them on a mandatory basis as soon as the 
war ended.
Against this background, one might expect very dif-
ferent outcomes regarding integration in the medium to 
long run. However, Germany apart, the overall story is 
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one of successful integration in all host countries. Differ-
ences are most pronounced in the speed of integration, 
not in the long-term outcome. Labor market outcomes, 
measured by employment rates, differ across countries in 
ways that can be linked to both their approach to integra-
tion and their initial labor market conditions.
Employment rates picked up fast in Austria where in 
1998, 64 percent of Bosnian refugees were in employment5 
(Figure 1.11 above). By contrast integration had barely 
begun in the other three countries. Sweden’s double-digit 
unemployment rate was a factor, whereas the lack of labor 
market integration in Denmark and the Netherlands – 
which were both close to full employment in 1998 – may 
reflect a lack of integration measures early on.
Employment then picked up in all countries, albeit at a 
different pace. In Austria, labor market outcomes around 
ten years after the end of the Bosnian war were already 
on par with those of the native population. In Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Sweden, Bosnians still participated 
significantly less in the labor market and showed higher 
unemployment rates, but the gap with respect to the 
native population clearly began to close, in particular for 
the younger age groups (Bevelander et al. 2009; van den 
Maagdenberg 2004). 
Recent evidence from Denmark and the Netherlands 
indicates that the educational attainment of young and 
second-generation Bosnians is on par with, or even exceeds 
that of the corresponding native population. More time is 
needed to assess if the gains in educational achievements 
of the second generation translate into higher employ-
ment rates, but the initial assessment is encouraging. 
Overall, the results point to four interesting findings. 
First, with favorable integration policies and labor market 
conditions, the employment rate reached that of the native 
population in little more than a decade (the Austrian case). 
Second, granting the right to work quickly upon arrival is 
important, but failure to do so can be overcome over time 
(Denmark, the Netherlands). Third, initial unemployment 
levels in host countries are important for short-term labor 
market integration (the case of Sweden). Although this is 
hardly surprising, it does bear upon a possible realloca-
tion of refugees across EU member states (see section 2.3). 
Finally, second-generation Bosnians, or those who arrived 
at a young age, perform roughly on par with native cohorts. 
We deem this to be a sign of a completed integration process.
Rebuilding Bosnia: Remittances and returnees
By the time of the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, more 
than 2 million Bosnians had been displaced from their 
homes, of whom more than a million lived outside Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. While many refugees outside Bosnia sub-
sequently returned to their home country (notably from 
Germany), many more chose to stay in their countries of 
asylum. Since the peace agreement, emigration has contin-
ued and the current size of the diaspora is estimated at a lit-
tle less than 2 million, or around 50 percent of the current 
population of Bosnia (BiH 2016; World Bank 2016).
The return of Bosnian refugees was complicated by the 
ethnic aspects of the war. Even after the peace agreement, 
many internally displaced Bosnians could not, or were 
not willing to return to their former homes in so-called 
minority areas where they feared persecution. Ethnic divi-
sions also politicized the process, with some local authori-
ties reportedly discouraging return (ICG 2002). As of early 
2017, according to UNHCR, there are still around 100,000 
internally displaced people in Bosnia.  
It is therefore unsurprising that the process of repatriat-
ing refugees is most often seen as problematic in the liter-
ature. A lot of early repatriation after the peace agreement 
was ‘forced’ (mainly from Germany), and some return-
ees became internally displaced in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina (Franz 2010). Return was further hampered by diffi-
cult economic conditions, with the official unemployment 
rate around 40 percent for most of the post-war period. 
In a qualitative study of 40 resettled Bosnians, de Koning 
(2008) reports that ‘a large majority’ of those interviewed 
would leave Bosnia again if they had the chance. This sug-
gests that for many refugees, repatriation was not a positive 
experience.
Only scant quantitative evidence exists on the wealth and 
human capital embodied in returnees to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. While a World Bank survey from 2001 finds that 
refugees and internally displaced individuals were at higher 
risk of poverty than those not displaced by the war (World 
Bank 2002), this may be a consequence of displacement, 
rather than low levels of education on the part of returnees. 
With such a large diaspora, remittances play a crucial role 
in the economy of Bosnian and Herzegovina. The World 
Bank estimates that remittances received from abroad 
amounted to more than 11 percent of GDP in 2014, down 
from almost 20 percent prior to the financial crisis (World 
Bank 2015). An analysis of the 2011 Household Budget 
Survey shows that 1 in 20 households receive money from 
abroad every year. Hence, remittances are important in 
sustaining the livelihoods of recipient households. Large 
inflows of remittances also typically raise demand for local 
goods and services along with the reservation wage of recip-
ients, contributing to an increase in the economy-wide real 
wage (until 2012 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Thus, indirectly, the benefits of remittances extend beyond 
recipient households. 
There is little evidence on the specific role of remittances 
in the process of rebuilding post-war Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Demirgüc–Kunt et al. (2009) find that in post-con-
flict economies, individuals who receive remittances from 
abroad are less likely to become entrepreneurs. The World 
Bank reports that one structural problem of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s economy is an overreliance on consumption 
and capital inflows, and an underdeveloped export sector 
(World Bank 2015). These observations are compatible with 
the ‘Dutch disease’ effect of remittances: real wage growth 
through more demand for local goods and services renders 
manufactured exports less competitive. 
In Bosnia and elsewhere, remittances are often associ-
ated with a lower GDP growth rate because they tend to 
weaken, through various channels, the incentives to invest 
in human capital. Nevertheless, Bosnian residents, both 
direct recipients of remittances and indirect beneficiaries 
through a higher real wage, enjoy a higher income level and 
living standard than they would in the absence of remit-
tances. Those host countries that allowed Bosnian refugees 
to stay, work, and send remittances, rather than requiring 
them to return home after the war, have therefore indirectly 
supported Bosnia’s post-war economic recovery.
5 Note that Bosnians cannot be 
clearly identified in the sample. 
However, cross-checking with 
macroeconomic statistics of 
refugee migration flows from 
the UNHCR between 1993 
and 1998 reveals that the vast 
majority of former Yugoslav 
nationals entering into Wes-
tern European countries were 
indeed Bosnians.
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T he large number of asylum seekers who arrived in the EU irregularly in the second half of 2015 and early 2016 has brought to a head the long-stand-
ing, underlying tensions in the EU asylum system. The 
main destination countries, including Sweden, Germany, 
and Austria, rapidly reached a point where they consid-
ered themselves over-burdened and began to limit the 
further inflow of asylum seekers by closing their borders. 
Restrictions affected several borders within the EU Schen-
gen area, along with the Western Balkans migrant route 
and the EU’s external border with Turkey, where Turkey 
agreed to curb people smuggling on its territory. 
The EU now seeks to conclude similar agreements with 
southern Mediterranean countries to close the central 
Mediterranean migrant route through Libya and on to 
Italy as well. The European Commission is also involved 
in a discussion with member states on how to distribute 
refugees and the associated financial burden fairly within 
the European Union. All the while, the countries of first 
arrival on the EU periphery (especially Greece and Italy) 
are struggling to host and process even the much lower 
numbers of asylum seekers who are continuing to land on 
their shores in early 2017. 
2. The global governance  
of refugee protection and 
challenges to the 
EU asylum system
Global governance of refugee protection
The global governance of refugee protection is centered 
on the 1951 Refugee Convention, which grants protection 
in signatory states to individuals who are “persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion” (Article 1; United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
2010). They are not to be penalized for entering the coun-
2.1 The protection of refugees 
as a global public good and its 
global governance Lead author: Matthias Lücke
try of asylum irregularly if they have come there directly 
from a country where their life or freedom was threatened 
(Article 31). Also, they may not be expelled or returned to 
any country where their life or freedom would be at risk 
(Article 33). The Convention and its associated protocols 
have been signed by nearly 150 countries (UNHCR 2015). 
We therefore consider it the benchmark for the global gov-
In this chapter, we begin by considering the global gov-
ernance of refugee protection and the EU’s proper role in 
the international sharing of responsibility for hosting ref-
ugees. We then ask how this role may be translated into a 
functional EU asylum system and sharing of responsibilities 
among the European Union and individual member states. 
In section 2.1, we discuss the public good nature of refugee 
protection, how it is only imperfectly reflected in the 1951 
Refugee Convention, and how the EU should assume its fair 
share of responsibility for the hosting of refugees worldwide. 
In section 2.2, we take a close look at the multilevel 
governance of asylum and refugee protection within the 
European Union. We explain how interdependencies and 
spillovers among various policy areas – sharing respon-
sibility for the hosting of refugees in non-EU countries, 
managing external EU border security, ensuring ade-
quate reception of asylum seekers, processing asylum 
applications, hosting recognized refugees, ensuring the 
return of unsuccessful applicants to their countries of ori-
gin – necessitate a carefully coordinated response at the 
EU, national, and sub-national levels. Against this back-
ground, we discuss salient proposals to reform the EU 
asylum system in section 2.3.
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ernance of refugee protection, even though some import-
ant host countries, including in the Middle East, are not 
signatories. 
Together, these rules imply that refugees must seek pro-
tection in the first safe country that they reach after leav-
ing their country of origin; they are not free to choose 
their country of asylum. Thus, following displacement, 
geography and accident largely determine the allocation 
of refugees to safe countries. The Convention recognizes 
that granting asylum under such conditions “may place 
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries” and that the 
resulting problems need to be resolved through interna-
tional cooperation (Preamble). However, the Convention 
fails to establish a framework, or even guidelines, for such 
cooperation. 
Refugee protection as a public good
The main challenge for designing rules for international 
cooperation is that refugee protection is, in economic 
terms, a public good. Countries sign the Convention 
because they value the fact that individuals are entitled to 
protection if they flee their countries of origin for fear of 
persecution. However, countries value that fact irrespec-
tive of where the refugees are hosted. Since hosting refu-
gees is costly, countries will normally prefer refugees to 
be hosted elsewhere, rather than hosting refugees them-
selves (and bearing the associated costs). 
Technically speaking, this makes refugee protection 
a public good characterized by ‘non-rivalry’ and ‘non- 
excludability’: the benefits – the satisfaction of seeing ref-
ugees in need supported and the gain in regional security 
as refugee movements are properly managed – accrue to 
all countries, regardless of whether they help to ‘produce 
the public good’ by hosting refugees or paying for the 
hosting of refugees elsewhere. 
Thus, each country faces numerous temptations to free 
ride: as long as refugees remain in the first safe country, 
other countries may drag their feet over providing finan-
cial support. Countries that would receive many refugees 
because of their geography may make themselves less 
hospitable so that refugees move on irregularly to other 
potential host countries or persecuted individuals stay 
in their countries of origin. Thus, without coordination, 
“too little of the public good of refugee protection will 
be produced” – or in plain language, potential refugees 
will not receive the protection that countries have collec-
tively committed to provide by signing the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.1  
Coordination is relatively easy to achieve if the benefits 
from a public good arise, say, at the national level – such 
as secure property rights through internal security and 
a well-functioning legal system. Competent authorities 
(such as elected representatives in a democracy) decide on 
the level of provision (the number of police, courts, judges, 
etc.) as well as the financing (typically taxes levied accord-
ing to individuals’ ability to pay). 
In the case of refugee protection, there is an additional 
challenge because it is a global public good. Similar to 
other global public goods (for example, climate change 
mitigation), there is no global authority to set and enforce 
quality standards of refugee protection or taxes to pay for 
it. Thus, the absence of formal rules for an international 
sharing of responsibility for refugee protection, with the 
1951 Refugee Convention merely calling for coopera-
tion in its Preamble, reflects a fundamental underlying 
difficulty, rather than an oversight that could easily be 
corrected.1 
Global responsibility sharing for refugees
In practice, low- and middle-income countries host most 
international refugees (Figure 2.1). UN organizations, 
especially the UNHCR and World Food Program, and 
other donors provide humanitarian assistance (food aid, 
shelter) to most refugees in developing countries, often on 
a very long-term basis. Most humanitarian assistance is 
ultimately paid for by high-income country governments. 
While these efforts amount to substantial financial burden 
sharing, we have argued elsewhere in more detail (Lücke 
and Schneiderheinze 2017) that they fall short of a reason-
able standard of global equity for three main reasons. 
First, UN organizations raise most of their funds for 
specific, national aid programs. Many such refugee situa-
tions are ‘protracted’: nearly half of all refugees under the 
UNHCR’s mandate are in situations that last longer than a 
decade (UNHCR 2016, Figure 7). Yet, donors are prone to 
neglecting long-lasting aid programs, which makes fund-
ing unpredictable and has led to significant shortfalls in 
the recent past. For example, food rations had to be cut for 
Syrian refugees in the Middle East in late 2015, contrib-
uting to such secondary movements as the large irregu-
lar inflow of refugees into Europe during the same period 
(Lattimer, Sparks, and Tuchel 2016, Figures 2 and 3). 
The required additional funding is not very large when 
compared, say, with total official development assistance 
at US$ 147 billion in 2015:2 available resources in 2015 fell 
short of needs by US$ 9 billion for all UN-coordinated 
1 Hatton (2015) makes this 
point formally based on a  
theoretical model.
2 See the OECD website at 
https://data.oecd.org/oda/
net-oda.htm. This figure solely 
relates to member coun-
tries of the OECD’s Develop-
ment Assistance Committee 
(DAC) and thus excludes China, 
among other non-traditional 
donors.
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Figure 2.1: Refugees by host country, end-2015
totel number of refugees, including persons in a refugee-like situation







appeals, with total needs budgeted at US$ 20 billion 
(Global Humanitarian Assistance 2016, Figure 3.2). Still, 
more resources are urgently required in a more predict-
able manner to ensure that the basic needs of refugees are 
reliably met (High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financ-
ing 2015).
Second, most refugees do not live in confined settle-
ments but are dispersed among host country popula-
tions. Therefore, they use public services (education, 
health care), infrastructure (water, sanitation), and hous-
ing that are in limited supply in many low- and middle- 
income countries. Since public services and infrastructure 
are typically provided and paid for by host country gov-
ernments, donors should help to overcome any shortages 
in funding or administrative capacity that host country 
governments may face when they expand public services 
and infrastructure to meet the needs of both refugees and 
local populations. On the donor side, this will require 
much closer cooperation between providers of humani-
tarian and development assistance as well as some addi-
tional funds (Bennett 2015). 
Third, while more generous financing for humanitarian 
aid and human development would go a long way towards 
equitable burden sharing at the global level, it may not go 
far enough when small countries receive a large number of 
refugees in a short time (say, Syrian refugees in Lebanon). 
In this case, more resettlement of vulnerable refugees to 
third countries, typically organized through the UNHCR, 
is necessary to relieve the excess burden that small coun-
tries would otherwise face. 
In addition to the approximately 16 million interna-
tional refugees who have moved abroad to seek protection, 
the UNHCR also protects or assists approximately 37 mil-
lion internally displaced persons (IDPs), mostly in Africa 
and the Middle East (UNHCR 2016, Map 1 and Annex 
Table 1). IDPs have left their homes to escape violence or 
persecution but remain within their country of residence. 
In this Assessment Report, we do not further address 
their situation: although the UNHCR faces similar chal-
lenges, compared with international refugees, when rais-
ing funds from the international community to support 
IDPs, there is no question of who is responsible for hosting 
them because they remain in their own countries. How-
ever, when trying to predict future flows of international 
refugees, IDPs are an important group to watch because 
they have already been displaced from their homes and 
may have few roots where they currently live. Therefore, 
they may be more prone to seek protection across inter-
national borders than other groups that face violence or 
persecution but still live in their own homes. 
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Implications for the EU
Thus, the EU and its member states in their roles as 
humanitarian and development donors have a moral obli-
gation to provide more substantial support in a predict-
able manner to non-EU countries (especially developing 
countries) that host many refugees. Moreover, this is not 
only a moral obligation that derives from the commitment 
made by signing the 1951 Refugee Convention to cooper-
ate and equitably share responsibility for refugee protec-
tion at the global level. It also makes economic sense, for 
several reasons, for the EU and its member states to help 
ensure that all refugees are guaranteed decent material 
living conditions, access to essential public services and 
infrastructure, and the prospect of economic and social 
integration in their host countries.
For a start, when the basic needs of refugees are not met 
in the countries of first asylum, this is a push factor that 
drives refugees to consider moving on to richer countries 
with better living conditions, be it because of opportuni-
ties for employment and entre preneurship or social trans-
fers. For example, sharply deteriorating living conditions 
in the EU’s southern neighborhood were in part respon-
sible for the large irregular inflow of refugees into the EU 
in late 2015 and early 2016 (as explained above). Therefore, 
helping to ensure decent living conditions for refugees in 
their non-EU host countries should be viewed as part and 
parcel of a comprehensive EU approach to asylum policy. 
In addition, refugees traveled from the Middle East 
to northern Europe in 2015 and early 2016 under unsafe 
conditions. Therefore, young men were significantly over- 
represented among those who made the journey, relative 
to refugees overall (although those young men who are 
already married may try to bring family members to the 
EU later, provided they qualify for family unification). 
Furthermore, some legs of the journey required assis-
tance from ‘intermediaries’ (people smugglers), so access 
to finance was a precondition – sufficiently high savings 
or the ability to borrow in order to pay smugglers. Thus, 
many vulnerable refugees never had a chance to move to 
the EU, even though they might have benefited more than 
others, say, from access to medical care after suffering 
trauma or for frail or disabled family members. Overall, it 
is arguably fairer for the EU and its member states to make 
a determined effort to help meet the basic needs of all ref-
ugees in their host countries, rather than to grant privi-
leged treatment to a self-selected few who travel irregu-
larly to Europe.
Finally, because of the high cost of living in high- 
income EU member states, it is relatively expensive to host 
a poorly selected and still limited number of refugees in 
Sweden or Germany (in the case of Germany, approxi-
mately €20 billion in 2016).3 These resources could be used 
to substantially improve the well-being of a higher num-
ber of refugees in low- and middle-income countries, even 
while resettling some vulnerable refugees to the EU.  
Thus, the thrust of the existing EU agreement with Tur-
key and future planned agreements with other southern 
neighborhood countries appears to be appropriate: the EU 
provides considerable financial and logistical support for 
the hosting of refugees and for their social and economic 
integration according to verifiable standards (see Section 
2.3 for a more detailed discussion). In turn, the partner 
country tightens border security to prevent people smug-
gling and curb irregular migration to the EU. Addition-
ally, EU member states resettle a limited number of ref-
ugees selected according to vulnerability, possibly under 
UNHCR auspices. 
Concerns and responses 
EU asylum procedures outside EU territory?
This approach to how the EU may live up to its responsi-
bility to help protect refugees world-wide is subject to at 
least three concerns that have surfaced in the wider debate 
on the EU asylum regime. First, this approach aims to 
make it more difficult for asylum seekers to access asy-
lum in the EU by preventing irregular travel to the EU. 
As an alternative, it offers better conditions for refugees 
in their present host countries, plus limited resettlement. 
However, this may not be good enough in some situa-
tions, for instance when refugees cannot reach a reliably 
safe country or the countries of first reception are severely 
overburdened by too many refugees relative to their own 
populations. In such situations, it has been proposed that 
individuals should be able to apply for EU asylum while 
they are still abroad (e.g. Barsbai and Braun 2016). 
From a legal perspective, there are doubts about whether 
asylum procedures can be conducted outside EU territory 
(for a summary, see Carrera and Guild 2017). Ideally, the 
EU would set up offices in third countries, conduct asylum 
procedures there, and transfer successful applicants to the 
EU under refugee status (or equivalent). Legal concerns, 
understandably enough, center on whether EU legal stan-
dards can be guaranteed in third countries – either as a 
matter of principle, or because of the special nature of asy-
lum procedures with applicants whose legal status in the 
transit country may not be secure. 
At the same time, critics do not seem to be concerned 
that asylum in the EU is now mainly accessible to those 
who are physically strong and rich enough to survive 
irregular travel to the EU with the help of people smug-
glers. If the EU and its member states are to focus (as we 
propose) on hosting the most vulnerable refugees while 
contributing financially to the protection of all others, ref-
ugees must be selected for resettlement in their countries 
of first asylum. If individuals in need of protection cannot 
reach a reliably safe country, any opportunity to request 
protection while still in transit would be an improvement 
over the present situation. Even if full asylum procedures 
cannot legally be conducted while applicants are outside 
EU territory, EU member states need to find a substitute: 
they might request that the UNHCR select vulnerable ref-
ugees for resettlement (a standard procedure) or they may 
themselves issue humanitarian visas based on prima facie 
evidence that the applicant has a legitimate claim to pro-
tection in the EU, while full asylum procedures would be 
conducted in the EU later. 
Refugee protection vs labor migration
Second, many immigrants currently apply for asylum 
in the EU but have their applications rejected because 
they cannot demonstrate that they have been persecuted 
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or require subsidiary protection. This is not surprising 
because many would-be labor migrants from non-EU 
countries have no legal access to employment in EU coun-
tries. Nonetheless, if they manage to travel to the EU irreg-
ularly (at present, many use the central Mediterranean 
migrant route through Libya, at considerable monetary 
cost and risk to their lives), they will normally be admit-
ted in an EU member state for as long as it takes to pro-
cess their asylum application. When that is turned down, 
they may still hope to file administrative or legal appeals, 
obtain temporary leave to stay in the EU because depor-
tation would amount to undue hardship, receive social 
transfers in the meantime, find employment that may later 
lead to an amnesty and a residence permit, or simply stay 
in the country irregularly. 
This situation poses several challenges. Most funda-
mentally, the distinction between refugee protection and 
labor migration becomes blurred. Individuals who face 
persecution at home have a right under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention to be protected in the first safe country that 
they reach, but they have no right to choose their coun-
try of asylum. By contrast, labor migrants have the right 
to leave their country of origin, but need permission 
from their intended destination country to move there 
– and the intended destination country is free to grant 
or not grant permission, according to whatever criteria it 
chooses to apply.
Curbing irregular immigration into the EU by individ-
uals without a legitimate claim to protection is challeng-
ing because these immigrants are not driven by a single 
‘push’ factor (such as refugees who face war or persecu-
tion at home). Rather, their migration decision is based 
on a complex calculus that involves conditions at home 
and in the desired destination country as well as the 
cost of migrating (see section 4.1 for a detailed discus-
sion). Changing the underlying incentives thoroughly 
enough to make irregular migration to the EU apprecia-
bly less attractive will probably require a combination of 
measures: providing reliable and credible information 
to potential migrants about the risks of irregular travel; 
improving border management and enforcement along 
migrant routes and at the external EU border (starting 
in West Africa in the case of the central Mediterranean 
route); along migrant routes, establishing migrant sup-
port centers that provide information and assist with 
return and reintegration, if requested; and for those who 
manage to reach EU territory, ensuring a speedy deci-
sion on any asylum application and, if rejected, a quick 
return to the country of origin.4
Even if most asylum applications from certain coun-
tries are rejected, there are a non-negligible number 
of positive decisions (for countries of origin that are 
promi nent on the central Mediterranean migrant route, 
see Figure 2.2). To avoid excluding those individuals 
from asylum in the EU (or obliging them to travel irreg-
ularly), it should be explored whether migrant support 
centers could also provide information and advice on 
humanitarian visas (once these are reintroduced by EU 
member states) and receive applications.
More effective management of the external EU bor-
der as well as national borders in the course of major 
migrant routes will have to be part of any strategy to 
curb irregular migration to the EU. This will require 
active support from a number of governments through-
out Africa (Hatton 2016a, 24). Yet these political lead-
ers will hardly become more popular with their voters if 
they are perceived as helping the EU to shut off irregu-
lar migration, which many of their voters value highly. 
So far, the EU’s New Migration Partnership Frame-
work offers additional assistance in the areas of migra-
tion management and migrant return and reintegration, 
along with financial instruments.5 Even so, there are few 
positive incentives that might generate popular support. 
In similar circumstances in eastern neighborhood 
countries, the prospect of visa liberalization with the EU 
has helped to promote significant, potentially unpopu-
lar reforms in border management and human rights 
(Ademmer 2017). While visa liberalization is not a 
short-term option for most African countries, enhanced 
opportunities for legal employment in EU member 
states could play an important role in sustaining coop-
eration. The economic impact in the destination coun-
tries should be limited because the economic effects of 
immigration into the labor market (rather than the wel-
fare state) are usually small on aggregate, with man-
ageable side effects on income distribution. EU mem-
ber states, especially those with a favorable labor market 
situation, should therefore create more opportunities 
for labor migration from non-EU countries. Migra-
tion may be made conditional on a minimum education 
level, vocational and language skills, a job offer from 
the destination country, a waiting period before one can 
claim social benefits, etc. Furthermore, such opportu-
nities could also be targeted at refugees in non-EU host 
countries. 
Does the EU seek to externalize a problem that is 
properly its own?
Third, proposals such as ours have been accused of 
‘externalizing’ an EU problem (refugees would like to 
live in the EU) to neighborhood countries. By contrast, 













































Figure 2.2 First-instance rejections of asylum applications  
by citizenship, EU-28, 2016  
percent of applications; countries of origin prominent on the central  
Mediterranean migrant route
Source: Own elaboration based on data from UNHCR Global Trends 2015.
4 The EU Trust Fund for Africa 
and International Organiza-
tion for Migration initiative 
for Protection and Reintegra-
tion of returnees along the 
Central Mediterranean migra-
tion routes (December 2016) 




5 See European Commission, 
“Commission announces New 
Migration Partnership Frame-
work: Reinforced coopera-
tion with third countries to bet-
ter manage migration.” Press 
Release IP/16/2072, Strasbourg, 
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the international community, irrespective of where they 
live. We have also pointed out how the EU may live up to 
its international responsibility more fully by supporting 
host countries more effectively and resettling some vul-
nerable refugees. We have explained why this approach 
makes economic sense, too. 
Therefore, we consider it wrong-headed to argue that 
refugees are somehow the EU’s problem (merely because 
they would like to live in the EU) and that by supporting 
them in their host countries, the EU improperly exter-
nalizes its own problem. Rather, the protection of refu-
gees who flee crises in non-EU countries and are hosted 
by other non-EU countries, in line with existing good 
practice in the global governance of refugee protection, 
is a global responsibility that (we argue) the EU and its 
member states should do more to live up to. 
More reflection needed: Sharing fiscal and 
administrative burdens within the EU 
More reflection is needed, first, on how the EU budget 
versus the member states should contribute to the cost of 
hosting refugees in non-EU countries and whether EU 
member states should be supported from the EU budget 
when they resettle refugees from third countries. Argu-
ably, organizing this humanitarian and development 
assistance is a task that may usefully be undertaken by a 
single actor – the European Commission – on behalf of 
all 28 (in the future, 27) member states. If funding came 
from the EU budget, member states would contribute 
in line with their contributions to the budget, which 
amount to approximately 1 percent of their GDP. Article 
80 TFEU also constitutes a legal basis for solidarity and 
responsibility sharing among EU member states in the 
field of asylum policy, which is intricately linked with 
EU support for the protection of refugees outside the EU 
(Vanheule et al. 2011). 
However, humanitarian spending by the EU is cur-
rently in the order of only €1 billion per year6 while 
funding shortfalls on the part of UN organizations 
alone amounted to US$ 9 billion in 2015 (see above). 
The EU’s multiannual financial framework is set several 
years in advance (it currently runs from 2014 through 
2020) and any change, now or in the future, requires a 
consensus among EU member states. Therefore, addi-
tional funding from national budgets may be required 
to close funding gaps for humanitarian aid. Since many 
member states are already important humanitarian 
and development donors, it would be logical to com-
bine additional funding from both the EU budget, to the 
extent possible, and member states. 
EU member states should find it relatively easy, polit-
ically and capacity-wise, to offer more places for the 
resettlement of refugees in the EU or to accept some 
prima facie refugees through humanitarian visas. The 
number of asylum seekers entering the EU is now much 
smaller than in late 2015 and early 2016, which has freed 
up reception capacities. That said, it would not appear 
promising to attempt to set fixed quotas for refugees 
to be received by each member state. A similar quota 
scheme has already failed to be fully implemented for 
the secondary distribution of refugees within the EU 
from EU member states of first arrival (see section 2.3). 
A voluntary approach may be sufficient, given that the 
emphasis would be on sharing financial responsibility 
for the hosting of refugees with non-EU low- and middle- 
income countries.
T he number of people who arrive in the EU to seek asylum depends on multiple, interdependent policy parameters: for example, ceteris paribus, 
the higher the humanitarian aid to refugees outside the 
EU and the lower the income support for asylum seek-
ers within the EU, the less likely it is that displaced people 
will embark on the long, expensive, and dangerous jour-
ney to the EU. 
Besides the necessity of supporting refugees in third 
countries (see section 2.1), there are both moral and eco-
nomic reasons to support refugees within the EU through 
a well-functioning asylum system. At the same time, 
favorable conditions for refugees may act as a pull factor 
for asylum seekers: the more assistance – directly, through 
income support or indirectly, through integration mea-
sures – recognized refugees receive, the more attractive 
the EU becomes as a destination. If the EU were a homo-
genous territory with closely aligned popular preferences 
for how asylum should be provided, the system could be 
2.2 EU asylum and  
refugee policy Lead authors: Nadzeya Laurentsyeva and Lars Ludolph
designed to attract an acceptable number of refugees. Yet, 
refugee support systems are highly heterogeneous across 
EU member states, reflecting differences in capability and 
attitudes toward hosting refugees. The Schengen agree-
ment exacerbates this problem: once asylum seekers enter 
EU territory, the lack of internal border controls makes 
it difficult to prevent asylum seekers from freely moving 
among member states. 
Successive Dublin regulations, the first introduced in 
1997, have guided member states’ handling of refugees 
arriving at their borders. The basic principle is that the 
member states of first entry are responsible for register-
ing and hosting the refugee, processing the asylum claim, 
integrating that person into society or ensuring his or her 
return to the country of origin (depending on the out-
come of the asylum application). For most asylum seekers 
entering EU territory, this means external border coun-
tries are responsible for them de jure. However, a clear 
misalignment of incentives between these external border 
6 Funding for European Civil 
Protection and Humanitar-
ian Aid Operations (ECHO); 
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countries, asylum seekers themselves, the EU, and other 
member states has de facto led to a disregard of the Dub-
lin regulations. Once asylum seekers have entered the EU, 
external border countries have a strong cost incentive to 
let them pass through their territory into other member 
states; in addition, asylum seekers often prefer to lodge 
their asylum application in the supposedly more favor-
able Western European countries. As they are aware of 
this nexus a priori, EU member states located on the EU 
external border could have an incentive to allocate fewer 
resources to managing the external border than member 
states together would desire. 
The key question therefore becomes how the tasks 
related to the asylum regime should be allocated among 
EU member states, and between member states and EU 
authorities, in order to achieve a desirable level of cooper-
ation. We argue that this implies the alignment of incen-
tives in several areas to avoid costly negative spillovers 
across member states. In the long run, there is a strong case 
for a substantial expansion of the responsibilities of EU 
institutions in external border management while incen-
tivizing member states on the external border to comply 
with their obligations to register and host refugees.  
In this section, we discuss the allocation of deci-
sion-making, implementation, and funding related to 
asylum policies within the EU. We seek to identify the 
conflicting incentives associated with the asymmetric 
responsibility sharing between the EU and its member 
states as well as among the EU member states. In section 
2.3 below we refer to these shortcomings as we evaluate 
the recent proposals for reforming the EU asylum system.
Task allocation in asylum-related policies 
within the EU
The Treaty of Maastricht that entered into force in 1993 
granted the EU institutions modest competences in the 
field of asylum and migration. These were later extended 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 and the Lisbon Treaty 
of 2009. At the Tampere European Council of 1999, an 
ambition toward a Common European Asylum Sys-
tem (CEAS), which ought to have increased coopera-
tion among the EU member states, was first announced 
(Kaunert and Leonard 2012). Yet, in 2015, asylum pol-
icies remained effectively decentralized, with the indi-
vidual member states responsible for the core decisions, 
implementation, and most of the funding. The role of the 
EU was limited to i) assigning responsibilities for reg-
istering and hosting asylum seekers who arrived in the 
EU, ii) setting minimum standards for asylum policies 
and harmonizing national asylum legislation, iii) assist-
ing member states during the implementation of policies, 
and iv) ensuring some degree of financial burden sharing 
through joint EU funds. Importantly, the EU institutions 
lacked an effective mechanism to enforce the implementa-
tion of EU rules and decisions and had to rely on volun-
tary compliance by the member states.
Protecting external borders
Over the past years, high irregular immigration flows 
have put pressure on the EU’s external borders. Most 
asylum seekers entered the EU irregularly by following 
one of the major migrant routes: the central Mediter-
ranean (from North Africa to Italy), the eastern Med-
iterranean (from Turkey to Greece), the western Medi-
terranean (from Morocco to Spain), and since 2012, the 
Western Balkans. Thus, even prior to 2015, the EU coun-
tries at the ‘exit’ of these routes – Italy, Greece, Hungary, 
and to a lesser degree, Spain – had been under consid-
erable pressure from irregular immigration (Table 2.1).
The Dublin system places the main responsibility for 
EU external border security on these frontier states in 
terms of border surveillance, smuggler detection, and 
search and rescue operations. To curb migrant flows, EU 
member states on the external border implemented sev-
eral bilateral agreements with their counterparts at the 
‘exit’ points of migrant routes, such as Spain’s ongoing 
cooperation with Morocco, Senegal, and Mauritania as 
well as Italy’s agreement with Libya. 
The EU’s role in border management has mainly been 
to provide financial support to member states on the 
external border. For example, since the surge in irreg-
ular immigration in 2015, Greece has received €1 bil-
lion from EU funds, Italy has received €655 million, and 
Bulgaria €269 million (Bučar et al. 2017).7 Figure 2.4 
below suggests that Greece in particular received large 
funds in comparison with its own expenditures; Italy, 
on the other hand, projects spending of €3 billion on 
the migration situation in 2017 alone.8 EU support, if 
not increased substantially, will only cover a fraction of 
these expenditures. 
EU member states further receive technical exper-
tise from Frontex, which was set up in 2005 to improve 
the coordination of European border management. Its 
mission comprises monitoring the EU external borders, 
coordinating joint operations to prevent illegal entries, 
and responding to emergencies, as well as assisting indi-
vidual member states in border management. Yet, rela-
tive to the scope of national operations and resources, 
the direct involvement of Frontex has remained low. In 
7 These numbers, while coming 
from official references, are not 
without controversy. For exam-
ple, Refugees Deeply has cal-
culated the actual EU  
support to Greece at €803  
million. See D. Howden and A. 
Fotiadis. “Where did the money 
go? How Greece fumbled the 
refugee crisis,” The Guardian, 





8 J. Politi, “Italy’s Renzi unveils 
spending plans in 2017 bud-





Table 2.1 Main irregular migrant routes to the EU








Origin: Eritrea, Guinea, 
Nigeria, Somalia 
55,300 120,200 170,760 153,946 181,126
Eastern Mediterranean
Destination: Greece
Origin: Afghanistan, Iran, 
Iraq, Somalia, Syria
148,000 119,000 50,830 885,386 182,534
Western Mediterranean
Destination: Spain
Origin: sub-Saharan and 
West Africa
18,150 21,650 7,840 7,164 10,231
Western Balkan
Destination: Hungary  
(Germany, Austria…)
Origin: Albania, Kosovo, 
plus arrivals from the eas-
tern Mediterranean route
5,460 30,990 43,360 764,038 122,779
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January 2015, the agency deployed a permanent staff of 
309, while its total funding for 2008–14 constituted €575 
million. In response to calls for a stronger EU role in 
external border management, Frontex was transformed 
in October 2016 into the European Border and Coast 
Guard, with a rapid reserve pool of 1,500 border guards 
and more technical equipment provided to external bor-
der countries. The sea border-security operations Triton 
and Poseidon launched in 2014 have also been expanded 
recently.
Thus, the EU has become much more involved in exter-
nal border management over the past few years, both 
on the ground and financially. While the EU does not 
cover refugee-related expenditures to the same extent in 
all affected member states, it helps overstretched mem-
ber states on the external border to abide by the common 
rules. Within the grander vision of a functioning Com-
mon European Asylum System (CEAS), these changes 
constitute a necessary shift of responsibilities toward the 
center to align incentives and address externalities among 
member states. 
Hosting refugees within the EU: De jure
The Dublin Convention of 1997, followed by its amendments 
Dublin II (2003) and Dublin III (2013), assigns responsibil-
ity for registering and hosting refugees who arrive in the 
EU. Originally, the main aim of this regulation was to pre-
vent asylum shopping. This practice of applying for asylum 
in several EU countries or applying in the country of choice 
after transiting other EU member states was made possi-
ble by the abolition of border controls within the Schen-
gen area. To prevent asylum shopping and avoid a race to 
the bottom among member states in terms of their asylum- 
related efforts, the Dublin system established detailed rules 
and implementation mechanisms to determine the coun-
try that would be responsible for a particular asylum seeker. 
Fundamentally, the Dublin regulations place the respon-
sibility for registering and processing asylum claims as well 
as for hosting refugees on the country of first entry into the 
EU, with a few exceptions for family reasons or other per-
sonal ties on a case-by-case basis. In practice, the regula-
tion is enforced through the readmission mechanism: if an 
individual applies for asylum in a member state that is not 
responsible for him or her, that member state may return 
the asylum seeker to the member state of first entry. Techni-
cally, this process depends on all immigrants being finger-
printed upon entering the EU and their data being entered 
into EURODAC, the integrated fingerprint database.
Thus, together with the responsibility for securing the 
external borders, the main burden related to registering asy-
lum seekers and hosting refugees falls on the EU member 
states on the external border. Other EU member states are 
expected to participate financially by contributing to joint 
EU funds. Recently, an internal EU relocation of asylum 
seekers from Greece and Italy was launched but this emer-
gency scheme remains bedeviled by efficiency and compli-
ance issues.9 Further proposals to redistribute asylum seek-
ers across the EU have found no consensus among member 
states yet.10 Therefore, financial burden sharing is the main 
channel of asylum-related support among member states.
Figure 2.3 Asylum applications in the selected EU  
countries, 2008–16
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.






















































Figure 2.4 Estimated short-term fiscal costs of caring for 
asylum seekers as a percentage of GDP
Source: Own elaboration based on Aiyar et al. 2016 (p. 12).
9 European Commission, 
“Relocation and Resettlement 
– State of Play,” DG Migration 
and Home Affairs, Brussels, 






ment_en.pdf (accessed 3 May 
2017).
10 We discuss these further in 
section 2.3.
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The EU itself manages some aspects of the financial bur-
den sharing while providing technical assistance to the 
member states and verifying that the minimum standards 
of refugee protection are met. To facilitate cooperation 
among member states, to assist them in protecting refu-
gees, and to provide technical support to the Commission, 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was estab-
lished in 2011 with an annual budget of €10 million for the 
2012–15 period. Since May 2016, the role of EASO has been 
strengthened to support both the implementation and the 
functionality of the CEAS (Bučar et al. 2017). 
Hosting refugees within the EU: De facto
According to the Dublin rules, most of the burden of 
dealing with illegal entry into the EU and subsequent 
asylum applications falls onto the member states on 
the external border. However, this uneven distribution 
of responsibility may overburden the member states of 
first entry to the extent that they can neither ensure 
effective asylum procedures nor basic living standards 
for the refugees. Beyond these immediate challenges, 
granting recognized refugees access to education and 
employment may be a challenge. Given poor condi-
tions in the countries of first entry to the EU, asylum 
seekers themselves have every reason to try to apply 
for asylum elsewhere and refuse cooperation with the 
member state authorities that try to implement the 
existing rules. The above may explain why data on 
first-time asylum applications show a starkly differ-
ent geographical distribution from expectations under 
the current legislation: although the external border 
countries Italy, Hungary, and Greece did receive a sub-
stantial number of asylum applications (particularly 
when measured against the size of their economies), 
Germany, France, Sweden, the UK, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands registered the majority of first-time asy-
lum applications even between 2008 and 2014 on aver-
age (Figure 2.3).
The collapse of the Dublin system arguably further 
increased the attractiveness of embarking on a journey 
to the EU from various parts of the world. The existing 
weaknesses in the system may have motivated more asy-
lum seekers to set off for Northern and Central European 
countries, while a functioning Dublin system would have 
kept them in the member states of first entry and possibly 
made the whole journey unattractive. 
Once asylum seekers move on from their countries of 
first entry without being properly registered in EURO-
DAC, the most attractive destination countries within the 
EU become de facto responsible for them. In 2015, this 
often occurred voluntarily when some EU member states 
applied the Dublin sovereignty clause to assume responsi-
bility for large numbers of refugees and take pressure off 
the countries of first arrival. Still, even when asylum seek-
ers are registered upon entry to the EU and then continue 
to other member states, transfers under the Dublin Regu-
lation cannot always be enforced. In 2011, the European 
Court of Human Rights ruled in the case of M.S.S. v. Bel-
gium and Greece that the implementation of the transfer 
violated several articles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights due to the poor living conditions of asylum 
seekers in Greece, the risk of detention, and deficiencies 
in the Greek asylum procedure.11 Thereafter, EU mem-
ber states practically stopped returning asylum seekers to 
Greece. De facto, the tasks of registering and processing 
asylum claims as well as hosting refugees were thus per-
formed by countries of the first-time asylum application 
in line with national legislation. 
The short-term fiscal cost incurred by the individual 
member states from caring for asylum seekers as esti-
mated by Aiyar et al. (2016) is shown in Figure 2.4  above. 
The distribution of costs among EU member states was 
uneven already in 2014 and shows the same pattern as 
the number of lodged asylum applications (see Figure 2.3 
above).12
Aligning incentives – What should be done?
The analysis above reveals that the large influx of asy-
lum seekers in 2015 and 2016 into the EU did not ‘break’ 
a Dublin system that had previously worked well; rather, 
it brought existing inconsistencies to the surface. A 
system that allows countries at the external border to 
‘wave through’ asylum seekers to other member states 
due to the lack of internal borders and in the absence 
of an effective enforcement of the Dublin regulations is 
clearly suboptimal. Incentives to invest in border con-
trols, to register arriving asylum seekers properly, and to 
ensure acceptable reception conditions are misaligned 
and incompatible with an effective asylum system at the 
EU level. 
Member states on the external border therefore must 
be incentivized to comply with existing agreements, espe-
cially in meeting their responsibility to register asylum 
seekers. Increased EU personnel on the ground is neces-
sary to ensure efficiency and compliance by monitoring 
asylum procedures and ensuring humane reception con-
ditions. By strengthening Frontex and EASO, the EU is 
currently moving in this direction but will have to increase 
its efforts further. The compliance of national authorities 
could further be reinforced by the credible threat of adja-
cent member states closing their borders. The examples of 
Macedonia shutting its border with Greece and Austria’s 
measures at its border with Italy show that closing popular 
migration routes unilaterally can exert pressure on exter-
nal border countries to meet their obligations, or at least 
limit negative spillovers, even within the Schengen area.
In exchange, the EU should provide substantial logisti-
cal and financial help to those member states on the exter-
nal border  that are most heavily affected by irregular 
immigration. Here, solidarity among EU member states 
is of utmost importance to make the system sustainable. 
Alternative approaches to reducing the pressure on mem-
ber states of first arrival, such as a scheme to relocate asy-
lum seekers from countries of first arrival to other mem-
ber states, have not found a consensus among member 
states so far. To make such a scheme feasible and opera-
tional, par ticipation in the relocation of recognized refu-
gees or asylum seekers who passed an initial admissibil-
ity check in the member state of first entry could be left 
to a ‘coalition of the willing’ until a permanent reloca-
tion scheme is implemented. We discuss this idea further 
in section 2.3.
11 See, in the European Data-
base of Asylum Law, ECtHR 
– M.S.S. v Belgium and 
Greece [GC], Application No. 





(accessed May 3, 2017).
12 The estimations are from 
January 2016. In some coun-
tries, such as Germany, annual 
expenditures in 2016 exceeded 
earlier estimations from Fig-
ure 2.4 and amounted to 
€21.7 billion or 0.7 percent 
of GDP, see Bundesminis-
terium der Finanzen, Analy-
sen und Berichte - Asyl- und 








shaushalts.html (accessed May 
3, 2017). The figure should 
therefore be interpreted as 
an illustration of the uneven 
cost distribution among mem-
ber states.
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2.3 Building blocks for 
reforming the EU asylum and 
migration regime: Closing the 
back door while opening the 
front door Lead authors: Matthias Lücke and Lars Ludolph
I n section 2.2 we have identified missing elements of a sustainable EU asylum system: i) more responsibility for external border management – rules and implementa-
tion – at the EU level; ii) a larger EU budget to compensate 
external border countries for processing and hosting asy-
lum seekers; iii) a ‘coalition of the willing’ approach to an 
intra-EU refugee relocation scheme; iv) financial support 
for third countries to curb irregular migration at its source 
and enable more efficient readmission; and v) resettling 
the most vulnerable refugees coming from third countries 
to the EU.
Although far fewer asylum seekers arrived in Europe 
in 2016 than in 2015, the situation remains fragile. In 
response, the European Commission has tabled several 
proposals. Long-term efforts have focused on four key areas 
of asylum policies: i) strengthening external border man-
agement; ii) an allocation mechanism to distribute asy-
lum seekers across EU member states; iii) migration part-
nerships with third countries to prevent irregular flows; 
and iv) the introduction of pathways into the EU through 
resettle ment. Thus, in general, we believe that EU author-
ities are gradually moving toward our suggested approach 
of opening the front door while closing the back door. 
However, proposals that focus on deterrence (closing the 
‘back door’) have progressed faster than those that assume 
responsibility for refugees outside the EU (and share this 
responsibility equitably across EU member states) and 
open up legal pathways for labor migration to the EU 
(opening the ‘front door’). We therefore urge European 
decision makers not to succumb to an ‘out of sight, out 
of mind’ approach. The remainder of this section assesses 
the (proposed) EU actions in the light of our advocated 
approach of closing the back door while opening the front 
door and the shortcomings identified in section 2.2. 
Closing the back door... 
The way toward more EU involvement in external 
border management
Of all the policy options to improve the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS), strengthening the EU’s external 
borders has found the most support among EU member 
states. Progress has been made in two areas in particu-
lar. First, the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) 
was launched in October 2016 to establish an operational 
strategy for border management and co ordinate EU assis-
tance for member states.13  In essence, the extended EBCG 
sets an operational and technical strategy that will then 
have to be implemented by the member states. Member 
states on the external border are legally obliged to coop-
erate, particularly in emergencies. The permanent staff 
of the EBCG will be increased to 1,000 by 2020 from 402 
at the beginning of 2016, the budget has been more than 
doubled (from €143.3 million in 2015 to €322 million in 
2020), and the agency can draw on a rapid-reaction pool 
of 1,500 European border guards if needed. Yet, non-com-
pliance, i.e. the refusal to deploy EBCG staff or abide by 
its strategy, will have few consequences for member states. 
The only lever the agency possesses is to urge adjacent 
A clear distribution of tasks would also benefit asylum 
seekers. If all countries are incentivized to assume their 
assigned responsibilities, neither the member states on the 
external border nor the most economically attractive desti-
nations in the EU would have an incentive to race to the bot-
tom in reception conditions. 
While there is a clear need for the EU to put its own 
house in order, the unprecedented inflows of late 2015 and 
early 2016 have revealed that, in exceptional situations, 
the member states on the external border may have to care 
for very large numbers of asylum seekers under the cur-
rent regime. Even if all parties fully discharge their duties, 
these member states may become overburdened. This 
issue clearly requires a long-term solution. Humanitar-
ian assistance to refugees outside the EU (see section 2.1) 
combined with third country agreements to curb irregu-
lar migration provide a viable solution for both human-
itarian and economic reasons. At the same time, more 
participation by EU member states in international reset-
tlement schemes – or other types of active resettlement 
from third countries to the EU – could offer protection to 
the most vulnerable refugees. 
In section 2.3 below we turn to some of the nuances of 
the EU’s response to the refugee crisis. We identify addi-
tional problems arising from i) the timing of implement-
ing new policies in the different areas and ii) the politi-
cal feasibility of all policies related to relocation to the EU 
from third countries.
13 Council of the European 
Union, “European Border and 
Coast Guard: Final approval,” 
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member states to close their internal borders and thereby 
potentially exacerbate an emergency in the country.14 
Another fundamental issue is the linkage between 
search and rescue (SAR) operations carried out by the 
agency and the responsibility of the EU member state of 
first arrival for the asylum process of those rescued. Coop-
eration between the EBCG and member states is not fully 
incentive-compatible because the latter are expected to 
bear the additional financial and administrative burdens 
of receiving even more asylum seekers. 
Carrera et al. (2017) propose to resolve this problem by 
making all asylum seekers rescued through SAR a joint 
EU responsibility and redistributing them according to 
the Commission’s redistribution key suggested in its 2016 
proposal to recast the Dublin system.15 While this is a 
preferred, equitable, first-best solution, there is currently 
fierce political resistance against any mandatory redistri-
bution scheme by some member states. Hence, whether 
the proposal and the proposed recast of the Dublin sys-
tem can be adopted any time soon, or at all, is currently 
uncertain. 
In addition, the new EBCG needs to address a difficult 
trade-off: on the one hand, it saves lives in the Mediterra-
nean; on the other hand, more extensive SAR operations 
could create an incentive for people smugglers to put 
more irregular migrants (many, if not most of whom will 
not qualify for asylum) on unseaworthy boats, leading to 
more people embarking on the dangerous trip across the 
Mediterranean. SAR operations close to the Libyan shore 
could therefore create undesirable incentives on the part 
of smugglers and migrants; however, the existence of such 
a ‘pull’ factor is disputed (Carrera et al. 2017). We argue 
below that, in light of the current situation in Libya, EU 
authorities should aim at preventing irregular migration 
before it reaches Libyan territory. 
With the above in mind, one possible solution to curb 
irregular migration flows from (and eventually, to) Libya 
may involve reception centers in the EU region of arrival 
where asylum seekers remain until their status has been 
decided and they are either obliged to return to their 
home countries (probably the majority of immigrants on 
the central Mediterranean route – see section 2.1, Figure 
2.2) or they are allowed to settle in the country of arrival 
(or elsewhere in the EU, based on (voluntary) redistribu-
tion – see section 2.2). EU institutions – mainly the Euro-
pean Asylum Support Office, Frontex, and Europol – are 
already assisting Greece and Italy in such reception cen-
ters, the so-called hotspots. This approach may need scal-
ing up. 
Second, the EU is moving toward more rigorous 
checks at the Schengen area’s external borders through 
the introduction of new technology.16 On March 2, 2017, 
the Council agreed to start negotiations with the Par-
liament on a Commission proposal for a new entry-exit 
system.17 While these may improve the functionality of 
the CEAS, they will not decrease pressure from immigra-
tion significantly.
Cooperation with third countries
On March 18, 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed on a contro-
versial deal to curb irregular migration to Greece.18  Start-
ing on March 20, 2016, it stipulates that every irregular 
migrant arriving in Greece from Turkey via the Mediterra-
nean is to be returned to Turkey. For every Syrian returned, 
a one-for-one mechanism selects a Syrian citizen, based on 
UN vulnerability criteria, from the refugee camps in Tur-
key for resettlement in the EU. As of March 2017, 3,565 Syr-
ians had been resettled from Turkey under the one-for-one 
scheme.19
In the broader picture, this deal helped to regain control 
over irregular immigration into the EU. However, for it not 
to violate the 1951 refugee convention and its 1967 proto-
col critically hinges on the status of Turkey as a safe coun-
try, in particular related to the issue of non-refoulement. 
The Commission’s view that domestic legislation in Tur-
key guarantees safety and fundamental rights is disputed.20 
Furthermore, the recent ruling of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union indicates that the EU-Turkey deal has 
weaknesses when it comes to political accountability and 
judicial oversight (Carrera et al. 2017). Future agreements 
with third countries will therefore have to be embedded in 
a democratically legitimized and clearly defined humani-
tarian and judicial framework.
While the EU-Turkey statement in its current form is 
therefore not an ideal template for future EU action, pre-
venting irregular migration into the EU at its source and 
ensuring readmission of migrants not eligible for asylum 
should be the way ahead for both humanitarian and polit-
ical reasons. The Migration Partnership Framework with 
third countries from June 9, 2016 is a step in this direc-
tion and lays out the future approach formally.21 Within 
so-called country-specific ‘compacts,’ EU authorities ini-
tially target Jordan, Lebanon, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Sene-
gal, and Ethiopia in order to curb irregular migration to the 
EU. The compacts’ short-term objectives are to both assure 
an effective readmission procedure and stop migrants in 
source and transit countries from embarking on the dan-
gerous trip to the EU. The new Cooperation Agreement on 
Partnership and Development with Afghanistan, while still 
at the fledgling stage, may further ease migratory pressure 
from one of the main source countries in the long term.22 
As these compacts inevitably increase the burden of han-
dling readmission procedures and improved border man-
agement for developing countries, the EU has increased 
the budget of the European Development Fund by €0.5 
billion for their support. The funds can be channeled into 
tailor-made development projects in the partner countries 
to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and thus 
create an incentive for partner countries to comply in par-
ticular with the readmission agreements. In addition, there 
is an EU external investment plan financed by €3.35 billion 
from EU funds through 2020 (with the European Fund for 
Sustainable Development as the main funding device) that 
aims to raise further funds from member states. This pro-
gram may generate additional private sector investment 
and could further foster economic opportunities in the 
partner countries.23  
Apart from the Eastern Mediterranean migrant route 
from Turkey to Greece, the second major route is the one 
across the central Mediterranean with Libya as the main 
point of departure (see section 2.2). The Malta Declara-
tion of the European Council on the external aspects of 
migration addressed this migratory route and includes 
Libya in the list of partners (February 2, 2017).24 EU 
14 See Carrera et al. (2017) for 
a detailed critical assessment 
of the European Border and 
Coast Guard. 
15 European Commission, Pro-
posal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member 
State responsible for exam-
ining an application for inter-
national protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by 
a third-country national or a 
stateless person recast, Brus-
sels, May 4, 2016, https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/transparency/regdoc/
rep/1/2016/EN/1-2016-270-
EN-F1-1.PDF (accessed May 
3, 2017).
16 Council of the European 
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19 European Commission, 
Tenth report on relocation 
and resettlement, Report from 
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authorities will train the Libyan national coast guard 
to combat smuggling networks, run information cam-
paigns geared toward irregular migrants, and help the 
Libyan authorities with capacity building at their exter-
nal borders. EU authorities also endorsed the bilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and the 
UN-backed Libyan government, which contains similar 
objectives.25  
In Libya, the situation remains characterized by politi-
cal instability and severe human rights violations against 
migrants and segments of the local population.26 It there-
fore remains to be seen if the envisaged EU and Italian 
measures can be implemented effectively in Libya. Given 
the situation there, the priority of EU-conducted mea-
sures should clearly be on preventing migration flows into 
Libya from other African source and transit countries. 
In conclusion, the new readmission agreements with 
African countries and, importantly, potentially with 
Afghanistan, may lead to a faster repatriation of rejected 
asylum seekers and may also discourage potential emi-
grants from embarking on the journey to Europe. At the 
same time, the increased financial development assis-
tance may further reduce emigration, even if its direct 
effectiveness on the root causes is heavily contested and 
the impact on irregular migration may solely stem from 
the lever EU authorities gain over the governments of 
third countries.27 Overall, deterrent EU policies to curb 
irregular migration at their source have made progress 
over the past two years.
... while putting the EU’s house in order … 
Alleviating migratory pressure in the member states 
on the external border
The solution most often advocated to ensure an equita-
ble sharing of responsibility for humanitarian migrants 
in the EU is to relocate refugees across member states and 
thereby ease the strain that the current regime puts on 
member states on the external border. A relocation mech-
anism would be fair to refugees: despite the undeniable 
differences in labor market opportunities and welfare 
generosity across the EU, even the least developed Euro-
pean countries offer protection from persecution and a 
higher standard of living to refugees on average than in 
the most common source countries (Carrera and Gros 
2015). Refugees would be discouraged from simply mov-
ing on to more attractive destinations because they would 
lose social assistance and the right to legal employment. 
If the threat of these penalties turns out to be insufficient 
to prevent intra-EU refugee flows, additional sanctions – 
up to the withdrawal of the refugee status or the outright 
rejection of an ongoing asylum request – would have to be 
considered. 
The physical relocation of refugees is without a doubt 
a potentially useful tool to correct for the burden put on 
member states on the external border by the Dublin Reg-
ulation. In theory, an external border managed by EU 
authorities in combination with a functioning, centrally 
managed scheme for relocation would allow for a welfare- 
maximizing, first-best solution to offering protection to 
humanitarian migrants. It could account for member 
states’ preferences while correcting for the public good 
characteristics of the protection of refugees in the EU (see 
section 2.1 and Hatton 2015). The price of opting out could 
potentially be determined on a market through tradable ref-
ugee-admission quotas, following an initial quota assign-
ment to member states by EU authorities (Fernández- 
Huertas Moraga and Rapoport 2014). A matching mecha-
nism whereby member states list their preferences for ref-
ugees and refugees list their preferences for member states 
could enhance efficiency and incentivize participation in 
the relocation scheme. 
In response to the high migratory pressure on Greece, 
Italy, and other member states, European home affairs 
ministers decided to relocate a total of 160,000 refugees 
across the EU.28 Financed by €1 billion from the EU bud-
get (around €6,000 per relocated refugee – which is less 
than the estimated annual cost of a refugee in most EU 
member states), the distribution among countries follows 
a sensible key: i) 40 percent is based on the size of the pop-
ulation, ii) 40 percent on the member state’s GDP, iii) 10 
percent on the average number of past asylum applica-
tions to the member state and iv) 10 percent on the mem-
ber state’s current unemployment rate.29 Only asylum 
seekers whose nationalities have an average EU-wide asy-
lum recognition rate equal to or higher than 75 percent are 
eligible for relocation. 
This list is updated quarterly based on Eurostat num-
bers and, as of April 1, 2017, does not include Afghanistan, 
Nigeria, or Somalia, three main source countries of asy-
lum seekers arriving in Italy and Greece.30
The relocation mechanism relies on a hotspot approach. 
Hotspots are external border areas exposed to a high 
existing or potential number of arriving migrants (see 
Neville et al. 2016). Upon request by a member state, EU 
agencies provide support related mainly to i) the registra-
tion and screening of immigrants (Frontex), ii) the asy-
lum process and relocation of immigrants identified as 
in need of international protection (EASO), and iii) vol-
untary or forced return (Frontex). The current hotspot 
approach leaves member states responsible for reception 
facilities. We argue below that this  approach is a step in 
the right direction but is incomplete in its current form for 
humanitarian and practical reasons.
The relocation mechanism was decided by the Coun-
cil through a qualified majority, a situation considered 
unusual in matters of asylum and immigration policy. The 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary voted 
against it, while Finland abstained.31 On October 25, 2015, 
only a few months after the scheme had been launched, 
a change of government in Poland made that country 
reluctant to take in its allocated share. It is therefore not 
surprising that compliance and operational issues have 
severely impeded the relocation scheme. In addition to the 
unwillingness to cooperate in various Central and East-
ern European countries, a number of additional issues 
have cropped up. Hotspots not being fully functional in 
Greece and Italy, insufficient means for transfers, mem-
ber states not providing the necessary reception facilities, 
and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of refugees to partic-
ipate in the scheme (“Why risk being stuck in Romania if 
your feet can take you to Germany?”) are the main diffi-
culties that still slow down relocation (Maiani 2016). As of 
April 21, 2017, only 16,998 people had been resettled from 
Italy and Greece.32 
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Despite this slow pace of implementation, the Commis-
sion aims to introduce a new permanent fairness mech-
anism within its proposed reform of the Dublin system 
of May 4, 2016.33 In the proposal, relocation is triggered 
if asylum applications to an EU member state exceed 150 
percent of the number assigned to the country under a ref-
erence key based on population and wealth. The proposed 
EU burden-sharing scheme includes a temporary opt-
out option – a “solidarity contribution” of €250,000 that 
can be paid by member states for each applicant rejected 
who had been assigned to it by the burden-sharing quota. 
Although the calculations on which the amount is based 
are not transparent – preferably, it would be based on 
actual costs in an accountable manner – the proposal 
begins to address the lack of enforcement in the existing 
redistribution scheme for refugees. 
Two other elements are important in this proposal: 
First, asylum applications still have to be lodged in the 
country of first irregular entry and the responsible coun-
try has to carry out an admissibility check prior to relo-
cation. The admissibility check is necessary to mini-
mize adverse incentives on the part of asylum seekers by 
deterring migrants with purely economic motives who 
must still expect to be rejected at the border. The con-
cern remains that in conducting the admissibility check, 
the EU member states of first entry continue to have an 
incentive to formally admit and send on inadmissible asy-
lum seekers to avoid repatriation costs. The issue can only 
be overcome by a more rigorous, albeit time-consuming, 
administrative procedure in which the receiving country 
confirms the admissibility check and only then accepts 
the allocated asylum seeker to start the full asylum proce-
dure. Ideally, an EU-financed and assembled body is put 
in charge of controlling admissibility, beyond the current 
hotspot approach. Such a body could form part of a Euro-
pean border and asylum service as suggested by Carrera 
et al. (2017). It could further improve the current poor liv-
ing conditions of asylum seekers in reception centers in 
hotspot areas (Guild et al. 2017).
Second, the suggested burden-sharing scheme explic-
itly accounts for asylum seekers resettled from third coun-
tries. This means a member state could decide to resettle 
refugees from third countries in sufficient numbers (i.e. 
100 percent of their assigned quota under the reference 
key) and thereby avoid both participating in the EU fair-
ness mechanism and paying the solidarity contribution.
However, it is uncertain whether the proposal in its cur-
rent form will be adopted. Several member states appear 
unwilling to assume their assigned responsibilities. The 
Visegrad countries in particular oppose any mandatory 
quota system.34 Despite other member states urging them 
to propose an alternative relocation mechanism, they 
reiterated their reluctance to commit to any mandatory 
quota in January 2017 and have not yet tabled a concrete 
suggestion.35
Thus, for political reasons, the mechanism remains 
a theoretical solution at this stage. Formally bring-
ing together a coalition of the willing, which is implic-
itly allowed for in the Dublin III Regulation through the 
sovereignty clause, is a feasible way toward a sustainable 
EU refugee relocation scheme when political feasibility is 
accepted as a constraint.36 Such a voluntary mechanism 
could then either explicitly take the preferences of mem-
ber states and refugees into account or would have to find 
a way to legally oblige refugees to participate in relocation. 
A coalition of the willing is clearly only a second-best 
solution to a public good problem. Still, since proposals for 
intra-EU relocation mechanisms are likely to peter out in 
the current political environment and the approach would 
leave the door open to a permanent solution involving all 
EU member states, it is currently the best option available. 
As suggested below, an higher EU funding could support 
those member states that take on responsibility for refu-
gees in a ‘money follows the refugee’ approach. 
Financial burden sharing
Under the current (Dublin) asylum regime as well as 
any conceivable, future regime, EU member states on 
the external border bear a disproportionate share of 
the financial cost and administrative effort. They are 
responsible for hosting irregular migrants, conduct-
ing asylum procedures, repatriating those whose asy-
lum application is rejected, and integrating recognized 
refugees into their economies and societies. As we have 
argued with respect to the global governance of refugee 
protection (section 2.1) and in the absence of a function-
ing relocation scheme, there is a strong case for financial 
burden sharing within the EU. 
In the long term, it would be desirable for the EU to 
take over external border management and related costs 
– including those related to asylum policy – and provide 
for these costs in the multi-annual budget framework. 
Until then, member states on the external border ought 
to be compensated for the verifiable costs of the asylum 
process up until the final decision on whether asylum 
will be granted, including repatriation if applicable. For 
the compensation of costs associated with economic and 
social integration, these would have to be estimated for 
all external border countries respectively on a PPP basis. 
The current financial burden sharing between EU 
member states through official EU support is far from 
a full compensation scheme. A total of €3.9 billion was 
allocated from the EU budget to member states in 2015 
and 2016 in response to the crisis situation.37 Yet recent 
estimates from the OECD (2017) put the unweighted 
average cost of processing asylum applications and car-
ing for asylum seekers at €10,000 per asylum seeker for 
the first year in the main recipient countries. This esti-
mate does not include integration measures during the 
asylum phase. With 2.46 million first-time asylum appli-
cants in the EU-28 in 2015 and 2016,38 this simple esti-
mate puts the total short-term costs at €24.6 billion.39  
While some member states like Greece have received 
a larger share from the asylum-related EU budget than 
others, this simple calculation shows that EU funds ded-
icated to asylum-related tasks within the EU need to 
be vastly increased. Not only would fuller compensa-
tion incentivize the member states on the external bor-
der to comply with their duties (a ‘money follows the 
refugee’ approach would further encourage member 
states to participate in an EU relocation mechanism). It 
would also compensate those member states that have 
borne the brunt of the recent inflows. To make it equi-
table, financing could come either directly from EU 
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funds (which would have to be increased accordingly) 
or from an additional fund to which member states con-
tribute according to their ability to pay (typically, based 
on their GDP). 
... and opening the front door
Granting legal access to member states’ territories for 
third-country nationals falls squarely within the compe-
tences of member states. Hence, policy innovations neces-
sarily rely on member states’ willingness to contribute. In 
practice, the only option absent substantial further inte-
gration is to count on a coalition of the willing. 
Increasing resettlement from third countries
To enhance legal pathways for humanitarian migrants to 
the EU, the Commission proposed on July 13, 2016 to cre-
ate a common EU resettlement framework. This resettle-
ment scheme from third countries should therefore be 
seen as complementary to the new Migration Partner-
ship Framework. The Commission further suggests that 
in order “to support Member States’ resettlement efforts 
under the targeted EU schemes, the Commission will pro-
vide €10,000 from the EU budget for each person reset-
tled. The funds will be allocated from the EU’s Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund. Resettlements outside of 
the Union resettlement framework will not be supported 
financially by the Union’s budget.”40 Under the envisaged 
scheme, each member state commits to a maximum num-
ber of resettled persons on an annual basis. Member states 
remain largely in charge of the practical operations related 
to identification, assessment of eligibility, and decisions 
on resettlement. The Commission, for its part, proposes 
the annual geographical focus of the resettlement scheme. 
The added value of EU coordination is the potential for 
a more strategic use of resettlement policy in the over-
all management of migration to EU countries. Given that 
member states retain control of the number of individ-
uals resettled in their territory, the proposal effectively 
amounts to establishing a coalition of the willing. 
The EU resettlement framework foresees a procedure 
in which assessing the fulfilment of refugee status is con-
ducted in the third country prior to resettlement. As 
pointed out by Carrera and Guild (2017), this is not with-
out its legal challenges. Nevertheless, the procedure is sim-
ilar to the one used by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the proposal explicitly 
mentions the potential of relying on UNHCR when iden-
tifying and assessing eligibility. 
The proposed framework moves in the right direction of 
a fairer migration policy. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that 
in order to muster a genuine alternative to arriving in the 
EU through the ‘back door,’ member states’ resettlement 
policies will need to shift gears. In 2015, which saw the most 
resettlements of the past 10 years, only 8,155 out of more 
than 330,000 positive decisions on asylum came through 
resettlements.41 We therefore call upon member states to 
start the process of increasing their national resettlement 
programs (through UNHCR or other agencies) even before 
EU legislation is passed. Member states’ incentives when it 
comes to relieving irregular migratory pressure on the EU 
are broadly aligned. Hence, even without EU coordination, 
individual member states’ programs have an impact. 
Opening legal pathways for labor migration
EU countries where labor market conditions and the 
demographic outlook are favorable to labor immigration 
should further open up opportunities for legal migration 
from third countries. The EU Blue Card Directive and its 
latest proposed revision target highly qualified individu-
als.42 At the same time, some member states may also ben-
efit from immigration by low- and medium-skilled work-
ers. Providing third-country citizens with legal channels 
of labor migration to the EU could potentially serve as 
a further instrument to curb irregular migration flows. 
Governments of source countries may find it easier to 
cooperate with the EU in curbing irregular migration, e.g. 
through readmission agreements, if they can offer their 
citizens the prospect of legal migration. Development 
assistance from the EU and its member states could pro-
mote vocational training to develop skills that are use-
ful in the country of origin and also allow participants to 
qualify for legal work in the EU. As with resettlement, the 
more EU countries are able to speak with one voice, e.g. by 
pooling the numbers of legal migrants accepted, the more 
leverage they will obtain with source countries.
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M ost EU member states are now facing the chal-lenge of integrating immigrants into their labor markets and into their societies. This challenge is 
compounded by the diversity of immigrants’ backgrounds 
and migration patterns –  some have come to work, oth-
ers as family members, yet others as asylum seekers or 
students; some temporarily, others permanently (see 
chapter 1). The integration of migrants into the labor mar-
ket (sections 3.1 and 3.3) becomes crucial in avoiding the 
risk that migrants use the welfare state more than the local 
population. On the other hand, if migrants are employed, 
local workers may fear competition, which may affect 
popular attitudes toward migrants and immigration (sec-
tion 3.2). 
Research into the effects of migration on the labor mar-
ket and on the welfare state is very rich. Without detract-
ing from the diversity of results in the literature, a fair 
summary is that the economic effects on the country of 
destination are, on aggregate, small. Whether they are 
positive or negative depends on the socioeconomic char-
acteristics of the new immigrants and a whole host of 
country-specific factors. By contrast, migrants usually 
benefit economically from migration if they move from 
a low-wage to a high-wage country. Since migrants often 
send remittances to family members in their countries of 
origin, the latter also, in general, benefit. 
These economic effects of migration in sending and in 
destination countries have been widely discussed and are 
3. Immigrant integration in 
the EU: Diverse experiences 
across host countries and 
regions, public attitudes 
toward immigrants, and policy 
interventions for labor market 
integration
well known. Therefore, we do not further address them 
in this Assessment Report. Interestingly, also, most indi-
viduals who are skeptical about immigration or immi-
grants are not primarily concerned about any negative 
economic impact that they themselves might experience. 
Rather, many skeptics are concerned about how their 
‘peers’ might be affected, while their collective identity 
tends to be ethnically based (rather than civic) and their 
perspective national (rather than European).
This chapter focuses on immigrants’ economic and 
social integration, which serves as a broad measure of 
immigration success. Section 3.1 provides an overview of 
the integration outcomes of immigrants across EU coun-
tries and highlights the variety of immigrant experiences 
in Europe. Section 3.2 explores the determinants of pop-
ular attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. The 
attitudes of local citizens as voters not only determine the 
immigration policies of host countries. The way the resi-
dent population receives immigrants also affects how suc-
cessfully the latter integrate into the labor market and 
into social life. Finally, section 3.3 focuses on refugees, 
who face particularly difficult integration challenges. We 
discuss the determinants of the economic integration of 
forced migrants and provide evidence-based recommen-
dations for policy interventions to facilitate labor mar-
ket entry and, hence, improve the economic and social 
well-being of refugees as well as the attitudes of the local 
population toward them.
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I n economic research, ‘integration’ is usually under-stood as ‘convergence’ in the outcomes of immigrants and those of the host population in various social and 
economic dimensions, such as labor market participa-
tion, earnings, educational attainment, health, and demo-
graphic behavior. This section focuses on the economic 
and education dimensions of integration. Economic inte-
gration represents a fundamental step for migrants as it 
enables them to act in their adopted society. Although 
economic integration does not guarantee social integra-
tion, it definitely facilitates it. Education is another cru-
cial dimension. It has long been considered a way of social 
advancement for all and in particular for immigrant fam-
ilies. Many migrants have a low level of skills and lack 
accumulated wealth and longstanding social networks. 
For them education represents a unique opportunity for 
social mobility for the next generation (Di Bartolomeo 
2011). The education and economic dimensions are also 
intrinsically interrelated. Better educated migrants are 
more productive and thus less likely to be net receivers 
of state welfare, and in turn, will be better accepted by 
receiving societies. Moreover, success in the education 
system would allow their children to obtain higher pay-
ing, higher status jobs with a contemporaneous rise in the 
family’s social standing.
Within the economic dimension, the focus is on 
employment and income dynamics to approach both its 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. In other words, this 
section analyses if and how migrants do integrate into 
host labor markets. As far as education is concerned, the 
analysis focuses on education levels and compares first- 
and second-generation migrants’ performances. Method-
ologically, immigrants are always compared with the local 
population (the majority group).
In this section, we use the migrant definition that 
refers to someone who has been born abroad. An alterna-
tive definition would rely on people’s foreign citizenship. 
However, this might give us a distorted picture because 
the challenges of economic and social integration do not 
depend on whether an immigrant becomes a natural-
ized citizen of their host country. Rules and practices for 
acquiring citizenship differ across EU member states, too. 
The definition based on citizenship also mixes up first- 
and second-generation immigrants, both of whom may 
be foreign citizens, whereas the latter would be born in 
the host country and not be immigrants according to our 
country-of-birth definition. This section always considers 
the performances of two migrant groups, namely people 
born in other EU countries (EU migrants) and in non-EU 
countries (third-country nationals).
Concerning their demographic characteristics, the pop-
ulation aged 25–54 has been selected to minimize the bias 
3.1 Immigrant integration in 
the EU: Employment, income, 
and education
 
 Lead authors: Anna Di Bartolomeo, Rezart Hoxhaj and Alessandra Venturini
due to i) migration related to reasons such as study or 
retirement, which varies extensively across destination 
countries; and ii) differences in age composition between 
the host population and migrants. In so doing, the two 
groups are more homogeneous for the sake of interna-
tional comparison. Data are taken from the 2014 EU 
Labor Force Survey micro dataset.
An interesting contribution is the attempt to analyze 
integration between countries and between regions.
Integration in the labor market: Employment 
The labor market outcomes of migrants vary from Euro-
pean country to country for several reasons:1
•  First, the functioning of the labor market and the eco-
nomic situation of host countries, which condition the 
probability of finding a job, are quite different. For 
instance, the unemployment rate ranged between 4 
percent in Germany and 22 percent in Spain in 2014. 
In addition, the presence of high unemployment ben-
efits (as in Sweden) discourages a rapid entrance into 
the labor market.
•  The selectivity of immigration policies conditions 
labor market outcomes. Typically, the higher the 
education level, the better is the level of economic 
integration.
•  Last, destination countries also differ in integration 
policies and in terms of the amount of funds involved 
in the integration process, which condition the effi-
ciency of any intervention.
On average, migrants have less access to employment 
opportunities than local people: the average employment 
rates equal 67.6 and 78.8 percent respectively. But, while 
for EU migrants the average rate (75 percent) is very close 
to that of the local population, the average employment 
rate of third-country nationals is much lower (64 percent).
The employment outcomes of third-country nationals, 
however, do show a high degree of heterogeneity between 
countries (Figure 3.1). Specifically, in our data, at least 
three main ‘integration groups’ seem to coexist: 1) the 
‘southern EU countries’, composed of recent immigra-
tion countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain); 2) the 
‘north-western EU countries’, which include longstand-
ing EU immigration countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom) and Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Fin-
land, and Denmark); and 3) the ‘new EU accession coun-
tries’ (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Romania, Poland, 1 See Venturini (2017).
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Slovenia, and Slovakia). In the first group, differentials 
between third-country nationals and local  residents are 
not so pronounced even if at a lower absolute level. By 
contrast, longstanding countries of immigration and 
Scandinavian countries have very large differences. The 
new EU accession countries present minimal employ-
ment-rate differences between third-country nationals 
and local people.
The picture does not change a lot when we disaggregate 
the employment rate differences by gender. However, a 
few points are worth noting in this regard:
•  Female employment differentials are much higher than 
male ones. This is true especially for some longstanding 
and Scandinavian countries of immigration – Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden – 
where the gaps between third-country nationals and 
local women’s employment rates exceed 25 percentage 
points. This result may reflect the fact that women have 
reached northern and western Europe mainly through 
family reunification and asylum-seeking schemes 
rather than as economic migrants. The low employment 
of women calls for more gender-oriented policy actions 
(Barslund et al., 2017) that take into account the chan-
nels of entrance to foster their labor market integration.
•  In the majority of new EU accession countries (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia), 
men coming from third countries have better employ-
ment chances compared with both the local population 
and EU migrants. These countries have attracted a few 
highly skilled third-country nationals whose ability to 
integrate into the labor market is higher. 
•  These reported differences between the host societies 
and immigrants reflect in part the fact that immigrants 
are, on average, less well educated and younger than 
local residents. When we control for age and education 
level, employment differences between the local resi-
dents and immigrants persist almost everywhere, but 
they are smaller. This result seems to support the idea 
that national labor market structures and the selectiv-
ity of immigration policies condition large parts of the 
observed gaps. Southern European states, which present 
a strong degree of labor market segmentation in terms 
of origin and gender, have attracted mainly economic 
migrants in ‘migrant-specific’ sectors, such as agricul-
ture, tourism, and the construction industry for men 
and the elderly care sector for women (Strom et al. 2013; 
De la Rica et al. 2013; Simon et al. 2014). Meanwhile, 
longstanding immigration and Scandinavian coun-
tries have not selected immigrants for labor market 
needs, favoring instead family migration and asylum 
seeker inflows, respectively. An additional effect on the 
employment integration of migrants is represented by 
the very generous welfare state regimes applied by Scan-
dinavian countries, which slow down migrant partici-
pation in the labor market (Nordin and Roth 2009).
Figure 3.1 Employment rates of local residents and (EU and third-country) migrants  
by EU country of residence and gender, 2014
Men Women





























EU migrants Third country nationals Native residents
Source: Own calculations based on EU-LFS Eurostat Labor Force Survey 2014 data.
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Figure 3.2 Probability of being in the tenth (top) and the first (bottom) income decile 
local residents vs. (EU and third-country) migrants, by gender, 2014
The U.K. deserves special attention here. There, employ-
ment differences are extremely low, except for female 
third-country nationals whose employment rate differ-
ential with local women equals around -20 percentage 
points. Yet, once controlled for gender, age, and education, 
the gap widens, indicating that although migrants have 
better ‘structural’ characteristics, they face difficulties in 
finding proper employment. As a result, while the U.K. 
has succeeded in selecting ‘the best and the brightest’, it 
has failed in fully integrating them into the labor market.
Integration in the labor market: Income
In terms of earnings, third-country nationals are dramati-
cally more likely to be concentrated in the bottom decile of 
the income distribution than local residents.2 Indeed, very 
few migrants are found in the top income decile distribu-
tion compared with the host population. EU migrants are 
again in a better position here (Figure 3.2).
Many differences emerge when EU statistics are com-
pared, revealing a high degree of heterogeneity by migrant 
origin. Large discrepancies are especially found in two 
southern European countries – Greece and Italy – where 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-LFS Eurostat Labor Force Survey 2014 data.
2 Income is defined as  
monthly (take home) pay from 
main job.
the proportion of third-country nationals (male and 
female) in the bottom income decile is higher when com-
pared with their local counterparts. In longstanding coun-
tries of immigration, the situation is more varied, with Ger-
many and Finland patterned like the southern European 
group. Again, third-country nationals are highly integrated 
in the majority of ‘new EU accession countries’ – Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. This would sug-
gest that this group is mainly composed of highly skilled 
individuals with relatively good integration outcomes.
In terms of gender, in almost all groups of countries 
women’s presence in the bottom income decile is signifi-
cantly higher than that of their local counterparts and even 
greater than migrant men.
When controlling for age and education, the situation 
does not vary significantly. In most cases, differences tend 
to be reduced but not to disappear. This suggests that differ-
ences in composition do not play a major role in explaining 
income probability gaps. Other determinants, such as dis-
crimination and a low level of upward professional mobil-
ity, may in part explain why differentials in income persist 
over time. 
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Education outcomes
When comparing educational attainment levels between 
migrant generations and local people (Figure 3.3), we 
observe large heterogeneous outcomes by country and 
by gender. In recent European countries of immigration, 
second-generation migrants are significantly better edu-
cated than their parents. This partially reflects the fact 
that in these countries – and especially in Italy and Por-
tugal – the education level of first-generation migrants is 
particularly low. In addition, second-generation migrants 
are typically better off than their parents due to the 
higher level of language proficiency and the country-spe-
cific skills they have acquired as they have grown up and 
attained education in the country of destination. By con-
trast, Scandinavian countries are characterized by very 
high levels of educational attainment of both groups (first- 
and second-generation migrants), with no significant dis-
crepancies compared with the host population. 
In both longstanding immigration countries and new 
EU accession countries, the picture is extremely hetero-
geneous and there are no clear trends. The U.K. is again 
a case in point. Here, driven by labor market demand 
and a selective immigration policy, the education level of 
migrants is actually higher than that of the local popula-
tion, regardless of gender or generation. Concerning gen-
der differences, there is a clear pattern of higher invest-
ment in education for second-generation women over 
men. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to distin-
guish between EU migrants and third-country nationals.
Employment outcomes: A regional analysis
Migrants’ integration has a strong regional dimension 
as integration takes place in practice at lower levels than 
national ones. The regions are indeed, today, crucial nodes 
for the shaping of immigrant integration policies every-
where in Europe. Here, we conduct a first analysis of inte-
gration outcomes and migrants’ incidence at a regional 
level.
Overall, data confirm a high level of heterogene-
ity within states. Systematically, the higher values of the 
regional dispersion of employment rates are found for 
both types of migrants compared with local people (Table 
3.1). In addition, with some exceptions, third-country 
nationals’ outcomes show a higher degree of variability 
within states compared with those for EU migrants. Also, 
income dispersion rates show a high degree of regional 
variation, although in some countries, greater variation 
is found for EU migrants than for third-country nation-
als. This pattern is linked to their different skill profiles, 
which is more homogenous for third-country nationals 
than for EU migrants.
Figure 3.3 Share (%) of the tertiary educated by EU country of residence 
first-generation migrants, second-generation migrants, and the host population, by gender, 2014
Source: Own elaboration based on EU-LFS Eurostat Labor Force Survey data for 2014 (ad hoc module).
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This regional variation is certainly also associated with 
the strong role adopted by regional governance over time. 
Specifically, the fact that integration policies are normally 
implemented and designed at the regional and local levels 
has two major consequences. On the one hand, integra-
tion measures have created differences in opportunities 
and incentives among regions, large and small cities, and 
urban and rural zones. On the other hand, the engage-
ment of actors of this kind has resulted in many more ad 
hoc interventions in accordance with local needs and pri-
orities. In so doing, local actors are able to address specific 
territorial needs and counterbalance the shortcomings of 
national and supranational policies.
When looking at the link between integration out-
comes and migrant presence in a given territory, inter-
esting findings emerge. In particular, an opposite trend is 
observed between EU migrants and third-country nation-
als. In terms of access to the labor market, high employ-
ment rates are associated with high shares of EU migrants 
in the total population. Conversely, the higher the share of 
employed third-country nationals, the lower is their rela-
tive presence by region (Figure 3.4). Concerning the cor-
relation between the probability of being in the bottom 
income decile and migrant shares, no significant asso-
ciation is found for EU migrants, while a weak but pos-
itive one is observed among third-country nationals. 
Overall, despite there being no strong trend, the (weak 
but) positive correlation between the employment out-
comes of EU migrants and their degree of concentration 
suggests that they are highly mobile and face fewer obsta-
cles in the labor market. At the same time, the (weak but) 
negative association found between third-country nation-
als’ employment outcomes and their degree of concentra-
tion suggests that this group of migrants is more likely to 
be trapped into “ethnic community enclaves” (Hatton and 
Leigh 2011), with few alternative sources of information 
and low employment opportunities. These results are con-
ditioned by the different human capital of EU migrants 
compared with third-country nationals.
Concluding remarks
Integration measured as success in labor market partic-
ipation and income outcomes do show a high degree of 
heterogeneity across Europe. Our descriptive results note 
the different paths toward socioeconomic integration for 
EU migrants and third-country nationals. The different 
paths are determined or influenced by the various char-
acteristics of destination countries (such as labor market 
structure and institutions, welfare systems, discrimina-
tion patterns, etc.), the role played by their diverse migra-
tion policies, and migrant characteristics.
In spite of this high degree of heterogeneity, some 
clear trends seem to emerge: First, a trade-off between 
the employment-income dimensions is clearly observed 
in our cross-country analysis, in which better employ-
ment outcomes are counterbalanced by poor economic 
conditions in terms of income. Migrants show a low (neg-
ative) difference in employment compared with the local 
population in countries where they are at the bottom of 
the income distribution and vice versa. The labor mar-
ket differential, controlling for gender, age, and education 
is reduced but does not change the general picture indi-
cating that the assorted characteristics are not the main 
driver of the differential. 
Second, the most critical situation is that of immigrant 
women from third countries. They are poorly integrated 
into host societies from an economic perspective regard-
less of age or education. This is true especially for some 
longstanding immigration countries and Scandinavian 
countries, such as Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Table 3.1 Regional dispersion rates*  
of (a) employment rates and (b) the probability of being in the bottom (first) income decile of the local  
residents, EU migrants, and third-country nationals’ by country of residence, 2014
Sources: Own elaboration based on EU LFS data for 2014. Note: The abbreviation n.a. stands for ‘not available’. * Dispersion rates represent the coefficient of vari-
ations (ratio of the standard deviation to the mean)*100 computed at a regional (NUTS2) level within states.
EU country 
of residence
Employment rate (a) Probablility of being in the bottom income decile (b)
Local people EU migrants Third-country  
nationals
Local people EU migrants Third-country  
nationals
AT 2.3 3.7 9.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
BE 7.5 6.1 14.3 27.5 24.3 20.7
DK 1.2 1.7 8.2 21.6 28.8 33.7
ES 10.6 12.7 18.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
FR 10.0 14.7 22.5 43.2 85.9 53.7
GR 3.7 17.1 16.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
HR 2.2 9.7 7.3 43.7 57.2 31.6
HU 5.2 5.5 15.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
IE 2.2 5.7 9.2 11.3 4.9 8.2
PT 4.5 16.9 6.2 35.1 82.1 31.7
SE 1.8 8.9 7.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
SI 3.7 0.5 5.3 0.2 84.7 26.7
SK 6.4 34.5 13.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
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Denmark, and Sweden. This is worth noting as, by com-
parison, EU women migrants are better off elsewhere, 
especially in new EU accession countries.
Third, we found some variation within countries, too. 
In particular, our results show different models of eco-
nomic incorporation for EU migrants and third-country 
nationals. EU migrants are more mobile, with migration 
trajectories driven by job opportunities. Third-country 
nationals appear to be a more homogenous group in terms 
of skills, are less mobile, and are concentrated in places 
that offer fewer job opportunities.
The integration of third-country nationals, measured in 
terms of educational attainment or human capital accumu-
lation, shows a positive pattern across generations. With 
few exceptions, second-generation migrants are more edu-
cated than first-generation ones. The increase in educa-
tional attainment has the potential to produce positive 
effects in the socioeconomic integration of second-gener-
ation migrants. In this sense, appropriate policy interven-
tions should be applied in order to favor school-work tran-
sitions and the optimal allocation of their human capital 
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Figure 3.4 Regional correlation analysis between the employment rates of migrants and the 
share of migrants among the total population 
EU migrants (a) and third-country nationals (b) in some selected EU countries,* 2014
Sources: Own elaboration based on EU LFS data for 2014. *According to data availability, only regions of the following countries are analyzed here: Austria,  
Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
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P ublic opinion and the individual attitudes of a local population towards migrants and immigration matter. First, they are important because they can 
exert substantial influence on policymaking, also beyond 
the narrow scope of migration-related issues. Second, they 
matter because they can influence migrants’ integration 
efforts and outcomes, which is one of the pivotal issues 
for societies experiencing increasing levels of immigra-
tion. Understanding what drives public attitudes towards 
migration and towards immigrants is therefore key to 
addressing one of the causes of failure or success of migra-
tion-related policymaking and integration outcomes.
But how do public attitudes matter for policymaking? 
In democracies, policies are ideally a reflection of voter 
preferences. Elected representatives need to consider not 
only their own ideologies, but also rely on their percep-
tion of what might be reasonably expected in terms of the 
(economic) effects of immigration on their specific con-
stituencies. Since EU-level policies depend on the support 
of those elected representatives and on elected govern-
ments and often on the officials appointed by those gov-
ernments, both national policies and EU policies are likely 
to be affected by public opinion towards immigration and 
immigrants. 
Suggestions for policy changes and policymaking pro-
cesses have to factor in the attitudes of the public, which 
– as we discuss below – are not carved in stone. Failure 
to do so may also have effects that go far beyond the rela-
tively narrow issue of migration and integration policies, 
especially in the current political environment in Europe. 
Recent Eurobarometer data show that EU citizens perceive 
immigration to be the most important issue facing the 
EU, and the second most important issue for the respon-
dents’ individual countries (see Figure 3.5a). Moreover, the 
 survey results also reveal how firmly respondents consider 
the EU to be responsible for dealing with immigration 
these days. At the same time their personal lives are only 
mildly affected by immigration (see Figure 3.5b). As they 
nonetheless consider migration to be a major issue that 
needs to be dealt with effectively by European and national 
institutions, failure to live up to these demands risks fur-
ther eroding trust in public institutions in general.
As stated above, the attitudes of the public can influence 
the integration efforts and outcomes of immigrants and 
refugees. Positive attitudes towards migrants and immi-
3.2 Determinants of public 
attitudes towards immigrants 
and immigration
 
 Lead authors: Esther Ademmer, David Benček and Tobias Stöhr
Figure 3.5a What are the two most important 
issues?  
EU average share of answers over time, by level at 
which issue is faced
Sources: Eurobarometer 77.3-85.2.
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gration are likely to facilitate employers’ decisions to inte-
grate migrants into the labor market; neighbors to estab-
lish contacts with the newly arrived next door; and local 
communities to integrate migrants into local sports clubs, 
which all represent important supply-side dimensions of 
migrant integration into host societies. Likewise, negative 
attitudes or even hostility towards migrants and migra-
tion is likely to create a discouraging environment in 
this respect. Incidence of hate crime against refugees, for 
instance, has soared in the aftermath of Angela Merkel’s 
decision to accept a large inflow of asylum-seekers into 
Germany, as demonstrated in a recent study by Benček 
and Strasheim (2016) (see Box 3.1). There are certainly a 
number of highly complex factors that turn hostility into 
criminal activity. Yet, it is also likely that attitudes trans-
late into behaviors that go beyond casting votes and hold-
ing politicians accountable. 
In this chapter we draw on two well-published reviews 
(Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hainmueller and Hop-
kins 2014) and several other studies and put these into 
context with current developments. We also add insights 
from related literatures. Three qualifications must be 
made: first, this section focuses on the public attitudes in 
receiving countries. It is thus silent on the perspective of 
recent migrants themselves. Neither do we cover attitudes 
towards emigration here, which is of particular relevance 
to low- and middle-income countries with high labor 
mobility. Second, the underlying research stems mostly 
from North America and Western Europe. The ‘general-
izability’ of findings will thus be highest in these regions. 
Third, studies and survey respondents do not always dif-
ferentiate between attitudes towards individual migrants 
and attitudes towards the more abstract phenomenon of 
‘immigration’ (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). We outline 
these differentiations whenever possible in the remainder 
of this section. 
Based on the insights generated by the surveyed liter-
ature, we argue that public attitudes are more strongly 
related to people’s identities and relatively ‘sticky’ world-
views than they are to personal economic concerns. Atti-
tudes are not inalterable, however. They can be changed by 
social interactions across borders and educational attain-
ment. Importantly, they can be ‘activated’ or ‘mediated’ by 
political discourse and media reporting on immigrants. 
We conclude with some tentative policy recommenda-
tions and outline what we  consider to be fruitful avenues 
for further research.
What drives attitudes towards immigrants 
and immigration?
There has been a substantial body of research whose the-
oretical foundations span the social sciences. We broadly 
divide these foundations into two strands of thinking: one 
that is inspired by a classic rationalist approach and con-
ceives of the individuals’ material interests and cost-ben-
efit analyses as a driver of attitudes towards immigrants 
and immigration. These factors are usually also termed 
utilitarian in research on public opinion and attitudes. 
The second strand of thinking builds on a social-con-
structivist perspective and posits that attitudes are the 
result of constructed social identities and internalized 
cultural norms and worldviews. This line of reasoning is 
often called identitarian. 
Utilitarian factors: Competition on the labor market 
and over scarce resources 
Among the first factors commonly referred to when try-
ing to explain negative attitudes towards immigrants and 
immigration are individual economic concerns. People 
feeling economically left behind or missing out in terms 
of prosperity, the reasoning goes, would oppose immi-
gration to fend off pressure on labor markets and welfare 
systems.
To this end, much of the economic literature has consid-
ered attitudes towards immigration and immigrants to be 
the result of a straightforward cost-benefit calculation by 
rational and self-interested individuals. For one, post-tax 
incomes may be affected by increased competition over 
scarce public resources: since immigration, especially that 
of low-skilled people, can trigger a substantial fiscal cost 
in the host country, the government may consider rais-
ing taxes or cutting public spending as a result. Relatedly, 
researchers considered a stylized fact that ethnic diversity 
reduces the provision of public goods in societies (Alesina 
et al. 1999). One argument to explain this pattern is that 
groups that are too heterogeneous are less willing to share 
and are less trusting of one another, such that lower redis-
tribution and lower public good spending emerge. A recent 
representative poll3 among the German electorate indeed 
shows that distributive fears are widespread: 60 percent of 
those surveyed worry that public spending on refugees will 
result in spending cuts in other areas. 
The evidence backing the argument that competition 
over scarce public resources drives public attitudes is, how-
ever, inconclusive. Recent studies question the straight-
forward relationship between ethnic diversity and public 
good provision by employing finer measures of diversity, 
or generally more nuanced analytical approaches (Bald-
win and Huber 2010; Gisselquist et al. 2016; Wimmer 
2016). Furthermore, from a purely self-centered income 
perspective, the local population anticipating higher taxes 
or spending cuts should oppose immigration (especially 
of low-skilled workers) and such attitudes should be more 
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With rising numbers of incoming asylum seekers, offi-
cial police statistics have recorded hate crimes against 
refugees and refugee housing as increasing by factors 
of 5 to 15 during 2015 (BMI 2016). Information col-
lected by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation and Pro 
Asyl, which has been geocoded and published as a sci-
entifically usable dataset by Benček and Strasheim 
(2016), shows that large parts of Germany experienced 
anti-refugee incidents during the years 2014 to 2016.
The data distinguish between four types of occur-
rences: arson, assault, demonstrations and miscella-
neous attacks against refugee housing (such as broken 
windows or xenophobic graffiti). Cases in the latter cat-
egory have soared, especially, increasing from 189 in 
2014 to 935 and 1441 in 2015 and 2016, respectively. 
Cases of assault and anti-refugee demonstrations have 
taken place in regional clusters, primarily in East Ger-
many. The disparity between East and West Germany 
is even more telling when factoring in population 
numbers. As the heat map below shows, attitudes and 
behavior towards refugees seem to differ significantly 
in both parts of the country.
Preliminary analyses of the data support some exist-
ing theories about determinants of xenophobic behav-
ior: while regions with higher unemployment alone are 
not more likely to experience anti-refugee events, the 
perceived labor market competition by a high ratio of 
incoming refugees to unemployed persons is positively 
correlated with occurrences. At the same time, prior 
contact with foreign nationals (measured by the past 
percentage of foreigners in the population) seems to 
lessen hostile attitudes and behavior.
Perpetrators also appear to be influenced by observed 
acts of violence towards refugees. The data show evi-
dence of positive reinforcement across all event types 
within regions. This suggests that prior violence can 
encourage the perception of social acceptance with 
respect to anti-refugee attitudes and behavior. For this 
reason it is advisable that policymakers are unambigu-









Box 3.1 Refugees and hate crimes in Germany
Figure 3.6 Anti-refugee incidents 2014-2016 
number of incidents per 100 000 inhabitants per district
Sources: Own calculations based 
on Benček and Strasheim (2016).
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widespread among locals with high incomes than among 
those with lower incomes. But evidence is mixed4 and 
more recent studies conclude that rich and poor local cit-
izens do not necessarily differ in their attitudes towards 
immigration and that fiscal threat is not a convincing 
mechanism. 
Then again, a recent study of attitudes towards the spe-
cial group of asylum seekers (Bansak et al. 2016) finds 
that European citizens prefer the better skilled among 
them. The higher the skill level of an asylum seeker, 
the lower the total amount of benefits that is typically 
expected to be paid out over time, because higher-skilled 
asylum seekers will find it easier to enter the labor mar-
ket and support themselves. Expected competition for 
public resources, however, needs to be seen in combina-
tion with expected competition for jobs.
The public’s expectations about adverse labor market 
effects are the typical origin of ‘drawbridge-up’ rheto-
ric with respect to migration. The underlying, very sim-
ple economic argument is that increased immigration is 
a labor supply shock. For a given level of labor demand, 
it thus raises competition and may negatively affect 
wages in the host country, depending on how flexibly 
wages can react. For locals with skills matching those of 
immigrants who are not subject to policies such as min-
imum wages, it could therefore be economically ratio-
nal to oppose immigration. But the literature has so far 
produced highly inconsistent findings about labor mar-
ket-driven explanations (as it has about the actual labor 
market effect, see Dustmann et al. 2016); some find that 
low-skilled workers are indeed more likely to prefer a 
restrictive immigration policy, arguably because they 
anticipate low-skilled migration, in particular (Scheve 
and Slaughter 2001). But these findings are questioned 
by other prominent scholars. Hainmueller et al. (2015) 
and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) show that high- 
and low-skilled workers, like rich and poor parts of the 
US population all favor high-skilled over low-skilled 
immigration. 
To distinguish between different levels of skill, most of 
the literature uses some measure of educational attain-
ment. Multiple studies show that higher levels of edu-
cation are consistently associated with favorable atti-
tudes towards immigration of all kinds (Ceobanu and 
Escandell 2010; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Huber 
and Oberdabernig 2016). Whether this effect is indeed a 
reflection of economic self-interest, however, is debated 
because education is also thought to foster cosmopoli-
tan values through a “liberalizing effect” (Ceobanu and 
Escandell 2010; see also Kuhn et al. 2016): education 
arguably encourages reflexivity, critical thinking, and 
provides for an environment in which individuals are 
exposed to and experience cultural diversity. Educated 
people consequently tend to be less ethnocentric (Chan-
dler and Tsai 2001) and often have a stronger preference 
for diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). 
In addition, the mere fact that education is a good 
predictor of attitudinal differences does not necessarily 
mean that it is indeed the causal factor at play. It may well 
be an underlying driver in the background that either 
affects the likelihood of obtaining education in the first 
place or that changes as a result of education. Whether 
this factor is related to individual traits, preferences or 
experiences is still an open question for researchers.
And yet, the liberalizing effect and changes in attitudes 
due to education are unlikely to be associated with a sim-
ple rational cost-benefit calculation about the individual 
economic situation of local citizens. By contrast, concerns 
related to effects on in-groups that locals feel part of, as 
well as other non-economic factors, have been shown to 
matter substantially when explaining attitudes towards 
immigrants and immigration. 
Identitarian factors: Sociotropic concerns and col-
lective identities
Among those factors is collective identity. Identity is 
usually associated with how an individual differentiates 
between members of its in-group and out-group. Such 
in-group versus out-group considerations in turn modify 
the economic considerations outlined above: if individu-
als expect immigration to have a negative effect on their 
in-group, they can be strongly opposed to immigration 
or immigrants, even in the absence of any personal disad-
vantages. Many people’s attitudes towards immigrants or 
refugees do not therefore depend on the socio-economic 
effect on themselves, but rather on the perceived effect on 
their in-groups (‘sociotropic concerns’). 
But how are such in-groups and out-groups defined? In 
principle, concepts of identity can define the in-group in 
a way that includes immigrants. For example, shared reli-
gion can signal shared values and in some cases explic-
itly establish a community of all adherents, regardless of 
nationality. Religion can, however, also be used as a label 
for strangers and shape attitudes towards very heteroge-
neous immigrants – notice the strong anti-Muslim bias 
in EU countries. A major differentiation made in the lit-
erature in this regard is between ethnic and civic concep-
tions of national identity. People defining their national 
identity in ethnic terms, consider their ingroup “on the 
principle of descent; the nation is a marriage of blood and 
soil”, while civic identity is associated with a greater per-
meability: “anyone can belong provided he or she accepts 
certain fundamental values and institutions” (Wright et 
al. 2012: 470f.). 
People who define their national identity in eth-
nic rather than civic terms tend to favor more restric-
tive immigration policies (Hainmueller and Hopkins 
2014; Wright et al. 2012). Interestingly, such individuals 
also hold negative attitudes towards all kinds of immi-
grant groups without making any further differentiation 
between them on the basis of other group-specific char-
acteristics (Kinder and Kam 2009 as cited in Hainmuel-
ler and Hopkins 2014). At the same time, national identity 
is also shaped by immigration experiences and strongly 
varies with education, among other factors, underlining 
the difficult and multidirectional relationships between 
them (Schildkraut 2014). Likewise, explanations that draw 
on fixed individual characteristics such as age or gender 
do not fare much better in explaining  attitudes towards 
immigrants and immigration. Even though research has 
shown that older, male, and rurally residing citizens hold 
negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, 
demographic factors do not prove to be very consistent 
(Ceobanu and Escandell 2010).
As a consequence of all these factors, Europeans’ atti-
tudes to individual asylum seekers seem to be a combi-
nation of sociotropic concerns about expected economic 
impacts, anti-Muslim bias and a sense of deservedness; 
4 While studies such as  
Hanson et al. (2007) and  
Facchini and Mayda (2009)  
find evidence to support this  
hypothesised mechanism, 
more recent work by  
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) 
and Tingley (2012) differs.
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voters in the EU accept asylum seekers with clear griev-
ances related to persecution or risk more than those with 
less clear circumstances or economic motives (Bansak et 
al. 2016). A sense of fairness is an important determinant 
of attitudes, not so much regarding the individual but the 
overall asylum and migration policy. Using the same sam-
ple of about 18,000 Europeans, Bansak et al. (2016b)5  find 
that acceptance of redistributing refugees across Europe 
is high as long as citizens of other countries are seen to 
shoulder their fair share; for example in a regime where 
allocated numbers of asylum seekers are proportional to 
population size and economic capabilities. These fair-
ness concerns carry considerable weight: in the major-
ity of European countries surveyed people are willing 
to support an EU-wide burden-sharing scheme, with no 
free-riding, even if it means that their country would have 
to accept more asylum seekers.
How do utilitarian versus identitarian explanations 
play out in explaining support for EU migration and 
asylum policies? In a study on support for EU control 
over immigration policy, Luedtke (2005) shows that cit-
izens who hold an exclusive national identity (as opposed 
to also identifying with Europe) are much less inclined 
to support a joint EU policy in this regard. He also shows 
that this factor is more important than factors associated 
with utilitarian arguments. This is in line with the find-
ing that a strong attachment to a nation state, and the per-
ception of being under threat from outsiders, goes hand 
in hand with greater scepticism toward European inte-
gration (Boomgaarden et al. 2011; see also Hooghe and 
Marks 2004). It also echoes studies showing that “citizens 
do indeed take into account the economic consequences 
of European integration, but conceptions of group mem-
bership appear to be more powerful” (Hooghe and Marks 
2004: 1). Against this backdrop, the Brexit-vote in the 
United Kingdom reflects a culmination of longstanding 
objections to conceding national sovereignty, coupled 
with the perceived threat of losing control during the ref-
ugee crisis. This can be seen as part of a broader trend: 
trust in institutions and politicians at various levels in 
the EU has fallen since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 
(Papaioannou 2013). Before 2015, right-wing parties pre-
dominantly campaigned on an anti-EU platform and less 
on anti-immigration agendas (Hatton 2016b). The lack of 
coordinated national responses to the large inflow of asy-
lum seekers in 2015-16 has likely been a game changer in 
this regard. It affected attitudes toward national govern-
ments, the EU and more generally the feeling of being rep-
resented in the political system, thereby further eroding 
the already low trust in public institutions among certain 
segments of society.
Moderating public attitudes: Contact, politics, and 
the media
Much of the literature on individual characteristics 
reviewed above conceives of the local population’s atti-
tudes as being relatively isolated from interaction with 
the outside world. Research on attitudes, however, has 
also explored how attitudes are affected by contact with or 
proximity to immigrants, the framing of migration issues 
in the political process, and exposure to media reporting 
or specific political contexts. 
Most prominently, the contact hypothesis reasons 
that contact with migrants would foster more favorable 
attitudes. This hypothesis was originally based on cer-
tain premises about how this contact would need to be 
established (Allport 1954): among them are “equal sta-
tus, cooperation, similar goals, and official endorsement” 
(Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 317). A study that looks at 
the impact of recent refugee inflows to parts of Austria 
indeed indicates that the increased presence of refugees 
at the local level can decrease the local vote share of the 
far right (Steinmayr 2016). Other research, however, casts 
doubt on the effect that a mere increase of the presence 
or visibility of a minority group may exert on public atti-
tudes. To name but two examples: a recent study from 
the Greater Boston area (Enos 2014) shows that contact 
indeed affects attitudes towards immigrants. It does how-
ever indicate that merely sharing a train journey with a 
visible minority group but without having personal con-
tact does not necessarily improve attitudes. Spending 
time side by side without communication can indeed have 
negative effects, for example by making a group such as 
undocumented immigrants stand out more. These effects 
may also vary with regard to the ethnic group in ques-
tion. This study also shows, however, that contact does 
not necessarily alter immigration policy preferences. 
Importantly, the impact of increasing the visibility of 
migrants depends on the estimated size of the group in 
the community. People are notoriously bad at such esti-
mates and therefore use cues from their own experience 
and information from other sources, which are not nec-
essarily correct either. This is especially concerning with 
respect to the current debate about the spread of deliber-
ately false (fake) information on the internet. The impact 
of immigration on attitudes thus also depends on the 
overall salience of immigration issues in national polit-
ical discourse and the media, as well as the strength of 
particular arguments. If immigration is a topic that is 
salient in national politics, people who are more exposed 
to immigrants in their communities tend to have more 
restrictive views on immigration than in times when the 
issue is less prominent (Hopkins 2010; Hopkins 2011). 
This salience can be affected either by politicians or other 
actors  bringing up a topic for debate and by the media’s 
subsequent reaction. 
Politicians and other elites can affect attitudes by high-
lighting and framing issues in certain ways: if, for exam-
ple, different politicians chose to frame immigration 
either as increasing the risk of terrorism or as increasing 
diversity in readily available cuisines, public discourse on 
the issue would be highly imbalanced with regard to the 
strength of the arguments, i.e. how compelling individ-
uals perceive different arguments to be relative to each 
other. And unless citizens’ penchant for exotic food out-
weighed their fear of terrorism, this relative difference 
in the strength of frames would likely pull them towards 
more critical attitudes to migration. The experience of 
partisan politics in the US (Druckman et al. 2013) fur-
thermore suggests that polarization and endorsement 
by political parties matter. If there is low polarization 
on an issue between political parties, citizens will be 
drawn towards the stronger frame. Yet, if these are sim-
ilar in strength, party endorsement can drive the opin-
ions of supporters. However, if polarization is high and 
party lines thus demarcate possible sides of an issue, 
the strength of the frames has little effect and it is party 
endorsement that drives opinions. 
5 This paper was pre-
viously accessible from 
SSRN.
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The media has the power to amplify effects. In an exper-
iment on a representative sample of US citizens in which 
a newspaper article was intentionally altered for some 
participants, Brader et al. (2008) find that media reports 
can trigger emotions, especially anxiety. This happens if 
reports of negative consequences of immigration are com-
bined with referrals to already stigmatized groups, even if 
they do not increase respondents’ beliefs about the sever-
ity of these consequences. Importantly, if these anxiet-
ies are triggered, they will increase the impact of differ-
ent types of news on actual political action. The media can 
thus play a very negative role that may threaten the social 
fabric. Similar mechanisms partly explain how politicians 
and other public figures can use the media to increase the 
salience of immigrant groups and of the consequences 
of immigration. Using their influence as an intermedi-
ary, the media might, however, increase or decrease the 
effect on citizens’ attitudes by reinterpreting or contex-
tualizing politicians’ messages. There is so far very little 
explicit research on this interaction (but see Adena et al. 
2015 and Yanagizawa-Drott 2014 for recent analyses of 
media accountability for discrimination and ethnic vio-
lence in historical contexts).
So far, there is also little evidence of a positive role 
for media. This might be a consequence of the differen-
tial weights that humans place on positive and negative 
information or risks, similar to the way in which peo-
ple overestimate losses compared to equivalent gains (see 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Implications 
To summarize, attitudes are less shaped by individual eco-
nomic experience of competition or worries about poten-
tial personal fiscal costs. Rather, the adverse economic 
effects that individuals fear their in-groups may suffer are 
more influential. The surveyed literature also shows that 
politicians and the media bear substantial responsibility 
in framing the attitudes of citizens towards immigration. 
We therefore put forward what we consider to be import-
ant policy implications:
Provide the public with nuanced factual knowledge
Attitudes are ultimately driven by subjective perceptions 
and beliefs, but these are substantially informed by pub-
lic debates. Policymakers, the media and experts bear a 
responsibility to present nuanced factual knowledge with 
regard to economic concerns about immigration in pub-
lic discourse. For instance, the majority of active research-
ers on the objective effects of immigration do not find 
them to be great in terms of labor market competition 
in advanced economies (Hainmueller et al. 2015; Hain-
mueller and Hiscox 2010). The group typically most under 
pressure from newly arriving immigrants are previous 
migrants who work in those niches of the labor market 
that are accessible without fluency in the host country’s 
language (e.g. Peri and Sparber 2009) or which have poor 
working conditions. The same logic holds for the fiscal 
costs of immigration, which are typically small in relation 
to other, sometimes highly inefficient budgetary items.
Watch for identity talk, when ‘taking concerns 
seriously’
Economic concerns about labor market integration or 
competition can be addressed in a straightforward fash-
ion. Yet, as argued above, anti-immigrant attitudes are 
also strongly driven by identity-related concerns: some 
people may be wary of immigrants not sharing civic val-
ues their (usually national) community holds dear (what 
we labeled as a civic form of identity). Others oppose 
immigration because it represents a threat to their eth-
nicity-based notion of identity associated with place of 
birth, skin color, etc. These two groups, in our view, each 
require different policy responses. For people whose civic 
identities are in principle open to anybody subscribing 
to the values and principles of a community, a politi-
cal ‘identity’ rhetoric that emphasizes the civic prin-
ciples of a community (and sanctioning in the case of 
violations) is important. Such rhetoric would come with-
out a clear delineation of in- and out-groups along the 
native-born-immigrant divide. This positive rhetoric of 
stressing civic notions of national identity is currently 
rather marginalized in Europe. Instead, populist and 
right-wing parties dominate the identity discourse by 
putting forward ethnic conceptions of identity, at times 
in the guise of civic identity (‘defending European val-
ues’). This ethnic identity discourse frequently sepa-
rates immigrants from “natives” and further feeds into 
anti-immigrant sentiments among the public. While pol-
iticians should take the concerns of host countries’ citi-
zens seriously, they should be wary of offering simplified 
solutions that create additional divides between the host 
society and immigrants. 
Another important role falls to politicians, other public 
figures and the media. The mechanics of identity mean that 
it can be relatively easy to single out particular minority 
groups in a society and split them from the majority pop-
ulation along some marker (e.g. religion, ethnicity) that 
they load with negative connotations. This means that 
even well-integrated members of society can be placed in 
an out-group facing very strong negative attitudes. Popu-
list politicians frequently use strong negative associations 
(i.e. terror, crime) to trigger anti-immigrant attitudes. 
Such a tactic calls for equally strong positive frames and 
low partisanship. In all this, the media have an opportu-
nity to lay bare the tactics being used to weaken the social 
fabric, which is precisely what people with strong prefer-
ences for shared values and culture care about. Responsi-
ble reporting might therefore decrease the destructiveness 
of opportunistic identity politics and facilitate a success-
ful integration of newcomers into society.
Create environments for positive interaction 
Immigration and integration policies should be designed 
in such a way as to foster positive interactions between the 
majority population and recent arrivals. Such contact has 
the benefit of transforming immigration from an abstract 
phenomenon into personal experiences with individual 
people, and, as research shows, is likely to lead to a reduc-
tion of anti-immigrant sentiment. Even if contact creates 
an awareness of differences, such interactions at the indi-
vidual level usually lead citizens to the realization that 
(also as a consequence of self-selection and sorting, see 
Chapter 4.1) the vast majority of newcomers are far more 
similar to themselves than prejudice would suggest.
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M any interrelated factors, from immigrants’ char-acteristics and their location choices to integra-tion policies in the destination countries and 
attitudes of the local population, can influence the eco-
nomic and social integration of immigrants. The eco-
nomic outcomes of immigrants vary widely across and 
within EU member states, as well as across immigrants’ 
origins. Immigrants from non-EU countries, on average, 
perform worse in terms of employment and income com-
pared with immigrants from EU member states (see sec-
tion 3.1 above). Figure 3.7 illustrates another dimension 
of variation: within the group of non-EU immigrants, 
employment rates differ considerably depending on the 
reason for migration. While the employment rate of those 
coming for employment or study purposes follows closely 
that of the host population, for immigrants seeking inter-
national protection, it takes up to 20 years of residence to 
catch up. This section focuses on this particularly vulner-
able group.
As the number of refugees7 in the EU substantially 
increased in 2015–16, their low expected employment rate 
for at least the next decade may result in sizable economic 
and social costs to host societies and refugees themselves. 
This calls for the design of efficient integration policies in 
the key destination countries. The labor market integra-
tion of refugees is important not only because it lessens 
the burden on the public budget. It also improves the qual-
ity of life for immigrants, reduces the risk of illegal activi-
ties and crime (Couttenier et al. 2016), and generates pos-
itive attitudes among the local population (Bansak et al. 
2016).8 In the medium and long run, if refugees stay in 
their destination country, earlier entry into the labor mar-
ket prevents the depreciation of their human capital and 
helps to avoid the unemployment trap. Furthermore, eco-
nomic integration tends to foster social integration and 
improves the outcomes of second-generation immigrants. 
It would be hard to argue against the benefits of early 
labor market integration and the need for language and 
integration courses, skill upgrading, or active labor mar-
ket policies. However, when it comes to the design of pol-
icy interventions subject to financial and political con-
straints, several questions emerge. Do refugees require 
a targeted approach or can the existing policies for the 
local population or other immigrants be extended to refu-
gees? How restrictive or selective should the regulation be 
toward asylum seekers and unrecognized refugees? How 
efficient are specific policies and through which mech-
anisms do they operate? To answer these questions, one 
needs, first, to understand the challenges that refugees 
face in the labor market; second, to carefully evaluate the 
costs and benefits of policies and regulations as well as any 
spillovers between them; and third, to be ready for some 
experimentation. 
In this section, we review the determinants of labor mar-
ket integration of refugees and provide evidence-based 
recommendations for integration policies. Rather than 
aiming at a comprehensive overview (see for example, 
Boockmann et al. Forthcoming), we highlight a number 
of policy-relevant issues. We start by summarizing the 
challenges to the labor market integration of refugees to 
understand what drives the gap in their economic out-
comes relative to other immigrants. We then draw on new 
macro- and micro-level evidence from Germany to exam-
ine in detail how the job search process of refugees evolves 
over time and what may determine its success. Skeptics 
may argue that fast labor market integration of refugees is 
not feasible due to a lack of education, qualifications, and 
language skills: it takes both time and financial invest-
ment to build up the necessary human capital. While we 
do not contest the importance of skills for the economic 
integration of refugees, the evidence presented illustrates 
that job matching frictions also play a significant role and 
that providing personalized job search assistance may 
accelerate refugees’ access to the labor market.
Challenges to the labor market integration 
of refugees
Compared with economic immigrants, refugees face more 
challenges in the labor markets. First, destination coun-
tries cannot select refugees based on their skills or how 
they match the existing labor demand. At the same time, 
refugees do not fully control the timing of their migration 
3.3 Labor Market Integration 

















Figure 3.7 Employment rates of non-EU born, 
age 15-64 
based on the reason for migration and years of  
residence in an EU member state, EU level
Sources: Tanay et al. (2016) based on the Eurostat Labor Force Survey (2014).
6 Section 3.3 was written by 
Dominik Groll and Nadzeya 
Laurentsyeva. Dominik Groll is 
the lead author of the sub-sec-
tion on macro-level evidence 
for Germany.
7 In this section, we use the 
word ‘refugee’ to denote all 
immigrants who seek inter-
national protection, i.e. both 
asylum applicants and recogni-
zed refugees.
8 Couttenier et al. (2016) exploit 
heterogeneity in public policies 
within Switzerland to show that 
facilitating labor market access 
to asylum seekers decreases 
the probability of violent cri-
mes. Bansak et al. (2016) survey 
18,000 residents in 15 Euro-
pean countries and find that 
the respondents favor asylum 
seekers with higher employ-
ment potential.
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Figure 3.8 Education and language skills of refugees and other non-EU born
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and the choice of destination. Therefore, refugees often 
lack destination-specific skills and networks. Second, ref-
ugees usually come from countries in distress; thus, they 
may have had no opportunity to acquire a good educa-
tion or professional skills and may be more likely to suf-
fer from physical and mental disorders. Third, until asy-
lum seekers are recognized as refugees, their legal status 
remains uncertain and they face strict regulations on 
labor market access. Therefore, both refugees and poten-
tial local employers have lower incentives to make job- 
related investments. Moreover, asylum seekers and rec-
ognized refugees are less flexible in responding to income 
shocks because they have fewer options to relocate within 
the host country or to return to the country of origin, at 
least in the short term. In sum, these challenges fall under 
three broad categories: a lack of skills, matching frictions, 
and uncertainty due to regulation. We now discuss the 
challenges in more detail referring to the academic litera-
ture and evidence from the ad hoc module on migration of 
the Eurostat Labor Force Survey (LFS 2014) as well as from 
recent firm-level surveys.
A lack of skills
Unlike regular economic immigrants, refugees are not 
selected based on their skills. Therefore, there is a gen-
eral perception that low education and a lack of profes-
sional qualifications prevent refugees from finding jobs. 
With respect to formal education, there are indeed dif-
ferences between refugees and other immigrants from 
non-EU countries, but they are not stark: the share of 
individuals with no or only primary education is five per-
centage points higher among refugees, while the share of 
those with tertiary education is eight percentage points 
lower (Figure 3.8, panel a). Since the employment rate is 
higher for highly skilled than for low-skilled immigrants 
(74 percent vs 52 percent on average in the EU), differ-
ences in education levels can explain part of the gap in 
economic outcomes. However, even among immigrants 
with the same level of education, refugees are less likely 
to be employed than other non-EU born. Moreover, the 
education gap between refugees and other non-EU immi-
grants changes only slightly over the years of residency 
in the host country. Therefore, it cannot account for the 
observed convergence in employment rates (see Figure 
3.7 above).
The lack of professional qualifications might represent a 
bigger issue. For instance, according to the results of firm-
level surveys in Germany and Austria (Ernst and Young 
2016; Falck et al. 2016), around 50 percent of employ-
ers consider the lack of qualifications a major obstacle 
to employing refugees. This could be due to difficulties 
in transferring the professional experience acquired in 
origin countries to more developed countries or to the 
absence of such experience (for example, due to a young 
age at migration). Additionally, refugees often do not pos-
sess formal proof of their qualifications; therefore, local 
firms are more likely to reject their job applications during 
the screening process. 
The biggest obstacle, though, according to both refugees 
and local firms, is insufficient language skills (see Figure 
3.9). Again, this reflects the short planning period before 
migration takes place. Using data from the Eurostat Labor 
Force Survey, Tanay et al. (2016) estimate that if refugees 
were proficient in the host country language, their employ-
ment rate would improve by nine percentage points. Dust-
mann and Fabbri (2003) examine the outcomes of immi-
grants in the UK and apply a careful research design to 
disentangle the effect of language skills from other pos-
Education Advanced language skills
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9 In many EU countries,  
refugees are not allowed to 
choose their location, but 
are allocated across the host 
country accord ing to criteria 
that most often include popu-
lation size and the state of the 
economy.
10 The plans were prepa-
red during a meeting with a 
caseworker from the public 
employ ment service and were 
tailored to the individual’s skills 
and circumstances. The plans 
could include language and 
civic courses, vocational train-
ing, job placements, etc.
11 The comparison group con-
sisted of immigrants who arri-
ved in Finland just before the 
program started and for whom 
participation was voluntary. 
12 The comparison group are 
refugees who arrived in  
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Sources: Tanay et al. (2016) based on the Eurostat Labor Force Survey (2014) and the survey of German human resource managers (Falck et al. 2016).
Figure 3.9 Obstacles to the employment of refugees: What do refugees and the local firms say?
sible confounding factors. They find that English profi-
ciency increases employment probability by around 20 
percentage points and generates 18-20 percent higher 
earnings. These estimates can serve as a rough benchmark 
of what policy interventions to support language acquisi-
tion could ideally achieve.
Over time, refugees’ language skills converge toward 
those of other immigrants, thus contributing to the con-
vergence of employment rates (see Figure 3.8, panel b). 
While language issues become less prevalent in the long 
run, a lack of language skills during the first few years 
after arrival hinder entry into the labor market and may 
eventually result in long-term unemployment. This obser-
vation not only calls for earlier language support mea-
sures, but also relates to the design of relocation policies.9 
For instance, Auer (forthcoming) examines the labor 
market outcomes of refugees who were randomly placed 
across Swiss language regions: the probability of enter-
ing employment during the first two years is 12 percent-
age points higher for those whose native language matches 
that of the region. Consequently, including knowledge of a 
local language as an additional criterion for the relocation 
of refugees could facilitate their entry into the local labor 
markets and decrease overall public spending on language 
support programs (or income support). 
Matching frictions
Matching frictions prevent individuals, who are will-
ing to work and possess the necessary skills, and firms, 
which would benefit from hiring these people, from meet-
ing in the labor market. Compared with the local popula-
tion and other immigrants, refugees face greater match-
ing frictions. Often, refugees cannot choose their location 
within a country and may therefore lack the necessary 
social connections (a network of friends or other immi-
grants) to find employment. Moreover, settlement restric-
tions limit the geographical area for their job search, mak-
ing it harder to find a job that would match the refugees’ 
skills and qualifications. In addition, many refugees come 
from countries with a different labor market culture, and 
thus are not familiar with job search procedures and 
methods in the host country. Complex regulations, the 
involvement of many entities in supporting refugees, and 
communication problems due to language barriers make 
it, in general, difficult to navigate the system. Therefore, 
merely extending the existing active labor market policies 
to refugees may not be enough to overcome the prevailing 
matching frictions. 
A possible solution is to develop targeted programs 
that offer personalized counseling. Sarvimäki and 
Hämäläinen (2016) evaluate the effect of such a program 
that was implemented in Finland in 1999 and targeted 
non-working immigrants. The core of the program was 
the preparation of mandatory, individualized integration 
plans and their realization under the supervision of public 
employment services.10 The cumulative earnings of immi-
grants who took part in the program, relative to a com-
parison group, increased by 47 percent over 10 years.11 A 
similar program was introduced in 2010 under the Swed-
ish Establishment Reform, which aimed at facilitating the 
integration of refugees. Andersson Joona et al. (2016) eval-
uate the impact of the reform and find that two years later, 
refugees affected by the reform had a 2 percentage-point 
higher probability of employment and 20 percent higher 
earnings relative to those not covered by the reform.12 For 
policy implications, it is important to note that the evalu-
ations from Finland and Sweden quantify the benefits of 
the counseling packages. It still remains unclear, though, 
Obstacles to finding jobs (refugees’ responses) Obstacles to employing refugees (firms’ responses)
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which mechanisms in fact ensured the observed faster 
labor market integration and higher earnings: access to 
better tailored language courses and professional train-
ing, or better matching and placement of job seekers, or 
stricter monitoring by caseworkers and, as a consequence, 
increased job search efforts by refugees? Would the results 
still hold if some elements of the above counseling pack-
ages were dropped? This calls for additional research that 
would evaluate the effects of concrete interventions. 
Local firms may also face frictions. For instance, in a 
survey of German firms, 49 percent of respondents name 
regulation as a large obstacle to employing refugees (Falck 
et al. 2016). This result suggests that firms have to bear 
the main bureaucratic costs associated with hiring refu-
gees. Accordingly, objective and timely information about 
hiring procedures could alleviate some of the frictions. 
Higher screening costs might also prevent firms from hir-
ing a refugee with no prior work experience in the local 
labor market, especially if the candidate has no formal 
qualifications (Ernst and Young 2016). To some extent, 
the first firm that hires a given refugee produces a public 
good by bearing the cost of screening and revealing some 
positive information about this person to other potential 
employers. To incentivize hiring among firms, the govern-
ment could offer subsidies. Clausen et al. (2009), for exam-
ple, using Danish administrative data, argue that provid-
ing subsidies for firms is an efficient policy to integrate 
newly arrived refugees and family immigrants into the 
labor market. Yet, as a long-term measure it could lead to 
distortions. An alternative way to alleviate this friction is 
to ensure certification of skills or to pre-screen job seek-
ers, for example, through public services. 
Uncertainty and regulation
Relative to other immigrants, refugees experience greater 
uncertainty. First, asylum seekers face uncertainty regard-
ing the decision on their asylum application: Will they 
receive a positive or a negative decision? Which protection 
status will be granted?13 Second, recognized refugees are 
entitled to temporary residence permits, but it is not cer-
tain that a permit will be extended upon its expiry. Hence, 
the observed slow labor market entry of refugees may be 
due to their shorter expected stay in the host country and, 
as a consequence, lower investment in the job search and 
country-specific skills before the uncertainty is resolved. 
Dustmann and Görlach (2016) and Adda et al. (2014), for 
instance, show that the short expected residency dura-
tion negatively affects human capital investment deci-
sions. Similarly, firms may reject an application from a job 
seeker if they are not sure about the applicant’s legal status 
or its duration. Also, it might not be profitable for employ-
ers to invest in firm-specific training given an uncertain 
time horizon. If refugees and firms correctly anticipate 
the duration of stay, their labor market decisions might be 
socially optimal. However, if in fact refugees are staying 
longer than they or firms expect, this will result in subop-
timally low investment in human capital. 
In addition, access to the labor market as well as various 
support measures can be explicitly restricted for certain 
groups of immigrants. Although many EU countries pro-
vide working permits also to asylum seekers (the waiting 
time ranges from 0 months in Sweden to 12 months in the 
UK), other regulations usually apply, such as a labor mar-
ket test, residency requirements, sector restrictions, and 
prohibition of certain types of activities (entrepreneurship 
or work in temporary employment agencies). Finally, in 
most cases, work permits are revoked if an asylum seeker 
does not eventually receive protection status. 
The rationale for restrictive policies towards asy-
lum seekers is to distinguish immigrants who come for 
humanitarian reasons from those who are driven mainly 
by economic motives. Yet, when combined with long asy-
lum procedures, such policies can backfire on the perfor-
mance of those who genuinely need support. Hainmüller 
et al. (2016), using the Swiss data, show that one additional 
year of limbo (the protracted period when asylum seek-
ers are granted only a temporary residence permit while 
waiting for the decision concerning their refugee status) 
reduces the future employment rate by about 5 percent-
age points. Havrylchyk and Ukrayinchuk (2016) quan-
tify the impact of limbo on the employment of refugees in 
France and find a similar effect. The ‘limbo effect’ found 
in both papers can be driven by both a longer uncertainty 
period and explicit labor market restrictions, which asy-
lum seekers face while waiting for the authorities’ deci-
sion. Therefore, possible policy responses could involve 
reducing the processing time for asylum claims or provid-
ing more labor market opportunities for asylum seekers. 
The labor market integration of refugees has recently 
received much attention.14 While existing studies iden-
tify challenges for economic integration and review best 
practices, the ‘hard’ quantitative evidence on how refu-
gees, especially from the recent waves of arrivals, actu-
ally perform in the labor market and how this perfor-
mance changes over time has been sparse.15 Furthermore, 
to guide policy, it is important to understand the potential 
contribution of concrete interventions. Below, we aim at 
filling these gaps by providing the newest evidence from 
Germany.
Macro level: Labor market outcomes of refu-
gees in Germany
Roughly 1.1 million refugees arrived in Germany during 
2015 and 2016. Based on the number of asylum applica-
tions (i.e. not counting ethnic Germans fleeing from East 
to West Germany), this was the largest inflow of refu-
gees into Germany since at least the early 1950s. This sub- 
section provides a snapshot of the current labor market 
situation of these recently arrived refugees in Germany.
Data
Since July 2016, refugees can be observed directly in the 
unemployment statistics of the Federal Employment 
Agency. Before, the number of unemployed refugees 
had to be approximated by the number of unemployed 
non-European nationals of the main origin countries of 
recent refugees (henceforth, Asylum-8 countries).16 Refu-
gees remain unobservable in employment statistics, where 
we still use the approximation based on the country of 
origin.
Unemployed refugees
The number of jobless refugees seeking employment has 
risen sharply since the beginning of 2016 (Figure 3.10). 
The number of refugees registered as unemployed stood 
at 178,000 in February 2017. An additional 215,000 ref-
ugees participated in various labor market programs 
(integration courses offered by the Federal Office for 
13 Protection status (i.e. refugee 
protection or subsidiary pro-
tection) determines the length 
of the residence permit, rules 
for family reunification, and 
long-term residency, as well as 
access to the labor market.
14 See Fóti and Fromm (2016), 
Martín et al (2016) and Dumont 
et al. (2016).
15 The full results from the first 
wave of the representative 
BAMF/IAB/SOEP survey of refu-
gees, who arrived in Germany 
in 2013–15, should become 
available in fall 2017. 
 16 The most recent refugees 
come from Afghanistan, Erit-
rea, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Somalia, and Syria.
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but expulsion suspended (2 %)  
17 Mini-jobs are jobs ear-
ning not more than €450 per 
month.
18 It is reasonable to assume 
that hardly any refugees 
who arrived in Germany in 
2015 found employment 
before December 2015, due 
to lengthy registration and 
asylum-application procedures 
as well as the employment ban 
during the first three months 
after registration.
Sources: Own calculations based on Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Migrations-Monitor Arbeitsmarkt and Auswirkungen der Migration auf den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt (Federal Employment Agency, 
Migration Monitor and Effects of Migration on the German Labor Market).












Migration and Refugees; training measures offered by 
the Federal Employment Agency). As a result, the actual 
number of jobless refugees seeking employment stood at 
393,000, which the Federal Employment Agency labels 
as “under-employed”.
Not all refugees registered as unemployed had already 
received a positive decision on their asylum application. 
While recognized refugees made up roughly 80 percent 
of the total, 18 percent had their asylum applications 
still pending and 2 percent had had their asylum appli-
cations rejected, but their expulsion from Germany had 
been temporarily suspended.
Refugees in employment
As mentioned, the number of employed refugees is not 
directly observable and therefore needs to be approxi-
mated by the number of employed nationals of the main 
non-European countries of origin of current refugees. 
In December 2016, 179,000 nationals of these countries 
either held a job subject to social security or a mini-
job.17  However, this number includes not only refugees 
from the recent wave, but also those who have lived in 
Germany for a long time. The change in employment 
may, thus, provide more relevant information: between 
December 2015 and December 2016, the number of 
employed nationals of Asylum-8 countries increased by 
only 57,000.18 
A recent representative survey among 2,350 refu-
gees who arrived in Germany between January 2013 and 
January 2016 provides additional information on the 
labor market situation of current refugees (Brücker et 
al. 2016a). According to this survey, 14 percent of ref-
ugees aged 18 to 65 were in employment; of these, 32 
percent were full-time employees, 21 percent part-time 
employees, and 24 percent were interns, trainees, or 
apprentices. 
Moreover, this survey confirms earlier estimates of the 
speed of labor market integration of refugees, which were 
based on representative surveys among refugees who have 
arrived in Germany since 1995. As those refugees differed 
from the recent ones in terms of their countries of ori-
gin and socioeconomic characteristics, it was question-
able whether their historic integration experiences could 
be applied to the recent cohort of refugees. In the year of 
arrival, only 10 percent of refugees of working age find 
employment (Figure 3.11). The employment rate increases 
subsequently, reaching 50 percent after 5 years, 60 percent 
after 10 years, and 70 percent after 15 years. As on aver-
age in the EU (recall Figure 3.7), labor market integration 
Composition of registered unemployed refugees, February 2017
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Job-finding rate 1.5 %
Job-finding rate 2 %
Other immigrants
Refugees
Sources: Own calculations based on Brücker et al. (2016b: Figure 5).
Figure 3.11 Historical employment rates of refugees and other 
immigrants in Germany
for refugees in Germany is markedly slower than for other 
immigrants. It takes roughly 15 years for refugees to reach 
the employment rate of other immigrants, which in turn 
remains below the employment rate of the host population 
even in the long term.
Projection of labor market outcomes 
By applying the historical speed of labor market integra-
tion to refugees from the recent wave, one can derive a 
projection for the number of jobless and employed refu-
gees over the medium term.19 To focus on the labor mar-
ket integration of those refugees who arrived in 2015–16, 
we assume no further immigration of refugees from 2017 
onwards. Of the 1.1 million refugees who filed an asylum 
application in 2015 and 2016, 70 percent were of work-
ing age (16-65). In line with the estimations of the Federal 
Employment Agency, we assume a participation rate of 75 
percent. In January 2017, there were still 385,000 pending 
asylum applications. Consistent with the recognition rates 
in 2015 and 2016, we assume that 50 percent of applicants 
will receive a positive decision (i.e. refugee status or sub-
sidiary protection). Asylum seekers whose applications 
are rejected do not make up part of the labor force. Finally, 
to replicate the speed of labor market integration observed 
in the past, we implement a monthly job-finding rate for 
jobless refugees of 1.5 percent and 2 percent, respectively 
(see Figure 3.11).
Under these assumptions, the number of jobless refu-
gees - either registered as unemployed or in labor market 
measures - continues to increase in 2017 as the remaining 
asylum applications are processed (see Figure 3.12 below). 
Starting in 2018, the number of jobless refugees declines 
gradually as a given fraction of refugees find employment 
every month. By 2021, more refugees are expected to be 
employed than jobless. Nevertheless, of the 514,000 ref-
ugees who enter the labor force, there are still between 
164,000 and 208,000 unemployed refugees (depending on 
the assumed job-finding rate) in 2021. With respect to the 
refugee cohort that arrived between 2015 and 2016, this 
corresponds to an unemployment rate of between 32 and 
41 percent.
Given the current number of refugees in Germany, 
their projected unemployment duration might result in 
a noticeable fiscal burden, as unemployed refugees are 
entitled to basic income support (ALG2). Our simulation 
exercise demonstrates that a relatively small increase in 
the monthly job finding rate – from 1.5 to 2 percent – over 
the five-year horizon results in a large difference in the 
number of unemployed refugees and, consequently, in the 
amount of public expenditure. This justifies investment in 
policy interventions that could accelerate the labor mar-
ket entry of refugees. 
Micro level: Refugees’ first steps into the 
labor market, evidence from Munich 
To draw concrete policy recommendations, it is neces-
sary to understand the job search process of refugees at a 
micro level: Which job search strategies do refugees ini-
tially adopt and what do they perceive as the main obsta-
cles? How does the job search process change over time? 
Which interventions can facilitate its success? We pres-
ent the results of a panel survey conducted among asy-
lum-seekers and recognized refugees looking for work. 
The data were collected in Munich during May 2016 to 
April 2017 as part of the ongoing project “Economic and 
Social Integration of Refugees in Munich: Evidence from 
a Field Experiment”.20 
Set-up
The survey participants are asylum seekers and refugees 
who arrived in Munich in 2015–16. The baseline sur-
vey took place during counseling sessions organized by 
a Munich-based non-governmental organization (NGO) 
that helps refugees to enter the German labor market. 
During the counseling sessions, all participants received 
basic information about job search in Germany as well as 
a CV in a standard German format, which they could for-
ward later to an employer or a job center. The baseline sur-
vey questions focused on job search behavior, job pref-
erences, and expectations. Around six months after the 
baseline survey, the interviewers re-contacted the partic-
ipants to ask about their current employment status and 
experience with the German labor market, and, if appli-
cable, to update information on their job search process. 
As of April 10, 2017, the research team had completed 338 
baseline and 197 follow-up surveys.
The survey participants are predominantly young 
unmarried men (see Table 3.2). Two-thirds come from 
three countries of origin: Nigeria, Syria, and Afghani-
stan. On average, the survey participants have 11 years of 
schooling; 51 percent graduated from a middle or a high 
school and 28 percent have attended a university. Only 
4 percent of the participants have no formal education. 
Thus, compared with the recent representative survey of 
asylum seekers and refugees in Germany (Brücker et al. 
2016a), the sample of job seekers is somewhat positively 
selected.21
There are also substantial differences among partici-
pants from different countries, with Syrian job seekers 
19 We choose a projection hori-
zon until 2021, as this currently 
corresponds to the horizon of 
the medium-term macroeco-
nomic projections of the Kiel 
Institute and other institutions 
like the European Commission.
20 The project is being under-
taken by a team of researchers 
from the Ifo Institute (Munich) 
and CEPS (Brussels) and sup-
ported by the Stiftung Merca-
tor. Since the data collection 
within the project is still under 
way (until September 2017), 
the results presented are preli-
minary. For more information 
on the study design and survey 
questionnaires, as well as for 





21 On average, 9 percent of the 
BAMF/IAB/SOEP survey parti-
cipants have no formal educa-
tion, 58 percent graduated 
from a middle or high school, 
and 19 percent attended a uni-
versity.
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Figure 3.12 Medium-term projection for labor market outcomes of 
recent refugees in Germany
standing out for their higher education credentials; they 
are also older and more likely to have a family compared 
with participants from other countries. 
When interpreting and extrapolating the survey results, 
it is important to keep in mind that the sample is not rep-
resentative of all refugees. The participants attend the 
NGO’s sessions voluntarily and thus reveal themselves 
to be active job seekers. On the one hand, their motiva-
tion to find work and invest in destination-specific skills 
is probably higher relative to refugees who never visit the 
NGO. On the other hand, by coming to an NGO’s coun-
seling session, refugees also reveal that they need support 
in the job search, beyond what is provided by the public 
employment services. Furthermore, conditions for labor 
market integration in Munich are more favorable than in 
other German (and European) cities. The unemployment 
rate is one of the lowest in Germany (4.5 percent in Sep-
tember 2015 and 3.9 percent in December 2016). In addi-
tion, even prior to the inflow of asylum seekers in 2015–16, 
Munich had already hosted a large share of foreign nation-
als – 25 percent of the city population at the beginning of 
2015. Hence, the local population in Munich is likely to 
have more positive attitudes toward newcomers. Together, 
these factors imply that the survey results might differ 
from a representative German or European case. 
Yet, analyzing such a selective immigrant sample in a 
favorable environment also brings an important benefit. It 
enables identification of obstacles to labor market integra-
tion other than low economic activity among refugees in 
general or weak local labor markets. In other words, there 
is labor supply by immigrants who are willing to work, as 
well as labor demand from local firms. The policy-relevant 
questions are what hinders successful matching between 
the supply and the demand and which policies can effi-
ciently address this problem. 
“Have you already started looking for jobs?” – 
“Don’t know where to start...”
On average, the participants attend an NGO’s counsel-
ing session nine months after they arrive in Germany. 
Most of them have not yet completed the asylum proce-
dure. While about 10 percent of the participants have had 
some working experience in Germany, 50 percent state 
that they have not yet started to actively search for jobs. 
Partly, this is due to restrictive regulations: in Germany, 
asylum seekers can obtain a work permit three months 
after arrival; only with a work permit can they register at 
a local job center. Thus, for many immigrants, receiving 
the legal permission marks the start of the search process. 
The absence of a work permit could explain inactivity for 
20 percent of the participants (those who arrived in Ger-
many less than four months ago as of the day of the base-
line survey). Other reasons that might hinder the begin-
ning of job search include uncertainty about housing due 
to probable relocation within Germany, participation in 
full-day German language or integration classes, insuffi-
cient knowledge of the language and procedures. Indeed, 
55 percent of the participants consider “insufficient lan-
guage skills” as the main difficulty in their job search (Fig-
ure 3.13, panel b, below). On the day of the baseline sur-
vey, only 11 percent of the participants spoke German at 
the B1 level or above. Knowing English at the B1 level or 
above does not alleviate the relevance of language barri-
ers. As another major difficulty, 28 percent of the parti-
cipants mention “complicated job search process – do not 
know where to search”. For instance, the low registration 
rate with the local public employment services (Munich 
job center) illustrates immigrants’ low familiarity with the 
available support measures. 
Regarding job search methods (Figure 3.13, panel a, 
below), 22 percent of job seekers rely on their friends. 
Finding a job with the help of a social network (friends, 
relatives, or acquaintances) is also the most prevalent 
method among economic immigrants.22 Refugees, how-
ever, might lack the necessary social networks and, there-
fore, additionally resort to their first local contacts for 
support with the job search. Thus, among survey partic-
ipants, 18 percent mention receiving such support from 
social workers and 6 percent from their teachers. About 20 
percent of respondents directly approach employers. Rel-
atively few participants search with the help of the public 
employment services: while 24 percent of respondents are 
registered at the Munich job center, only 16 percent men-
tion it among their job search methods. Online job search 
is relatively uncommon, with less than 20 percent of job 
seekers reporting that they use it. This figure, however, 
masks substantial heterogeneity among participants from 
different countries of origin: while almost 50 percent of 
Syrians use the Internet for their job search, slightly more 
than 10 percent of job seekers from other countries search 
for work online. 
Six months later: More search activity and a change 
in search methods
As the results of the follow-up survey show (see Figure 
3.14, below), search activity by the participants rose over 
the six months that passed between the two surveys. The 
22 On average in the EU, 
43 percent of economic 
immigrants report this method 
as the most successful for fin-
ding a job (Tanay et al. 2016). 
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Sources: Data collected from May 2016 to April 2017 for the project “Economic and Social Integration of Refugees in Munich: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, 
Ifo Institute (Munich) and CEPS (Brussels). Note: PES refers to public employment service.




















Figure 3.13 Job search behavior at the time of the baseline survey
Source: Data collected from May 2016 to April 2017 for the project “Economic and Social Integration of Refugees in Munich: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, Ifo Institute (Munich) and CEPS (Brus-
sels). Note: based on 338 completed baseline surveys.
share of job seekers registered with the public employ-
ment service has increased by 11 percentage points; the 
average amount of weekly hours spent on job search has 
grown from 1.7 to 4 hours. By the time of the second sur-
vey, around 50 percent of participants have already been 
in contact with a German employer for work, a job offer, 
interview, or an informal meeting.
The increase in search activity could in part be 
explained by completion of the bureaucratic procedures: 
some participants have obtained their work permit.23 In 
addition, job search strategies have changed. More job 
seekers mention using the Internet for their job search or 
receiving support from the job center. As the immigrants’ 
own social networks expand over time, more job support 
is provided through friends, while assistance from a social 
worker or a teacher becomes less relevant. The change in 
reported difficulties reflects the fact that the participants 
have become more familiar with how one may search for 
a job in Germany. The language barrier remains the major 
issue, its importance slightly decreases as the participants 
progress in learning German.
Labor market integration: First results
On the day of the follow-up survey, out of 197 respon-
dents, 24 percent were working. Among the employed, 
45 percent had a full-time job, 30 percent had a mini-
job, and 25 percent had an internship or were taking part 
in a vocational training program. Consistent with the 
reported search methods, 44 percent of job seekers had 
found jobs either through friends or by directly contact-
ing the employer (see Figure 3.15 below). Fewer successful 
matches had come through social workers and the pub-
Afghanistan Nigeria Syria rest Africa rest Asia Total
Female 5% 7% 3% 9% 4% 6%
Age 24 28 31 26 30 28
Married 22% 21% 31% 20% 31% 25%
Months since arrival 8 6 13 8 9 9
Attended university 27% 8% 57% 18% 37% 28%
No formal education 3% 6% 0% 9% 4% 4%
German, >= B1 14% 2% 23% 8% 10% 11%
English, >= B1 10% 67% 34% 59% 39% 44%
Registered at PES 29% 20% 32% 11% 33% 24%
Return intention 28% 27% 45% 24% 27% 30%
Observations 59 90 74 66 49 338
23 Yet, as of the day of the  
follow-up interview, 70 percent 
of the participants still had not 
received a decision on their 
asylum claim. While the majo-
rity of Syrians (77 percent) had 
completed the procedure, 
more than 90 percent of the 
participants from Nigeria and 
Afghanistan were still waiting 
for the decision. 
Method to look for work Difficulties during job search
65
on Asylum and Migration Policies in Europe
Change in outcomes Change in methodsto look for a job      






























































Source: Data collected from May 2016 to April 2017 for the project “Economic and Social Integration of Refugees in Munich: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, 
Ifo Institute (Munich) and CEPS (Brussels). Note: based on 135 observations with both baseline and follow-up surveys completed.
Figure 3.14 Outcomes and job search behavior at the time of the follow-up survey
lic employment services. Around 18 percent had obtained 
their jobs through the personalized matching services 
provided by the NGO. 
In addition to those currently working, about 10 percent 
of the participants had received job offers, but eventually 
declined them. The three primary reasons for refusing an 
offer were bureaucratic issues (such as not obtaining the 
timely approval of the employment office or recall of a 
work permit), conflicting time with a German language/
integration course, and a low wage.
Most of the jobs found are in the low- and middle-skill 
sectors: cleaning, bars/restaurants, and personal care 
account for almost two-thirds of all jobs. These jobs do not 
require advanced knowledge of German, and the conven-
tional search methods, such as a social network, should 
perform well. Not surprisingly, the employment rate of 
highly skilled job seekers (those who at least started a uni-
versity degree) is lower compared with other participants. 
The rate of contacting employers for an interview, by con-
trast, is higher for the highly skilled. It takes longer for 
highly skilled refugees to find a job that matches their 
qualifications. This could be due to suboptimal social net-
works and search methods, and as a result, more severe 
matching frictions. Furthermore, highly skilled job seek-
ers face higher opportunity costs of accepting a low- 
paying job instead of improving their language skills or 
investing time in further education. Consequently, in the 
short term, the labor market performance (if measured by 
working status) of highly skilled refugees might appear 
inferior to that of the low-skilled. 
Evaluating the determinants of labor market inte-
gration: The role of matching frictions
While multiple policies can be designed to facilitate the 
labor market integration of refugees, resource constraints 
compel policy makers to identify those areas where pol-
icy interventions are most efficient. Although the descrip-
tive survey results provide some interesting insights about 
the job search behavior of refugees and its development 
over time, they do not allow identification of the causal 
mechanisms behind successful labor market integration. 
For instance, if many job seekers name ‘language’ as their 
main difficulty, should the government provide more lan-
guage courses or rather train intermediaries to efficiently 
explain the search procedures? If it takes a long time for 
highly skilled immigrants to find a job, does this call for 
massive investment in retraining them or for a faster rec-
ognition of their qualifications? Or could better support 
during the job search process improve their outcomes? 
Apart from providing survey evidence, the project 
applies an experimental design to evaluate the impor-
tance of matching frictions for the labor market integra-
tion of refugees. In a nutshell, the project design allows for 
the causal evaluation of the NGO’s personalized matching 
services. During the counseling sessions, the NGO’s vol-
unteers enter the participants’ CV information into their 
database of job candidates. In addition, the NGO main-
tains a database of job vacancies. Once the NGO volun-
teers identify a potential match, they inform a job seeker 
about it and, if agreed, send the CV to the employer. In 
this way, the NGO attempts to reduce a matching friction 
between job seekers and employers: the intervention may 
improve participants’ labor market outcomes by creat-
ing awareness of job opportunities, reducing search time, 
enhancing match quality, or serving as an indirect referral 
to employers. Moreover, during the interview and hiring 
process, the NGO can provide all the participants as well 
as their potential employers with informational support. 
Figure 3.16 (panel a, below) illustrates the preliminary 
experimental results.24 As a relevant outcome, we choose 
the incidence of being in contact with a German employer 
for an interview, job offer, or work.25 The light green bar 
plots the mean outcome of those participants who were 
offered all of the NGO’s services, including job match-
24 As of April 10, 2017, the re-
search group had contacted 
about 40 percent of the study‘s 
participants for the follow-up 
survey, i.e. those who had par-
ticipated in the NGO‘s counse-
ling sessions before October 
10, 2016.
25 There are two reasons for this 
choice. First, this is the relevant 
outcome to evaluate the extent 
of matching frictions that pre-
vent job seekers and employers 
from meeting in the labor mar-
ket. Second, the period of six 
months (between the baseline 
and the first follow-up survey) is 
too short to evaluate the effect 
of the intervention on working 
status; this will become possible 
in later surveys, which will fol-
low in 2017 and 2018.
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Source: Data collected from May 2016 to April 2017 for the project “Economic and Social Integration of Refugees 
in Munich: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, Ifo Institute (Munich) and CEPS (Brussels).










0 % 5 % 10 % 15 % 20 %
ing. The purple bar on the right side plots the mean out-
come of those who were offered all services except for 
the direct matching with employers. Among the partic-
ipants who had no access to matching services, 34 per-
cent had contacted a German employer within the pre-
vious six months. Among those who could, in addition, 
receive matching services, the contact rate was 44 percent. 
To interpret this result, consider two job seekers who dif-
fer only in their access to the matching services: within 
the six months between the baseline and follow-up sur-
veys, the probability of having a work-related contact with 
a German employer is 10 percentage points higher for a 
job seeker who receives matching support.
To put this result into context, we consider the same 
outcome but now compare it among participants from 
different countries of origin (Figure 3.16, panel b).26 The 
green bar plots the mean outcome for Syrian job seek-
ers and the blue bar corresponds to the mean outcome of 
the participants from other countries. Relative to refugees 
from other countries, Syrians are better educated; already 
at the time of the baseline survey, they have better German 
skills; they experience the fastest asylum procedures and 
the highest recognition rates; in addition, Syrian refugees 
have access to a wide range of integration support pro-
grams. As expected, the share of Syrians who have already 
contacted a German employer for work-related reasons is 
19 percentage points higher. Comparing the outcome of 
Syrians with other refugees can serve as a rough evalua-
tion of a hypothetical policy bundle that would simulta-
neously improve professional and language skills, accel-
erate administrative procedures, and offer integration 
courses.27 However, such a policy bundle would be much 
costlier, both financially and in terms of the time spent by 
refugees, than provision of more efficient matching ser-
vices. In this context, the NGO’s matching services, which 
increased the likelihood of a work-related contact by 10 
percentage points, appear to be an efficient intervention. 
Certainly not all contacts will result in long-term employ-
ment for refugees; reducing the initial matching frictions 
between refugees and local employers is only one step 
toward labor market integration. Further follow-up sur-
veys of the study’s participants will examine whether facil-
itating labor market entry for refugees through matching 
services effectively increases their employment rates and 
job quality in the medium and long run. 
Policy implications
Our micro-level study follows the labor market integration 
of refugees in the first months after their arrival in Germany. 
It confirms that economic integration of the recent wave of 
refugees is feasible, but does not happen fast. A simple calcu-
lation exercise shows that the employment rates in our sam-
ple are in line with those found in the previous macro stud-
ies. On average, the follow-up survey takes place 15 months 
after a participant arrived in Germany. Assuming a uni-
form job-finding rate during these 15 months, the aver-
age monthly job-finding rate equals 1-2 percent (depend-
ing on whether we solely consider full-time jobs or all types 
of employment). This is broadly in line with our assump-
tions in the macro-level simulation exercise above. From 
the micro-level evidence presented, three useful observa-
tions emerge. 
First, refugees do not enter the labor market immediately 
after their arrival. During the first few months, economic 
participation is low due to restrictive regulation and lack 
of information about the local job search process. During 
this period, providing relevant information about job search 
procedures, available support measures, and efficient job 
search methods can increase the economic activity of immi-
grants. One way to disseminate such information systemati-
cally is through the local individuals who are usually in reg-
ular contact with refugees in the early stages: social workers 
and language teachers.
Second, a lack of skills, particularly local language skills, 
represents an obstacle for labor market integration. Yet, 
the employment prospects of refugees also depend on fric-
tions in job matching, i.e. on whether job seekers can come 
into contact with employers who are trying to fill a vacancy. 
Overcoming these frictions through personalized match-
ing services by public or private employment agencies may 
facilitate early entry into the labor market. Apart from iden-
tifying potential matches, the intermediaries need to ensure 
support throughout the job search process and to commu-
nicate the essential information to both job seekers and 
local employers. Therefore, such matching services have to 
be delivered by professionals who know the relevant admin-
istrative procedures.
Third, job search skills develop over time as immigrants 
learn about efficient job search methods from their own 
experience. Hence, refugees should be encouraged to start 
their job search early (for instance, while they are still in lan-
guage classes or waiting for an asylum decision). This would 
allow them to acquire the necessary job search skills faster 
and thus to reduce the ‘idle’ period during which their pro-
fessional qualifications might depreciate. 
The existing empirical evidence points to the importance 
of early access to the labor market for refugees. In prac-
tice, however, refugees enter the labor market with a delay. 
Most EU member states impose restrictions on labor mar-
26 The probability to receive 
matching services does not 
depend on the country of  
origin.
27 It is very hard to precisely 
identify what drives differen-
ces in economic outcomes bet-
ween immigrants from different 
origin countries. This difference 
might be also caused by beha-
vioral characteristics, migra-
tion motives, health issues, etc. 
Thus, we simplify when assu-
ming that the observed dif-
ference between Syrians and 
other immigrants in the sample 
is primarily due to education 
background, language skills, 
and regulation.
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ket access for asylum seekers before their refugee status is 
recognized. While such measures are supposed to deter 
would-be economic migrants from entering as asylum 
seekers, they are costly in the long run because they lower 
incentives for both refugees and firms to invest in job rela-
tionships early on. Moreover, the asylum procedure may 
drag on for several years. With no access to work, immi-
grants in such a precarious situation represent a burden for 
the public budget and might be more likely to engage in ille-
gal activities.
Reducing the duration of the asylum process is the prac-
tical policy option to address the above problem. Still, in 
case the asylum procedures do take a long time, there is a 
strong case for granting asylum seekers access to work. The 
pertinent question is whether such a policy would attract 
more illegal migrants to the country. The existing empiri-
cal evidence, however, points to reception policies (which 
include early access to work) having only marginal signifi-
cance with respect to the number of asylum applications in 
a particular country (Hatton 2016). 
Yet, allowing access to work for asylum seekers leads to 
a more controversial question: Should an employed asy-
lum seeker whose application has been rejected be allowed 
to continue to live and work in the host country? In other 
words, should there be an option for a status conversion 
from the ‘asylum track’ to the ‘labor migration track’ if 
an asylum seeker fulfills the requirements for the labor 
track?28 On the one hand, such a status conversion facili-
tates labor market integration due to reduced uncertainty 
for both refugees and local firms. The possibility of status 
conversion makes early job search more attractive for asy-
Source: Data collected from May 2016 to April 2017 for the project “Economic and Social Integration of Refugees in Munich: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, 
Ifo Institute (Munich) and CEPS (Brussels). Note: based on 135 observations with both baseline and follow-up surveys completed.
Figure 3.16 Outcomes and job search behavior at the time of the follow-up survey
Matching vs no matching (all countries of origin) Syrians vs refugees from other countries of origin

























lum seekers, because with a job, they may be able to stay 
in the destination country even if their asylum applica-
tion is rejected. Additionally, local firms would face a lower 
risk of losing workers due to negative asylum decisions and 
hence would be more willing to employ asylum seekers. On 
the other hand, allowing for status conversion may attract 
higher numbers of irregular migrants driven primarily by 
economic rather than humanitarian motives. 
Because individual member states can best evalu-
ate their benefits and costs associated with this trade-off, 
they should decide whether to allow for such status con-
version. For instance, if the country-specific costs of ref-
ugees’ unemployment duration are high or the return of 
rejected asylum seekers is difficult to enforce, status con-
version might be a reasonable option. A long-term solu-
tion, however, should safeguard against mixing economic 
and humanitarian migration, while addressing the roots 
of the above trade-off: long asylum procedures, costly 
return, and a lack of alternative entry options for eco-
nomic migrants. As discussed in Chapter 2, a coordinated 
EU approach to managing external border areas, screen-
ing and registering asylum applications, and ensuring 
fast return would make irregular migration for economic 
motives less attractive. In addition, these measures would 
allow for faster asylum procedures in the host countries 
and, hence would shorten the uncertainty period for ref-
ugees and the local firms. Simultaneously providing more 
opportunities for legal migration (that correspond to the 
needs of economies) and communicating these opportuni-
ties to potential economic migrants would encourage them 
to choose legal paths to migration.
28 For instance, Sweden cur-
rently allows for such a con-
version: if an asylum applica-
tion is rejected, the employer 
of an asylum seeker, subject to 
a number of conditions, can 
sponsor the application for a 
work permit. In Germany,  
a ‘three + two’ rule guarantees 
up to five years of residency 
(independent of an asylum 
decision) for those who receive 
a credible apprenticeship con-
tract with a German employer 
and meet the necessary langu-
age requirements.
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T he flows of migrants that we observe are the out­come of ongoing decisions by millions of indi­viduals and their families on whether to migrate 
or not. Potential migrants weigh the benefits of migration 
(tangible and intangible) against the cost (again, tang­
ible and intangible). Similarly, migrants and their fami­
lies decide whether to stay in their host country or return 
home, and how much time and money to invest in tang­
ible and intangible assets specific to their host and home 
countries.
If policies to manage migrant flows (chapter 2) and pro­
mote the economic and social integration of migrants in 
host countries (chapter 3) are to be effective, policy mak­
ers must take into account the way migrants make these 
decisions. In section 4.1, we review the relevant theoret­
ical and empirical literature and point out implications 
for the current debate on asylum and migration policies in 
Europe. Specifically, we ask how rising per­capita income 
affects emigration from poor countries and how poten­
tial migrants are likely to react to the fortifying of borders 
between poor and rich countries. 
In the ongoing public debate on immigration in Europe, 
there are often calls for development assistance to be re­ 
invented to eliminate the underlying causes of migration 
from poor countries. In section 4.2, we draw on our under­
standing of how individuals and families decide whether 
4. A country-of-origin  
perspective: migration  
decisions, development  
assistance, and how migrants 
help to shape values at home
to migrate (section 4.1) to review the complex linkages 
between migration, on the one hand, and develop ment 
assistance, financial remittances sent by migrants, and 
other financial flows to developing countries, on the other 
hand. We also discuss the challenges inherent in recent 
EU aid programs that target measures to reduce irregular 
migration by the recipient countries. 
Many migrants maintain close links with family and 
friends in their countries of origin, even while their eco­
nomic and social integration is progressing well in their host 
countries. This situation of having close economic and social 
links in two societies has been characterized as migrant 
transnationalism. Apart from financial remittances to fam­
ily and friends, transnationalism also leads to ‘social remit­
tances’: the transfer of values that migrants acquire in their 
host countries, to family, friends, and society at large in their 
countries of origin. We review the research literature on 
when and how migration may affect fertility behavior, the 
social status of women, and political attitudes in migrants’ 
countries of origin (section 4.3). This analysis helps us to 
better understand the ties that bind migrants to their coun­
tries of origin and destination, and hence migrants’ deci­
sions on where to live. Furthermore, by changing social and 
political values and institutions in countries of origin, social 
remittances are potentially an important channel through 
which migration affects development.
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T he process of migration starts when individuals decide to leave their country of origin – either because their lives are not safe and they seek pro­
tection abroad (forced migration), or because they look for 
better economic opportunities (labor migration). Individ­
uals do not make such decisions alone. The cost of migrat­
ing may be borne by family and household members and 
emigrants are often expected to reciprocate by sharing 
their future higher incomes abroad with relatives back 
home through regular or one­off remittances. Living con­
ditions at home, earnings opportunities abroad, and the 
immigration policies of potential destination countries all 
affect whether individuals decide to emigrate and where 
they go.
4.1 Determinants of migration: 
Who leaves, who arrives, and 
what drives their destination 
choices? Lead authors: Claas Schneiderheinze and Tobias Stöhr
We need to understand how potential migrants make 
these decisions because the process has a major impact on 
the present and future number of migrants as well as their 
socioeconomic characteristics. For example, while 31 per­
cent of immigrants ages 15 and older in the U.S. had at 
least some college education in 2011, this share was 22 per­
cent in Germany and only 12 percent in Italy (own calcu­
lations based on the OECD Database on Immigrants in 
OECD Countries, DIOC). Figure 4.1 shows that the larg­
est bilateral migrant stocks differ considerably in the share 
of highly skilled migrants. The socioeconomic character­
istics of immigrants affect their labor market and social 
integration and have important implications for possi­
ble policy interventions and even for internal security in 
destination countries.
Figure 4.1 Share of highly skilled migrants among the bilateral migrant stock, 2010 
most important stock per destination
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Such differences in the composition of immigrant pop­
ulations are the result of both migrants’ decisions and des­
tination country policies. Immigrants who arrive in a des­
tination country will have made several choices: They will 
have considered staying in their country of origin, but 
have ultimately decided to leave. They will have advanced 
from the stage of merely considering the possibility of 
emigration to making specific plans to actually moving to 
a destination country. They will have decided whether to 
migrate legally or illegally. Once in the destination coun­
try, they may have considered staying for a longer time 
but, due to changing circumstances or new information, 
may have decided to migrate on. All these decisions are 
taken under binding constraints, especially the immigra­
tion policies of potential destination countries, such that 
desirability and feasibility often do not overlap.
Determinants of migration and destination 
choice
Migration decisions consist of two steps: ‘self-selection’ 
and ‘sorting’. Self­selection describes the process through 
which some members of a society decide to become emi­
grants, while the majority stays behind. Sorting describes 
the choice of destination. These two decisions are of 
course taken simultaneously; therefore, many determi­
nants affect both the number of emigrants and the choice 
of destination. In order to assess how policies influence 
migration, it is thus important to always consider the 
impact on both self­selection and sorting.
Traditionally, determinants of migration have been cat­
egorized as push vs pull factors (Lee 1966). On the one 
hand, factors in the country of origin that increase the 
likelihood of people leaving are said to ‘push’ people out. 
On the other hand, factors that make potential destina­
tion countries attractive ‘pull’ a prospective migrant to 
a  destination. This framework, however, is incomplete. 
Positive developments in the country of origin can make 
it more attractive to stay and likewise, a destination can 
become less attractive over time. A better way of concep­
tualizing the migration decision is as a subjective cost–
benefit comparison that takes into account many fac­
tors, including possible barriers to migration (such as 
restrictive immigration policies) and the cost of overcom­
ing them. Furthermore, the costs and benefits of migra­
tion heavily depend on individual factors, such as educa­
tion, language skills, personal networks, and the distinct 
social and economic prospects in the home country. 
Merely studying push and pull factors at the country level 
without considering migrants’ individual characteristics 
would lead to an incomplete analysis with little explana­
tory power.
By contrast, in an individual cost–benefit model, pro­
spective migrants not only compare their current situa­
tion with that in one destination country but also take a 
considerably more complex decision. Potential migrants 
compare their expected utility in their country of origin 
with that in a set of potential destination countries. At 
a given point in time, their migration propensity is deter­
mined by the benefits and costs of moving to the subject­
ively most attractive destination country. This is the basic 
utility maximization framework. 
Many destinations will not be seriously considered 
because they are too unattractive or potential migrants 
do not have sufficient information about them. In this 
context, attraction is defined broadly to include country­ 
specific policy­induced and psychological costs. 
Figure 4.2 GDP per capita of 10 major countries of origin, 2014 immigrant flows
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Financial migration costs affect both self­selection and 
sorting. If migration cannot be financed to any destina­
tion, emigration becomes infeasible for the very poor. Yet 
typically, financial costs only restrict the set of reachable 
destinations. With increasing income levels, the absolute 
importance of financial migration costs for emigration as 
well as sorting decreases. Psychological costs, for exam­
ple the separation from family and friends or the feeling 
of not ‘belonging’ to the society at the destination, at least 
initially, are largely unmeasurable – yet many migration 
researchers consider them to be far more influential than 
the financial cost of migration. As a result of modern com­
munication technology, psychological migration costs are 
lower than in the past. Still, they may be crucial for the 
choice of a specific destination country and for the deci­
sion between circular and permanent migration. Psycho­
logical migration costs are probably related to income in 
a similar way as workers’ valuation of leisure: with higher 
income, financial migration costs become less important, 
but psychological costs remain highly significant. Never­
theless, as Figure 4.2 shows, income and income differ­
ences between origin and destination explain far less of 
the variation than many in the public would believe. Other 
factors such as the absolute size of the country of origin 
and many country­specific factors that we discuss below 
are also part of the story. Also, the composition of the top 
10 countries of origin of migrants to the EU is far from 
the perceptions conveyed in the media, policy debates, and 
public discourse in general.
Individual costs and benefits of migration depend sig­
nificantly on characteristics shared between the migrant 
and the potential host­country populations. Shared lan-
guages and culture lower the cost of migration by facilitat­
ing labor market and social integration; they often explain 
why a particular, far­off place is the favored destination of 
emigrants from a particular country. Even between lin­
guistically and culturally very different countries, bilateral 
migration can be high if family members, friends, acquain­
tances, or other co­ethnics have already settled in the des­
tination country. Such migrant networks transmit infor­
mation about specific destinations to their nodes in other 
countries and thus improve access to information. Fur­
thermore, they allow emigrants to cope without knowl­
edge of the host country’s language, may provide shelter, 
and often make it easier to find the first job after arrival. 
The foremost impact of networks is thus on sorting, by 
making one destination (maybe even a particular location 
within a destination country) far more attractive than all 
others. 
Within the specific, bilateral, origin–destination country 
pair, the decrease in migration cost and the higher chance 
of finding employment owing to the presence of a personal 
network can tip the scale for an individual toward migrat­
ing. Over time, well­established networks thus attract ever 
less highly self­selected migrants. Network effects mean 
that large, idiosyncratic inflows of immigrants can have 
implications for bilateral migrant flows for decades after­
ward. One example is immigrants from Turkey in Germany 
– countries that share neither a common border nor lan­
guage. By channeling remittances, trade, and investment, 
such longstanding ties can bind different countries together 
in ways that go far beyond hosting bilateral immigrants. 
In contrast to the costs of migration, the potential ben­
efits depend far more on differences in country charac-
teristics. Traditionally, income differences between two 
countries are viewed as the key motivation for international 
migration. Other things being equal, a migration­induced 
increase in disposable income clearly raises a destination’s 
attractiveness. However, research has shown that for 
many migrants, absolute deprivation and low levels 
of local amenities play a crucial role for the decision 
to leave home and can be more decisive than country 
differences in income. For example, local amenities, 
such as public service provision, governance, and secu­
rity, explain more of the migration decision in developing 
countries in Africa, Asia, and South America than income 
(Dustmann and Okatenko 2014). Hence, low subjective 
well­being in the country of origin is considered a good 
indicator for emigration intentions (Cai et al. 2014) and 
heavily influences self­selection.
The way country differences play out in the migration 
decision highly depends on migrants’ individual char-
acteristics, such as education or language skills. Gener­
ally, more educated individuals are more likely to migrate. 
This is because the level of education positively affects the 
employment opportunities and expected wages in the des­
tination country and consequently increases the bene­
fits of migration. On average, migrants are thus positively 
selected from their country of origin. In addition, there is 
positive sorting: countries differ in their financial return 
to education because of the sophistication of their econo­
mies, the relative supply of workers of different skill levels, 
and taxation. A country with higher returns to skills thus 
attracts more positively self­selected immigrants (Grogger 
and Hanson 2011). While sorting is heavily influenced, the 
influence of education on emigration intentions should 
not be overestimated. Income differentials between the 
developing and the rich world are so large that even low­
skilled workers, who may have difficulty finding jobs in 
advanced economies, can multiply their real incomes 
through migration (Clemens et al. 2008). 
Higher education is an important prerequisite for 
migration to many destinations, though. In many coun­
tries, immigration policy conditions legal access on higher 
education while illegal migration is often unattractive. In 
such cases, education may be the crucial factor that makes 
migration feasible and thereby affects the incidence of 
migration, the choice of destination, and the choice of sta­
tus (legal or other). 
Prevailing constraints on legal migration are binding for 
most aspiring migrants and function like a filter. For those 
who do not qualify for (legal) immigration to any rich 
country, other countries in the developing or emerging 
world might be accessible, but not attractive enough. Par­
ticularly in the case of points­based immigration regimes, 
such as Canada’s, a disproportionately high share of the 
immigrant population exhibits those visible characteris­
tics that are targeted by the system. Many other would­be 
immigrants only have the option of illegal immigration 
or trying their luck as an asylum seeker. This is why coun­
tries in Europe with higher barriers to legal immigration 
also see higher numbers of illegal entries and why coun­
tries that deny a higher proportion of asylum claims have 
more illegal stayers (Czaika and Hobolth 2016).
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Finally, three factors are all too often omitted when 
analyz ing migration flows at the macro level – information, 
uncertainty, and the planning horizon. They are crucial 
because they determine how individuals weigh all the fac­
tors that influence their migration decision against each 
other.
First, if information is scarce, expectations of the costs 
and benefits associated with migration may be far from 
the truth (see Box 4.1). With limited knowledge of poss­
ible destinations, migrants will consider a smaller set than 
they could actually access. Individuals with little informa­
tion may also decide broadly that migration seems attract­
ive to them and only then start considering absolute as 
well as destination­specific constraints. Such a two­step 
decision process could explain why many more people 
state a willingness to migrate internationally than follow 
through with their plans within a reasonable period of 
time (e.g. Docquier et al. 2014).
Second, another reason for relatively low rates of emi­
gration (compared with the number of people who stay) is 
risk. Income as well as overall well­being abroad is uncer­
tain, which makes migration less attractive particularly 
for the risk averse. 
On the other hand, emigration may be motivated by a 
desire to diversify risks faced in the country of origin. In 
most developing countries, extended families function as 
the relevant economic units, sharing large parts of their 
incomes and collectively deciding about economic mat­
ters. In this context, migration by individual family mem­
bers may help to diversify income risks and thus improve 
the well­being of the extended family. Particularly in rural 
areas in developing countries, sending family members to 
urban areas decreases the detrimental consequences of 
negative shocks to agriculture, and thus reduces the risk 
of hunger and deprivation. If risk reduction is the main 
motive for sending a migrant, this person may not be the 
one with the highest expected earnings at the destination. 
This is among the insights from the so­called ‘New Eco­
nomics of Labor Migration’.
Nevertheless, families typically do not go over the heads 
of the affected individuals when they take migration deci­
sions. The potential migrant’s personality also matters. 
Risk­averse individuals are more likely to shy away from 
uncertain outcomes abroad than those who are more tol­
erant of risks. Therefore, the absolute and relative levels of 
risk involved in reaching each possible destination affect 
self­selection and sorting and, hence, the average charac­
teristics of those who arrive. On the other hand, in a high­
risk environment in the country of origin, such as during 
a civil war, self­selection may run the opposite way, as the 
most risk­averse people may be the first to leave. 
Third, migrants not only consider the present but also 
have a planning horizon that may extend to their chil­
dren and thus go well beyond an individual’s lifetime. 
Expected outcomes in the country of origin and at possi­
ble destinations are also likely to be considered well into 
the future. It may therefore be rational to migrate from 
an existing job at home into unemployment abroad, if the 
expected probability of finding a job in the destination 
country at a higher wage is sufficiently high. 
Migration is thus an investment that has to pay off over 
the life cycle; as a result, the expected benefits of migra­
tion loom larger for the young. A country that provides a 
long­term perspective for immigrants, such as a firm pros­
pect for permanent residency, can expect to attract immi­
grants who are well motivated to spend time and effort to 
integrate into the labor market and into society at large, 
to build a business, etc. By contrast, if the legal status of 
immigrants is insecure a country will attract primarily 
those who are interested in quickly earning some money, 
without much longer­term attachment to the country. 
In combination with the perspective of the new eco­
nomics of labor migration, these three factors explain 
why the recent wave of refugees and other immigrants to 
Europe consisted largely of young men, some with very 
misguided expectations of life in Europe, who paid high 
fees to people smugglers to enter the EU irregularly, while 
most national labor markets in the EU are not legally 
accessible for most of the world’s population.
The special case of forced/refugee migration
Forced migrants (or refugees) merit a separate discus­
sion because their motives differ from labor migrants and 
they often arrive in a host country suddenly and in rela­
tively large numbers (as in the EU during 2015). Refugee 
status may be based on either persecution (political, 
ethnic, religious, or related to sexual orientation) or vio­
lent conflict in the country of origin (subsidiary protec­
tion). Leaving aside mixed migration (i.e. a combination of 
economic motives and persecution), refugees differ from 
other migrants in that they perceive remaining in their 
home country as very risky. That risk may be thought of as 
a negative component of their migration cost (i.e. reduc­
ing the total cost). As a result, refugees become less and 
less self­selected, the higher the risk of remaining in their 
country of origin (see Chin and Cortes 2015). 
In some circumstances, such as persecution for polit­
ical opposition, this risk is individual; in other circum­
stances, such as a civil war, the risk affects most of the 
population. In either case, there may be no expected wage 
gain or other economic improvement through moving 
abroad. Quite to the contrary: refugees living in camps or 
simply squatting often have to sell any remaining assets 
to survive, especially if host countries limit labor mar­
ket access.
Most refugees are hosted by developing countries. 
Many refugees around the world depend on humanitar­
ian assistance but especially in less publicized crises there 
is often little outside support. In such cases refugees are 
far from passive. With few formal labor markets, they 
may be actively rebuilding their lives, integrating eco­
nomically with the host population without depending 
on humanitarian assistance from host societies or inter­
national sources (Betts et al. 2014). This can spark com­
petition but there can also be winners in the host popu­
lation, for example farmers facing increased demand for 
their produce.
The economic perspective does not play a major role in 
determination of the first country of refuge; what mat­
ters is distance and accessibility. Even common languages 
or historical ties are not statistically robust predictors 
for the sorting of refugees (Echevarria and Gardeazabal 
2016), not least because of national migration and asy­
lum policies.
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A necdotal evidence, such as the quote above, suggests that often a migrant’s expectations at the time of the move are not met in reality. The 
mismatch between expectations and realization is a 
consequence of unrealistic and/or false expectations 
based on inaccurate information about life conditions 
and earning potential at the destination. 
Potential migrants may have access to several 
sources of information. The socioeconomic behaviors 
of visiting immigrants might give non­migrants a false 
impression of life abroad. For example, by consum­
ing lots of goods that 
indicate high social 
status, such as expen­
sive clothing, visit­
ing immigrants may 
wrongly convey signals 
of high returns associ­
ated with the migration 
experience to family 
and friends at the home 
location (Gmelch 1980). 
Media also seems to 
play a crucial, though a 
priori ambiguous, role 
in informing poten­
tial immigrants. Mai (2004) finds that Albanians’ 
overoptimistic perception of the lifestyle and wealth 
in Italy was highly influenced by what was shown in 
Italian television programs, while Farré and Fasani 
(2013) argue that information gathered from tele vision 
broadcasting enabled internal migrants in Indonesia 
to make a more realistic cost–benefit analysis of 
migration. A more direct channel of information to 
potential migrants is the network of parents and rela­
tives living in the country of destination. In principle, 
networks have some knowledge of the local context, 
including labor market conditions and wage pros­
pects. The better migration networks are integrated 
within the local context, the more they are able to con­
vey accurate information to their network members 
who are willing to migrate (Elsner et al. 2014). 
To date, aspiring migrants’ ability to correctly pre­
dict the outcomes of their migration remain little 
studied. A case study on Tongan immigrants in New 
Zealand suggests they underestimate potential wages 
in New Zealand (McKenzie et al. 2013). By contrast, 
Hoxhaj (2015) stud­
ies illegal immigrants 
from 55 origin coun­
tries who crossed the 
Italian borders in 2003. 
This study finds that 84 
percent of them over­
estimate the poten­
tial wage they could 
earn in Italy. Obvi­
ously, an overoptimis­
tic expectation of pos­
sibilities abroad can be 
financially detrimen­
tal because it can cause 
bad financial decisions. Also, it can have serious impli­
cations for migrants’ psychological situation if they see 
themselves undershooting their expected outcomes. 
Both financial and psychological aspects can result in 
‘failed migrations’, i.e. situations where outcomes turn 
out far worse than the migrant had expected or hoped 
for. Measures aimed at informing potential migrants 
might considerably reduce such failed migrations and 
also lower the migratory pressure experienced by des­
tination countries.
Box 4.1 Information sources, the quality of information and migrants’ expectations
I came to America because I heard 
the streets were paved with gold. 
When I got here, I found out three 
things: first, the streets weren‘t 
paved with gold; second, they 
weren’t paved at all; and third,  
I was expected to pave them.
 
Anonymous Italian immigrant at Ellis Island, 
New York, in the early 1900s
If refugees see no long­term perspective for themselves 
in their country of first asylum (or current living condi­
tions are simply too bad), they may seek to move to another 
host country that offers better conditions in the medium 
to long run. One recent example was the widely used 
migration corridor from Syria first to Turkey and then 
onwards to Sweden or Germany (see also Box 4.2 below). 
Such intermittent flight blurs the distinction between 
refugee migration and other forms of migration. The deci­
sion to leave the country of first asylum (in our exam­
ple, Turkey) again gives rise to self­selection and sorting. 
Those who move on are likely to be positively self­selected 
with respect to (remaining) wealth and labor market pros­
pects in the final destination country. Families are often 
unable to fund onward migration for all members and will 
therefore invest in the migration of one member who they 
deem most likely to survive the hardships of a risky jour­
ney, find work, and sponsor family migration. If unaccom­
panied minors receive a more secure legal status in poten­
tial host countries than other asylum seekers, this may 
tip families’ incentives toward choosing a young mem­
ber for secondary migration who can credibly claim to be 
underage. As a result, the forced migrants who remain in 
the country of first asylum are often the most vulnerable, 
which represents a challenge to the ethical foundations of 
the current European asylum system.
Will everybody leave sub-Saharan Africa to 
realize higher incomes?
Increasing international migration is often considered 
an inevitable consequence of globalization. Facilitated by 
advances in communication technology, social, economic, 
and cultural ties across national borders are multiplying. 
They help to spread information, thereby reducing actual 
and perceived migration costs and making emigration 
more desirable and more feasible for many individuals.
Yet, immigrants are regarded with reservations in many 
societies. Stated reasons include increased competition 
in the labor market, foreign infiltration, and security (see 
chapter 3.2). In this context, it is often argued that with­
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I n 2015, close to 900,000 refugees and other migrants arrived in Germany as part of the “refugee crisis” (simply called refugees in the remainder of this 
box). In total, about 2 million foreigners moved to the 
country and over 800,000 left. In absolute terms, this 
inflow of 900,000 people was the largest number of 
new refugees in any EU member state. In most publicly 
available data sources, refugees are usually not dis­
tinguished from other immigrants. However, several 
German institutions have jointly conducted a detailed 
study that allows some conclusions on how self­selec­
tion and sorting have led to the large inflow of refu­
gees (IAB 2016). 
The four largest groups of recent refugees, account­
ing for two­thirds of the total, are Syrians, Afghanis, 
Iraqis, and Eritreans. A large majority of the respon­
dents report fear of violent conflict or war as a rea­
son for initially leaving their country of origin (70 per­
cent), followed by persecution (44 percent), but also 
economic motives such as poor personal living condi­
tions (39 percent). Thus, most refugees indicate motives 
based on upon which they could be granted asylum or 
subsidiary protection. Notably, the majority of refu­
gees did not flee directly from their country of origin 
to Germany: of those from Syria, Iraq, and Afghani­
stan, only about 60 percent came to Germany directly 
while the rest spent at least three months in a transit 
country. The majority moved on from the transit coun­
try due to poor living conditions (reported by 55 per­
cent of those who originally planned to stay there) or 
poverty, although discrimination, persecution, and a 
second displacement experience were also reported. 
More than two­thirds of interviewees said that respect 
for human rights was a reason why they chose Ger­
many; more than 40 percent respectively reported that 
they were attracted by the German education system 
and the expectation that they would “ feel welcome in 
Germany.” 
This example shows quite clearly that conditions 
in the country of first asylum largely determine sec­
ondary migration, which is often driven by economic 
desperation. Moving to Germany from transit coun­
tries (mostly Turkey) involved high expenses on peo­
ple smugglers, a considerable risk of drowning at sea, 
and very widespread experiences of fraud, economic 
exploitation, physical violence and, particularly for 
women, sexual violence. The large demand for smug­
gling services, however, reduced the cost for the indi­
vidual by inducing more people to offer smuggling ser­
vices or by creating the opportunity to reap economies 
of scale and probably also decreased the risk per indi­
vidual, such that the share of young men among refu­
gees in 2015–16 was lower than in earlier waves from 
the same countries.
Box 4.2 Germany’s recent refugees
out tighter restrictions and border controls large parts of 
the developing world would migrate to the richest nations 
to enjoy higher living standards. Judging by differences in 
available income alone, it is surprising that so few people 
from poor countries attempt to migrate to richer countries. 
In the Gallup World Poll, respondents are asked whether 
they would, under ideal circumstances, like to migrate to 
another country permanently. In 2010–12, for which data 
are available, only 7 percent responded positively to this 
question in Rwanda and only 10 percent in Mozambique 
in spite of large differentials in living standards compared 
with the rich world. Since the financial costs of migration 
are ruled out by the hypothetical ideal scenario set by Gal­
lup’s interviewers, the psychological migration costs stem­
ming from the preference to remain ‘home’ and the satisfac­
tion of people with their current and expected livelihoods 
must be the main factors keeping the willingness to migrate 
low. Countries with similar income levels to Rwanda and 
Mozambique at the time, for example, Burkina Faso and 
Liberia, had a reported willingness to migrate of 28 percent 
and 50 percent of the population, respectively (Esipova et al. 
2014). Why such large differences? While pointing out indi­
vidual factors is difficult without a proper causal analysis, 
which is hardly feasible at the country level, one reason may 
be different economic outlooks. Rwanda was economically 
developing and fast improving amenities while Burkina 
Faso’s economy was largely stagnant. Post­conflict Mozam­
bique and Liberia shared similar income levels and growth 
rates but the experience of civil war was far more present in 
Liberia. In addition, satisfaction with government and lib­
erty can play an important role. In total, all sorts of private 
motives for not wanting to migrate add up to a considerable 
implicit cost. Docquier (2016) points out that the number 
of aspiring migrants in the hypothetical Gallup scenario 
is still six times smaller than what a model of wage equal­
ization without migration barriers would predict. Still, this 
would indicate a more than threefold increase compared 
with current migration flows.
While large shares of the population seem to be willing 
to emigrate, if asked in the Gallup poll only a small seg­
ment of these respondents plan to migrate in the next 12 
months and ever fewer have made concrete preparations 
as is shown by other questions in the Gallup survey. Why 
this inertia? For one thing, psychological costs like leaving 
one’s family become salient when thinking about migra­
tion; for another, the infeasibility of legal migration due to 
financial constraints and legal barriers is often apparent to 
an aspiring migrant.
Furthermore, the possible improvement in well­being 
by migrating is not only a matter of absolute costs and 
benefits. An individual’s relative income position in a 
society also affects her well­being/utility and thus the sub­
jective benefits of migration. Most people are willing to 
give up absolute income for a higher relative position in 
the income distribution. Mujcic and Frijters (2013) show 
in an experimental setup that the average migrant from 
Mexico to the U.S. would require a permanent annual 
income gain of about $10,000 (or 70 percent of the initial 
average income) just to make up for her lower income rank 
in the U.S. This effect is likely to be particularly significant 
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for potential emigrants who are relatively well­off in their 
country of origin (and hence have the necessary resources 
to migrate) but would end up as low­skilled workers in 
the country of destination (and hence at the bottom of the 
income ladder). 
In general, rising living standards in developing coun­
tries can both spur and deter out­migration. Therefore, 
the direction of impact is related to the initial standards of 
living. For very poor households increasing incomes relax 
the financial constraint, and thus make migration feasi­
ble (or enhances the set of feasible destinations). Apart 
from that, any improvement in well­being creates incen­
tives to stay in the homeland, as the opportunity costs 
of migration increase and the net benefits of migration 
diminish. At higher income levels, income differences in 
relation to richer destination countries are often not suf­
ficient to make up for risks and psychological costs. The 
consequence is a hump­shaped income­migration rela­
tionship, as depicted in the stylized relationship in Fig­
ure 4.3, which is based on empirical work by authors such 
as Clemens (2014). Even though the issue has not yet been 
conclusively researched, there is evidence that migration 
due to income differences does not imply full conver­
gence of incomes. Rather, migration rates decrease at rel­
ative income levels of 1:4 or 1:3. In societies or groups that 
are not constrained in their migration decisions by finan­
cial means, external shocks such as civil conflicts, natural 
disasters, or economic crises potentially lead to stronger 
emigration responses.
Given improving living conditions in the developing 
world (at least on average) (World Bank 2016), the high 
risks associated with the migration decision, strong pref­
erences for a high relative income, and the substantial psy­
chological costs of migration that have a positive income 
elasticity, the benefits from migration must be extensive 
to justify a move. In consequence, for the vast majority 
of households expected utility is higher at home and they 
decide against migration independent of the immigra­
tion policy regime. Given the large numbers of households 
that are financially constrained though and the relatively 
low share of actual international migrants from sub­ 
Saharan Africa so far (section 1.1), relaxed financial con­
straints due to economic development could increase the 
absolute number of migrants who actually follow through 
with their willingness to migrate under hypothetical cir­
cumstances, even if they remain a small share of the pop­
ulation of their country of origin. The decreasing effect 
of higher income levels will only be reached after a long 
time of sustained convergence with the rich world and 
most people in sub­Saharan Africa are nowadays on the 
upward­sloping parts of the graph in Figure 4.3.
While improving the current economic condition in the 
country of origin is thus unlikely to decrease migration 
in the short run in its own right, supporting countries in 
achieving better economic and social trajectories is a far 
more promising way to decrease migration pressures from 
sub­Saharan Africa in the future.
Border walls and their likely effects
Recently, perhaps the most visual form of increasing 
migration costs for undocumented migrants – the building 
of walls and fences – has regained popularity among 
policy makers in Europe and the United States alike. 
In 2015–16 several European borders were fortified or 
fences were about to be built at Calais and other borders: 
Hungary­Serbia, Hungary­Romania, Hungary­ 
Croatia, Slovenia­Croatia, Austria­Slovenia, Austria­Italy, 
Macedonia­Greece, Latvia­Russia and Estonia­Russia 
(Cosgrave et al. 2016). At the same time, President Don­
ald Trump is pursuing an extension of existing border 
walls and fences at the southern border of the U.S. For 
many, building a wall at the national borders is the most 
appealing way to curb illegal immigration, to regain con­
trol over entry, and to improve security. The universal 
rationale for building a physical wall is to avert the per­
ceived and actual negative consequences of illegal immi­
gration with respect to the economic and security con­
cerns of nationals. At the very least this requires a border 
wall, which we will use as a placeholder for all simi­
lar obstacles in this section, as an effective way of stop­
ping people from using a particular route, thus making 
assumptions that it is not easily crossed and is costly in 
terms of building, maintenance, and patrolling. Often, 
little thought goes into the effects such a border wall can 
have beyond reducing the absolute number of immi­
grants in the short term. 
It has repeatedly been shown that even very strict 
immigration policy regimes cannot prevent migration if 
they are poorly implemented and not coordinated with 
other policies. Instead, very restrictive immigration poli­
cies rather change the path and composition of migration 
(Massey, Pren, and Durand 2016; Cosgrave et al. 2016). 
Building a wall will mostly affect sorting by  diverting 
flows. Increasing barriers to migration on one route usu­
ally shifts the flow of migrants quickly toward the sec­
ond­best entry route (Gilman 2008). 
For a whole region such as the European Union to dis­
courage someone from illegally crossing its border by put­
ting up a wall, the financial and non­financial costs to 
potential migrants of crossing any section of the exter­
nal border need to become prohibitively high. This will 
require large expenditures and effective implementation 
Figure 4.3 Stylized hump-shaped relationship 
between emigration and GDP per capita
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in each and every member state on the external border. 
Otherwise, the member state where the external border is 
easiest to cross will become the main entry point and for­
tifying borders will simply shift border crossings from one 
country to another. 
Naturally, the physical fencing of sea borders is imposs­
ible. Yet, some sections of the external EU borders are so 
difficult for migrants to reach that these can be policed 
relatively easily. However, sea borders that are difficult 
to protect, for example the central Mediterranean or the 
Aegean Sea, require considerable investment and a co ­
ordinated approach. In these places, creating borders that 
are impassable for irregular immigrants will only succeed 
by coordinating with the governments of potential launch 
points of people smugglers’ boats.
Making borders less permeable will also have an effect 
on the choice of migration channels. If there are ways of 
entering the destination country legally, these will come 
into higher demand. Yet, legal options are not available 
for most of those shut out by a border wall. If there are no 
legal options, there will be more overstayed visas as well as 
overt and covert illegal entries. Since many of those who 
would consider overstaying visas will never get one in the 
first place, building land­based walls is likely to further 
increase the attractiveness of the highly risky sea route. 
Generally, the more difficult a border is to cross, the 
higher will be the share of the expected benefits of migra­
tion for the migrant that ends up with the people smug­
glers or traffickers who help the migrant cross the border. 
The higher the defenses, the more of the business of facil­
itating illegal border crossing will move from small scale 
people smugglers to organized crime. Thus, a successful 
coordinated policy approach not only requires invest­
ment in border protection and coordination with Neigh­
borhood countries, but also a strategy to address serious 
criminal activity that may become more prevalent while 
border crossings decline.
What about self­selection? By closing off easy routes to 
enter the destination illegally there will be an increase in 
the migration cost and in the involved risk. This will make 
the particular destination less attractive. If the border and 
all alternative ways of  entry were effectively closed, which 
is very difficult and expensive (e.g. Cosgrave et al. 2016), 
this would lead to a decrease in illegal immigration. If 
other destinations exist, the emigration rate of a coun­
try might not change much, though. There will only be an 
impact on the emigration rate if there are no other attrac­
tive or feasible destinations. 
While self­selection may not be altered much, sorting 
most probably will. People who will still attempt the cross­
ing of a newly reinforced border will be those with the 
highest expected benefits of crossing the border after con­
sidering all the involved expected costs and their alter­
natives. First, this group will consist of people overesti­
mating the gains from reaching a particular country, i.e. 
especially those who are poorly informed. Illegal immi­
grants lacking information are unlikely to be a good 
fit with the destination country either economically or 
socially. 
Second, this group will include those with actual high 
returns at the destination and, importantly, no better alter­
native. Given that illegal immigrants typically will not 
receive a working permit, this restricts them to the infor­
mal sector. Work in the informal sector without any alter­
native to work in other countries that are easier to enter 
legally or illegally means that the person must have some 
country­specific skills or networks that facilitate finding 
informal work and will typically have a low education level. 
This in turn means that the share of migrants from already 
bilaterally important country origins and notably illegal 
family migration will play an important role. Among the 
remaining illegal immigrants, the relative weight of groups 
from countries from which a large diaspora with few out­
side options exists will thus increase. Those not discour­
aged by a wall will be more willing to take risks as well, 
altering the composition toward younger, male, and more 
desperate people. Especially refugees will be unlikely to be 
deterred but will take great risks, resulting in tragedies like 
the thousands who have drowned in the Mediterranean.
Without a reliable and sufficiently likely threat of being 
deported, however, crossing the wall in any possible way 
might still be considered a worthwhile investment. Only 
if the risk of deportation reduces the expected benefits 
of undocumented immigration sufficiently will aspiring 
migrants be discouraged from coming to a given destina­
tion country. The risk of deportation nonetheless comes 
with an immediate effect on sorting. For migrants who 
plan to settle in the destination country the possibility 
of deportation constitutes an enormous cost, while for 
migrants who rather look for short­term financial bene­
fits through illegal or informal activities the expected ben­
efits from migration may not be affected equally. Hence, 
while making a destination less attractive for the average 
migrant, such enforcement can have adverse side effects. 
In the U.S., stepping up enforcement turned undocu­
mented circular migrants from Mexico into a popula­
tion of largely undocumented settled immigrants, with­
out significantly reducing the likelihood of a first trip to the 
U.S. (Massey, Pren, and Durand 2016). The likelihood of 
return to the country of origin for current irregular immi­
grants falls because they will usually not run the risk of 
being unable to return to the US after a home visit. If there 
is no path to legalization, incentives prevail to keep sepa­
rate from the host society rather than to integrate and risk 
deportation. This will reduce social cohesion and may lead 
to the emergence of problem groups made up of socially 
excluded, precarious outsiders who are locked­in in the 
destination country. If such a group is highly visible, and 
particularly if the group is associated with negative char­
acteristics like high crime rates, this can have negative 
spillovers on legal immigrants from the same countries 
of origin or on other individuals whom poorly informed 
members of the majority population associate with the 
same group. 
The act of building a wall will also have repercussions 
for the identity and perception of different groups in soci­
ety. The implication of fencing off the outside world is that 
outsiders are a problem. This can worsen relations between 
the majority population and minorities, thus hampering 
the integration and assimilation of legal immigrants and 
creating divides between the majority population and sec­
ond­ or third­generation immigrants with some associa­
tion with the same countries of origin. That could worsen 
integration outcomes. The building of walls also communi­
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I nternational migration is interconnected with other key aspects of globalization, such as international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign aid. Migra­
tion policies cannot therefore be considered in isolation 
from trade policies, facilitation of FDI, and donor strate­
gies. The aggregate flow of FDI to developing countries has 
4.2 Can foreign aid affect 
migration decisions?
 Lead authors: Mauro Lanati and Rainer Thiele
grown considerably since 2002 compared with ODA (see 
Figure 4.4). However, as clearly emerges from Figure 4.5, 
ODA still represents the most relevant source of income 
for the least developed countries (LDCs), as the ability of 
LDCs to attract flows other than ODA – despite the growth 
in private finance – remains very limited (OECD 2015).
Figure 4.4 FDI vs remittances and ODA flows
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank 2016a (Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016: Third Edition. Washington, DC: World Bank) and OECD Devel-















cates insiders’ unwillingness to get involved with those 
beyond the wall. Especially for poorly informed migrants, 
the exclusion might even enhance the perception of desir­
ability, further changing the mix of migrants.
A reduction in illegal border crossings due to a border 
wall will depend on effective implementation and coordi­
nation to shut down all alternative points of entry. As long 
as some entry routes remain open, border walls have been 
shown to fail their purpose of cutting illegal migration 
(Gilman 2008). Given the high estimated cost per illegal 
entry deterred, border walls are likely to be an inefficient 
use of money (e.g. Cosgrave et al. 2016). The reasons for this 
are manifold, involving not only legal and economic hur­
dles but also many practical issues involved in building and 
maintaining physical barriers in difficult terrains. As irreg­
ular border crossings become more expensive due to a bor­
der wall, illegal entries will shift more and more towards 
overstayed visas, reliance on smugglers and traffickers, and 
migrants taking grave risks to reach their destination. 
Thus, reducing the number of illegal border crossings 
by building walls is far more complex than it might appear 
and entails various financial and non­financial costs for 
migrants, destination countries, and societies at large. Con­
sidering all of these ramifications, physical border walls are 
likely to be ineffective in many contexts and prone to caus­
ing detrimental side effects. Other policy options may turn 
out to be considerably better deals if society wants to cur­
tail illegal border crossings.
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Figure 4.5 Composition of external finance  
in LDC and in other developing countries
Source: OECD 2015, based on OECD Development Assistance Committee 















Indirect effects of aid on migration 
Theoretically, the impact of foreign aid on migration is sub­
ject to contrasting forces and its net effect is not clear cut a 
priori. In general, there is no direct link between aid and 
migration.2 Aid is rather expected to affect the determinants 
of migration, most notably incomes in developing countries, 
the hypothesis being that aid raises disposable incomes and 
higher incomes in turn reduce emigration (income chan-
nel).3 Aid might also influence other determinants of migra­
tion, such as the creation of networks or the impact that 
additional wealth might have on financing migration costs 
for a larger share of the population in the countries of origin 
(budgetary constraint channel) (Parsons & Winters 2014). 
This transmission mechanism would point in the opposite 
direction of aid­induced rises in migrant outflows, as loos­
ening budget constraints make migration more feasible. 
Combining the two channels gives rise to the hypothesis of 
a hump­shaped pattern of migration (see chapter 4.1), which 
implies that at very low levels of income per capita, growth 
spurs migration by allowing poor migrants to better afford 
the migration­ related costs (the budgetary constraint chan­
nel dominates), whereas at higher levels of income per capita 
the income channel becomes more and more important rel­
ative to the budgetary constraint channel. 
In the empirical literature, there appears to be some 
agreement that the effect of foreign aid on migration flows 
is positive, suggesting that the budgetary constraint channel 
of foreign aid dominates the income channel. Lucas (2005) 
regresses aid inflows on net outflows of migrants along with 
a few control variables, on a sample of 77 developing coun­
tries in the period 1995–2000. His results indicate a signif­
icantly positive relationship. Similarly, Faini and Venturini 
(1993) postulate that income growth may fail to stem emi­
gration because it relaxes credit constraints, which tend to 
be especially binding in poorer contexts. They estimate some 
simple regressions using migration data for Greece, Portu­
gal, Spain, and Turkey and find support for their hypothesis. 
Accordingly, they conclude that aid is not a reliable and use­
ful instrument for controlling migration.
A more recent and influential cross­country study that 
investigates the aid­migration link is Berthélemy et al. 
(2009). In addition to the budgetary and income effects, they 
identify another channel through which aid may be associ­
ated with migration flows. Berthélemy et al. (2009) claim 
that the more intense is the bilateral relationship through 
aid policy implementation between country pairs, the lower 
is the information gap between the potential migrants in the 
recipient country and the donor country (network channel). 
The assumption is that this additional information reduces 
the transaction costs associated with the migration flow. 
Their cross­section estimates indicate that both bilateral 
aid and the recipient’s total aid have significantly positive 
impacts on migrant stocks. The network effect is shown to be 
particularly strong for skilled migrants, whereas unskilled 
migrants are more strongly encouraged by increases in total 
aid, which relaxes their budget constraints. 
All these papers study the relationship between aggregate 
official aid and migration. Yet, the flows labelled as ODA 
are not alike and the effectiveness of aid is likely to depend 
on its type, the way it is delivered, and its target. The United 
Nations Development Programme (2011) stresses, for exam­
ple, that foreign aid measured at the aggregate level encom­
passes large amounts of development aid, such as the costs 
of hosting migrants or the costs of educating foreign stu­
This chapter provides an overview of the potential 
effects of foreign aid on international migration. The 
continuing importance of official development assistance 
(ODA) for a number of developing countries is not the 
only reason to focus on the aid­migration link. Unlike 
international trade and FDI, foreign aid is an area over 
which policy makers in OECD countries exert direct 
control, and is perhaps the most frequently mentioned 
policy option to affect migration decisions in destina­
tion countries (see section 4.1 for a detailed discussion of 
these decisions). The link between aid flows and migra­
tion is still relatively unexplored empirically. The fairly 
limited number of empirical studies on the aid­migra­
tion link is in stark contrast to the intensity of the current 
public debate in this area. As pointed out by Parsons and 
Winters (2014), the influence of ODA on migration flows 
“is an issue of some intrinsic interest, but its intellectual 
interest is dwarfed by its relevance to the policy debate 
over the last twenty years.” With the arrival of thousands 
of migrants on the southern European coasts, there is 
growing pressure on the European Commission and the 
most affected EU member states to find a quick way to 
effectively manage (and stem) the migration flows, and 
many see foreign aid as an essential part of the solution. 
Indeed, pledges to scale up aid to developing countries 
are now routinely accompanied by a statement that help­
ing countries to develop gives their people an incentive to 
stay at home. In June 2015, for instance, the UK defense 
secretary declared that “Britain needs to spend more of its 
budget on helping [to] stabilise countries so that it doesn’t 
have to ‘fish’ migrants out of the Mediterranean.”1 But 
does foreign aid really help reduce migration flows?
1  See The Guardian, “Michael 
Fallon: UK aid budget should 
be used to discourage mass 
migration from Africa”, by 
Rowena Mason, June 21, 2015.
2  The migration compacts cur-
rently being discussed at the 
EU level (see below) would 
constitute an exception. 
3  Note that for the income 
channel to work aid only needs 
to raise disposable house-
hold incomes, but not econo-
my-wide growth rates. Hence, 
the highly contentious debate 
on the aid-growth relation-
ship (see, for example, Rajan 
and Subramanian 2008) is not 
touched upon here.
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dents, which never actually reaches developing countries 
and therefore has no discernible income effect. At a more 
conceptual level, various authors (e.g. Qian 2015; Bazzi et 
al. 2012) argue that the impact of aggregate ODA is diffi­
cult to interpret as it is composed of many different types 
of aid (debt relief, cash transfers, food, etc.) and each type 
of aid faces different measurement issues and, more impor­
tantly, each affects a different set of outcomes. With the 
adoption of the Millennium Development Goals, for exam­
ple, the focus shifted from raising growth rates in recipi­
ent countries to improving social indicators, such as school 
enrollment (Thiele et al. 2007). Concerning the study of the 
aid­migration link, this conflation raises a number of prob­
lems, for instance that only some types of aid (e.g. aid for 
infrastructure) may lead to positive income effects and thus 
potentially reduce migration, while others (e.g. aid for pri­
mary education) are unlikely to raise income, at least in the 
short to medium run. The aggregate results are therefore of 
very limited use for policy makers, except that they caution 
against regarding foreign aid indiscriminately as an appro­
priate instrument to stem migration flows.
The need for shifting away from an aggregate analysis that 
does not account for the heterogeneous nature of foreign 
aid has been acknowledged for some time in the empirical 
aid literature. Bazzi et al. (2012), for example, disentangle 
aid components that potentially affect growth from those 
that are unlikely to do so in a cross­country study of the 
aid­growth relationship. To the best of our knowledge, the 
only study that applies a disaggregated approach to investi­
gate the aid­migration link is by Moullan (2013), who exam­
ines the impact of foreign health aid on the emigration rates 
of physicians. Using panel data for 17 destination countries 
and 192 source countries over the period 1998–2005 and 
accounting for the endogeneity of foreign aid, he finds that 
the relationship between the two variables is significantly 
negative and large: a doubling of health­related aid reduces 
emigration of physicians by 70 percent. This implies that 
aid targeted at the health sector could be a potent weapon 
against the medical brain drain. The negative impact of 
health aid on emigration of physicians found in Moullan’s 
study is in line with the concept of hump­shaped migra­
tion patterns. Physicians usually belong to the wealthier seg­
ments of the populations in migrant­sending countries and 
thus are unlikely to be subject to binding budget or liquidity 
constraints. At the same time, they directly benefit from any 
aid­induced improvements in their home countries’ health 
services.
While a sectorally disaggregated analysis constitutes an 
important step towards arriving at meaningful policy con­
clusions, it still masks considerable heterogeneity. Taking the 
example of Moullan’s study, it is likely to matter a lot for a 
physician’s decision to emigrate or not whether aid for health 
is mainly spent on hospital equipment or whether it supports 
vaccination campaigns. Angelucci (2004) focuses on one 
specific intervention: she evaluates the impact of Progresa, 
Mexico’s conditional cash­transfer program, on the domes­
tic and international migration decisions of the poor rural 
households targeted by the program. Progresa comprises an 
unconditional nutrition­support grant as well as primary 
and secondary schooling subsidies that are conditional upon 
attendance in the last four years of primary school and the 
first three years of secondary school, respectively. Angelucci 
finds that the nutrition grant and the primary schooling sub­
sidy raise international migration but not domestic migra­
tion, suggesting that it is mainly the costlier international 
trips that cannot be financed by credit­constrained poor 
households. By contrast, the grants for secondary schooling 
are associated with reduced international migration. This 
suggests that the condition provides an incentive for families 
to stay in Mexico, whereas in the case of primary schooling 
the condition does not matter because parents would in any 
case let their children finish primary school. 
The general lesson to be learned from the available evi­
dence is that the indirect impacts of foreign aid on migration 
flows are context­specific and can either be positive or neg­
ative. It therefore does not come as a surprise that govern­
ments interested in using aid as a means to regulate migra­
tion have tried to exploit more direct aid­migration links. 
Aid directly targeting migration flows 
National governments throughout Europe have long seen 
migration mainly as a phenomenon to be controlled (Gubert 
2014). To this end, several European countries – includ­
ing France, Germany, and the Netherlands – have imple­
mented specific development aid programs with the pur­
pose of creating incentives for migrants to return to their 
countries of origin. At the level of the EU, the so called co- 
development concept was formally endorsed at the Euro­
pean Council meeting in Tampere in 1999. The aim of this 
concept was to integrate immigration and development in 
a way that migration flows will benefit both the country of 
origin and the country of destination. There has been a huge 
discrepancy, however, between EU discourse and concrete 
actions towards the goal of making migration a real driver 
of development for the  countries of origin (Gubert 2014). 
The EU’s practical stance on co­development has largely 
revolved around the interests of destination countries, tar­
geting development aid at those recipients willing to imple­
ment migration control measures and accept repatriations. 
In an empirical study on a large sample of country pairs 
composed of 22 donors and more than 150 recipients over 
the period 1993–2008, Bermeo and Leblang (2015) find that 
donors indeed use foreign aid to achieve their broader immi­
gration goals, targeting migrant­sending areas to increase 
development and decrease the demand for entry into the 
donor country. 
The approach of directly linking aid and migration has 
gained further momentum during the recent surge in the 
number of incoming migrants. Foreign aid is now explic­
itly utilized as part of a mix of policy measures by the EU in 
an attempt to stem irregular migration flows.4 More specif­
ically, the EU has established partnerships with third coun­
tries in the form of tailored compacts “developed according 
to the situation and needs of each partner country, depend-
ing on whether they are a country of origin, country of tran-
sit or a country hosting many displaced persons” (European 
Commission 2016b). Box 4.3 illustrates the contents and the 
framework of these partnerships in more detail. In these 
compacts, foreign aid is used, on the one hand, as an incen­
tive – along with other measures such as trade policies – to 
reward those countries willing to cooperate effectively with 
the EU on migration management and ensure there are con­
sequences for those who refuse. This is a carrot and stick 
approach that aims at creating incentives to take action in 
tackling illegal emigration in the countries of origin. On the 
other hand, foreign aid is also seen as a long­term measure 
to help third countries’ development in order to address the 
root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement.
4  Measures linking immigra-
tion policy to development 
assistance have recently been 
put in place by national gov-
ernments. See for instance the 
partnership agreement with 
the French Ministry of Immi-
gration, Integration, National 
Identity and Inclusive Devel-
opment signed by the Agence 
Francaise de Developpement.
5  See European Commission 
2016d.
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The European Commission reports that the first coop­
eration programs carried out with five priority countries 
of origin and transit in sub­Saharan Africa – Niger, Nige­
ria, Senegal, Mali, and Ethiopia – have started to yield tan­
gible results. For instance, Niger has taken action to combat 
migrant smuggling and set up an institutional framework 
for managing the migration dialogue with the EU and its 
member states (European Commission 2016b). The posi­
tive preliminary results included in the first progress report 
of the Partnership Framework have been published only 
four months after the beginning of the cooperation agree­
ments.5 This is of course way too early to critically assess the 
impact of the measures implemented, especially – by defi­
nition – those devoted to addressing the long­term objec­
tive of preventing migration flows through effective devel­
opment cooperation.
While it has not yet been possible to rigorously test 
whether the EU may be able to achieve the goals it is pur­
suing with these compacts, several factors should caution 
against expectations that are too high. First, the develop­
mental component of the strategy rests on the assumption 
that the income channel dominates the budgetary con­
straint channel, which probably does not hold for some of 
the very poor priority countries, such as Niger and Mali. 
Second, the previous empirical literature (e.g. Kilby and 
Dreher 2010) has shown that foreign aid is more likely to 
foster economic development in recipient countries if it is 
governed by developmental rather than political motives. 
Third, the track record of aid conditionality is fairly weak 
(e.g. Svensson 2003). Recipient countries have often been 
unwilling to implement the conditions imposed on them 
and donors have often refrained from withdrawing for­
eign aid in response to such behavior. This pattern, as 
observed for classical development assistance, may well 
carry over to the case of migration compacts. And finally, 
going by the limited success of previous attempts to fos­
ter donor coordination (e.g. Nunnenkamp et al. 2013), it 
cannot be taken for granted that the EU and its member 
states will keep the promise to closely coordinate their 
efforts (Box 4.3).
Conclusion
Overall, the evidence on the relationship between for­
eign aid and migration so far is sketchy and therefore 
of rather limited use for providing policy advice. Even 
the transmission of aid impacts through the income and 
budgetary constraint channels, to which most empir­
ical research refers, is less straightforward than might 
appear. Particularly in (mostly poor) recipient countries 
with weak governance structures, the bulk of aid may be 
captured by elites, never reaching the intended benefi­
ciaries and thus leaving migration decisions unaffected. 
The main challenge for obtaining reliable estimates 
of the causal impact of foreign aid on migration is 
the unclear direction of causality, which gives rise to 
biased results. This challenge is particularly obvious 
for migration compacts where development assistance 
plays a dual role and thus causality goes both ways: any 
observed increase in foreign aid may be a reward for suc­
cessful actions in stemming irregular emigration from 
the countries of origin, but may as well be the cause of 
changes in migration flows. Up until now, the issue of 
reverse causality between migration and foreign aid has 
only been partially resolved. Improved data availabil­
ity and increasing accuracy of the data on migration 
and foreign aid could lead to more reliable estimates 
from which to derive policy implications, for example by 
enabling researchers to employ larger sample sizes and 
to distinguish between regular and irregular migrants 
as well as refugees.
T he EU introduced a new Migration Partner­ship Framework in June 2016. The main stated goal is to develop win­win relationships with 
the EU’s partners to address the global challenges of 
migration and development. These new partnerships 
– or ‘compacts’ – with several key countries of ori­
gin and transit aim at mobilizing and focusing all EU 
and member states’ tools and resources, with the mul­
tiple objectives of saving lives and breaking the busi­
ness model of people smugglers, addressing illegal 
migration, and increasing cooperation on returns and 
readmission of irregular migrants, as well as fostering 
investment in partner countries. The short-term mea-
sures included in the partnerships are strictly focused 
on addressing the humanitarian emergency related to 
the recent migration crisis. This involves saving lives 
at sea and in the desert, tackling trafficking and smug­
gling, increasing returns of those who arrived illegally, 
and at the same time encouraging legal ways to Europe 
for those in need, with particular attention given to 
the situation of refugees. The long-term measures, by 
contrast, are meant to address the root causes of irreg­
ular migration and forced displacement by support­
ing partner countries in their political, social, and eco­
nomic development. In this context, the EU’s foreign 
aid, which recently averaged €4.4 billion per year to the 
key priority countries, is seen as a key tool to improve 
opportunities for sustainable development. The com­
pacts have a tailor­made approach, in the sense that all 
the elements included in each partnership combine dif­
ferent policy tools like development aid, trade, mobil­
ity, energy, security, and digital policy, which are suited 
and adjusted to each situation depending on the part­
ner – whether a country of origin, transit, or host of a 
large migrant population. Overall, the plan of the new 
Partnership Framework is to make available nearly 
€8 billion over the next five years to support key third 
countries, and to closely coordinate the development 
assistance through joint efforts by the EU and its mem­
ber states. 
Box 4.3 Migration compacts
Source: European Commission 2016c (https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf).
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T he link between migration and development in countries of origin has always been at the core of research and of policy making.
The role of financial remittances and the way they are 
used in developing economies has been carefully stud­
ied to understand the allocation of money sent home, 
which type of allocation provides the best returns on 
remittances for migrant families and for the local com­
munity, and how remittances favor growth and develop­
ment. Monetary remittances also help spur financial lit­
eracy, which can transform workers into entrepreneurs 
and which favors development. They additionally con­
tribute to changing the role of women in society because 
women frequently become the family’s money manager 
and they acquire higher relative power within the fam­
ily and society.
Monetary remittances can be reinforced by return 
migrants who bring back money and professional human 
capital. History has shown that the effects of both mone­
tary and human capital remittances can be very positive 
for the country of origin but that the effects are strongly 
related to the level of economic and social development in 
the areas in question. According to Cerase (1967; 1974), in 
the 1960s and 1970s migrants returning from the U.S. to 
southern Italy were treated by their fellows as ‘Americans’ 
and were even cheated by extended family members. The 
local administration was unhelpful, sometimes hostile, 
and it was impossible to buy land and get permission to 
start up an activity. A very different experience met Ital­
ian migrants returning to their homes in the north east, 
where both the administration and the local productive 
system, which were much more dynamic than in the south 
of the peninsula, were taking advantage of returned finan­
cial and human capital. The narrative of migrants coming 
back from America and bringing with them a new way of 
life is described in many novels and films. They brought 
different clothes, different food and different modes of 
behavior. Women were more independent. Returning 
migrants became, in fact, agents of change6. 
Reserachers have tried to better understand the effects 
of migration on the origin country. There has been an 
attempt to understand what makes a move successful, not 
just for the individual family, but for society as a whole. 
In addition to the monetary remittances migrants bring 
back other remittances that are more difficult to measure 
and quantify. When they return for holidays or when they 
come back for a longer period they bring with them for­
eign goods, yet also different values, culture, etc. The new 
model of lifestyle sometimes only lasts for a short time 
because migrants, after a while, return to their previous 
lifestyle. But as Cerase points out, it depends upon the 
receptivity of the community and the capacity of migrants 
to permeate it.
In the title of this section we refer to cultural, social, and 
political remittances to point out the broader dimensions 
4.3 Cultural, social, and 
political remittances
 Lead author: Alessandra Venturini
of the concept and the areas where more research has been 
carried out.
Three conditions are necessary for the transfer: first, 
the migrant has to adopt different behavior and to under­
stand and like the alternative way of organizing society 
that is prevalent in the destination country; second, he or 
she has to bring back home these differing ways of life; and 
third, the home society – meaning family, civil society, 
and institutions – has to be ready for a change. Grabowska 
et al. (2017) define the phases as acquisition, transfer, and 
outcomes, and finally their diffusion.
The first point is not automatic: the more the commu­
nity in the destination country is open the more it is per­
meated by the destination country’s values, while instead, 
the more it is closed, the more it tends to keep the values 
prevailing in the origin countries at the time of departure. 
Here it is enough to think of Little Italy or China Town 
in New York, which halted all cultural updates at the 
time of departure. More recently there has been empiri­
cal research on assimilation that demonstrates the nega­
tive role played by large communities on wages and on the 
probability of exiting from ethnic jobs.7
The last point, diffusion, is also an important compo­
nent that should not be taken for granted. As Grabowska 
et al. (2017) note, the origin society can resist, imitate, or 
innovate. 
The scale of change in the country of origin with respect 
to monetary remittances depends on three different fac­
tors: the size of the migrant population versus the local 
one; migrant characteristics versus the structure of the 
society by educational level and social class; and the dura­
tion of migration, be it temporary or permanent (OECD 
2017). 
Changes can also be worked by the diaspora abroad, 
which has many ways to keep in contact and to transfer 
innovative social behavior. The transnational space is at 
the center of symbolic exchanges that do not necessar­
ily go together with financial and goods­and­services 
exchanges.
The society of the origin country, in general, receives a 
lot of diverse cultural stimuli from various sources. Con­
P eggy Lewitt (1998) coined the term “social remittances” to define the diffusion of ideas, values, beliefs, norms of behavior, practices, 
and social capital.
Since then social remittances have been under­
stood as non­financial assets acquired as a result of 
migration and eventually transferred to others, usu­
ally the home regions of migrants.
Box 4.4 Definition of social remittances
6  For a European analysis and 
a theoretical approach, see 
Grabowska et al. (2017). 
7 See for instance Hatton and 
Leigh (2011) and Strom et al. 
(2013).
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sider, for instance, the educational policies adopted by 
large countries or large religious communities that build 
schools or universities around the world. In this way they 
affect the educational models and values of faraway coun­
tries. Notable examples, just to name a few, are the global 
American universities, the Alliance Française, Spanish 
universities and the Goethe Institutes. In 2007 the Euro­
pean Commission proposed a European Agenda for Cul­
ture in a globalizing world favoring economic and social–
political development.8 Again in 2015, the European 
Council9 asked the European Commission and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to 
prepare “a strategic approach to culture in external rela­
tions” to pursue peace and multiculturalism. And “cul­
tural diplomacy” has recently received the attention of the 
High Representative/Vice­President Federica Mogherini 
as a form of support and assistance that the EU can pro­
vide to third countries.10 
Migrants, however, acting within the close and extended 
family play a very important role in opening up a society 
to new values, by gaining the trust of people who are diffi­
cult to reach and who anyhow might prove diffident about 
accepting novelties.
Sociological, anthropological, and economic research 
has looked a great deal at how migrants affect the val­
ues and culture of the origin country. Sociologists have 
focused on understanding the mechanism, the dynam­
ics of the cultural transition, the reaction and the support 
for social innovation, while economists have attempted 
mainly to show that relationships exist and their causal­
ity. Although not a comprehensive survey, below we pro­
vide three examples of the effects of migration: the fer­
tility decision within the migrants’ families at home in 
the origin country, women’s empowerment, and political 
remittances affecting home­country institutions.
Fertility
Cultural transfer can affect many spheres of individual 
and personal life. These include family life and the dif­
ferent values affecting consumption patterns, the roles 
played by women in the couple, the education of children, 
and also the fertility decision. In a broader perspective 
these dimensions will affect population growth, encour­
age the empowerment of women, and strengthen demo­
cratic values.
For a long time, the population transition, namely the 
link between very high fertility rates and the stationarity 
value (two children per woman), was studied, analyzing 
the effects of economic growth (Malthus effect), women’s 
education, age at marriage, and how these variables were 
also affected by migration.
In his 2007 paper, Fargues approached the link between 
migration and fertility directly and questioned the 
general view that migrants are potential agents of the dif­
fusion of demographic modernity. He showed that this 
was only the result of recent migration from high to low 
birth­rate countries. By comparing fertility in Morocco, 
Turkey, and Egypt, he first correlated the evolution of fer­
tility with the income dynamic and with women’s educa­
tion, and then he focused on migration’s effect pointing 
out the differential in fertility rates in migrants’ destina­
tion countries. This varied from two in Europe to seven 
in the Gulf countries (in 1980–95). He also noted how 
Moroccan and Turkish migrants went predominantly to 
Europe, while Egyptians went mainly to the Gulf. 
By taking the remittance flows as a proxy for emigra­
tion and the strength of the link with home, he pointed to 
a different link between Moroccan, Turkish, and Egyptian 
fertility rates and migration, negative in the first case and 
positive in the second. Fargues did not assert a causal link 
between the two variables, but the mechanism seems very 
convincing and reinforces the idea that migrants adopt 
and send back the cultural values prevailing in their host 
country.
The model of fewer children but with a better quality of 
life, health, and more education is not particularly rooted 
in sending countries, thus sending countries are sensi­
tive to the model their migrants encounter abroad. Migra­
tion to Europe has accelerated the reduction of birth rates 
in the Maghreb countries. The Egypt of the Infitah, on 
the other hand, with stronger Arab exchanges, has seen 
a more gradual decline. The story based on a rich knowl­
edge of these countries is very convincing even if the test 
is only indirect.
Later Beine et al. (2008) built on this hypothesis using 
aggregate data for 208 countries on migration stocks and 
aggregate fertility rates. By instrumenting the emigration 
rate with a set of valid instrumental variables11 they find 
support for the previous analyses that migration towards 
OECD countries contributes to demographic transition, 
while the opposite takes place with migration towards 
8 See the European Commis-
sion’s (2007) Communication 
on a “European Agenda for 
Culture in a globalizing world”; 
see also the Council Conclu-
sions on the promotion of cul-
tural diversity and intercultural 
dialogue in external relations, 
Council of the European Union 
(2008). 
9 Outcome of 3428 Council 
Meeting: Education Youth Cul-
ture and Sport, 23-4 Nov 2015  
and see also 2014 EP Prepa-
ratory Action ‘Culture in EU 
external relations’ http://cul-
tureinexternalrelations.eu/.
10 On this subject, see the 
mimeo by Lanati and Venturini 
(2017) on “Imports of cultural 
goods and migration: An unex-
plored relation”.
11 The instrument used a 
dummy variable for islands, the 
(log of the) size of the coun-
try measured by its surface (in 
squared kilometres) and (the 
log of the) distance to the main 
destination of the migrants.
P hilippe Fargues, in his pioneering work (1994; 1997) studied Egyptian fertility and its evolu­tion according to the traditional driving fac­
tors: wealth, women’s education, and age at mar­
riage. He also looked at the importance of different 
political regimes, which in the 1960s had already 
institutionalized fertility control. The correlation 
of the fertility rate with this policy – which started 
with the socialist regime of President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser (1952–70), but which also continued with the 
liberal regime of Anwar Sadat (1971–82) and with 
that of Hosni Mubarak (1982–2011) – seemed erratic 
and not even especially aligned with the model pro­
posed in various political phases. The decrease of 
fertility under Nasser was reverted by an increase in 
fertility in the 1970s. This change was explained by 
the end of the war with Israel, the liberalization of 
the economy (which attracted foreign investment), 
and also by mass migration abroad, which had pre­
viously been forbidden. As the recession started in 
1984, fertility declined but not as expected. Other 
social values acquired from abroad reinforced the 
norm of a large family and affected the decision to 
have more children. As shown in Figure 4.6, those 
Egyptian areas with more migrants to the Gulf 
countries had a higher fertility rate and were much 
more distant from the transition value.
Box 4.5 Fertility trend in Egypt
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countries with high income and fertility rates such as 
those found in the Gulf.
Bertoli and Marchetta (2015) point to another important 
difference between migration outflows: while the outflows 
to the Gulf countries are temporary by nature, because the 
countries of destination do not offer settlement opportu­
nities or family reunification, migration to OECD coun­
tries is both temporary and permanent. For that reason, 
Bertoli and Marchetta analyze, with micro data, the effect 
of migrants returning to Egypt from the Gulf countries 
on the fertility rate. They find that families with return 
migrants from the Gulf have a higher fertility rate. To find 
a causal effect they checked for the non­random selec­
tion of migrants at migration, but they were unfortunately 
unable to isolate the mechanism for the transfer of norms.
In closing, there is a strong conviction and, indeed, evi­
dence that fertility is affected by fertility norms imported 
from abroad by migrants. However, given the many chan­
nels of information that can affect the family decision, it is 
difficult to disentangle and to measure the specific effect of 
migration transfers although it seems very relevant.
Women’s empowerment
The effect of the departure of the male breadwinner, since 
our earlier records of emigration, has conditioned the future 
development of the family. Women in many cases become 
responsible for money use in the household and become 
independent of their brothers and father. They are thus able 
to take decisions regarding their children, and their author­
ity in society is growing. This does not imply the implemen­
tation of a new imported model, but just a change and a 
more egalitarian evolution in gender roles. 
Women’s emigration has increased their independence 
even more and in many cases women have become the 
family breadwinner.12 Migration has also changed wom­
en’s roles in the origin society. Its dynamic has been slow 
and in some cases they have been trapped in the patriar­
chal family without any independence. Indeed, for some 
women migrants going back has just been a return to the 
past, with limitations that are no longer acceptable or 
rational. For this reason, some of them have been reluc­
tant to go back.13
Migration and especially temporary migration trans­
fers home new values and new ways of organizing the 
family and social life. Both Okolski (2012) for Poland and 
Sandu (2010) for Romania consider temporary migration 
one of most potent modernizing factors today, because 
they act directly at the individual level. 
Grabowska and Engbersen (2016) analyze the effect of 
the values brought back by temporary Polish migrants 
by surveying empirical research into two phases of Pol­
ish emigration: one at the end of the 19th and the other in 
the early 20th century, as well as the most recent migra­
tion waves before and after EU enlargement. They struc­
ture the results in the Lewitt (2011) categories: norma­
tive structure, systems of practice, and social capital. They 
then argue that old migration brought back non­con­
formist attitudes, and a greater attention to individualis­
tic autonomy that favored the emancipation of social roles, 
especially for women. Also the systems of practice gave 
less importance to religious practices and more impor­
tance to individual efforts and work achievement. This 
has introduced an alteration of family bonds with trans­
national families, the acceptance of a single status, and 
12 Of course, we do not con-
sider trafficked women.
13 Iredale, Guo and Rozario 
(2003) note that when skilled 
women return home, they 
often face a range of prob-
lems. There is a disjuncture 
between their own aspirations 
as highly skilled and educated 
returnees and local gendered 
perceptions and modes of dis-
crimination that inhibit their full 
economic, social, and political 
participation in their own  
communities and societies.
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14 The second measure is 
achievement in secondary and 
tertiary education.
15 See also Chauvet, L. and S. 
Mesple-Somps. 2014
divorce. In more recent migration waves the revision of 
gender roles and family relations has continued. Women 
have gained more self­esteem and self­confidence. White’s 
(2011) survey of Podkarpacie showed that when migrants 
returned from the U.K., those under 25 were less sup­
portive of tradi tional gender roles; Western ideas, it was 
argued, reinforced a willingness to change gender roles, 
something already diffused among the better educated 
and the younger members of society.
The empowerment of women begins to occur when 
migration draws women from rural to urban areas 
(Hugo 2000), separating them from a family group. These 
migrants are engaged in employment outside the home in 
formal sector occupations, within the legal framework for 
an extended period. Empowerment is still more dramatic 
with their move abroad and reduces the intergenerational 
impact of the patriarchal structure within the family by 
resisting their identity as subordinate subjects. 
A good deal of evidence from different cultural back­
grounds exists: in the cases of Peruvian and Bolivian 
migration (Bastia and Busse 2011), Senegalese migra­
tion to France (Jettinger 2011), and even internal Chi­
nese migration (Connelly et al. 2010), the distinction 
between the place of reproduction (family back home) 
and the place of production (foreign labor market) has 
changed women’s childcare as provided in a patriarchal 
society. Women migrants also give priority to investment 
in health and education as revealed by Mexican (Pfeiffer 
and Taylor 2008) and Ghanaian experiences (Guzman et 
al. 2008), or at least more than men in these cases. 
There is growing evidence of collective action and 
mobilization among migrant women in various parts 
of the world. This suggests that their empowerment has 
come from a combination of external impetus and inter­
nal transformation, and that they would like to transfer 
their empowerment home and into the political arena.
Two econometric studies – a broader one by Lodigiani 
and Salomone (2012) that covers 78 countries and a more 
country­specific study on Turkey by Akkoyunlu (2013) – 
try to find a causal link between international migration 
and women’s seats in parliament. This is one of the two 
measures14 of women’s empowerment used in the Gen­
der Inequality Index by the United Nations in the Human 
Development Reports.
Lodigiani and Salomone use annual political data from 
Paxton et al. (2006), which provides very detailed yearly 
data on women’s inclusion in parliamentary bodies. They 
take 78 countries for the period 1960–2000. Many tech­
nical solutions have been adopted to make the two data­
sets compatible with a traditional Heckman selection. The 
results confirm that there is a strong positive role for the 
migration index, namely the share of migrants weighted 
by the differential in women’s seats in the destination 
countries versus origin countries. The results work with 
many alternate specifications and controls.
Akkoyunlu (2013) uses the number of women in par­
liament in Turkey, chosen as a gauge of women’s empow­
erment, and looks at its evolution in terms of the emigra­
tion rate, the relative education of women to men, and 
democratic measures. Six decades of data, from 1960 until 
2011, shows a strong positive effect for migration, which is 
stronger for migration to European countries and to core 
OECD countries. Unfortunately, the question of endoge­
neity is not raised by the author.
All this research suggests that the effects of cultural, 
social, and political remittances brought back from migra­
tion by both men and women are very broad, but they 
are very difficult to measure given the direct and indirect 
effects of economic remittances.
Political remittances
The impact of migrants on the home country’s political 
life has been studied by sociologists, anthropologists, and 
economists. Sociologists elucidate the complex relation­
ship between the social infrastructure of transnational 
connections, remittances, and their political implica­
tions, while economists concentrate on the causality of 
the relationship. 
All reach the same conclusion, namely that migration, 
by confronting individuals with new environments and 
novel institutional organizations, force a comparison with 
origin countries and affect political norms there. Migrants 
are very important transnational political actors. As 
some political scientists have pointed out, migrants are 
“new and unaccounted power groups” (Itzigsohn and Vil­
lacre 2008), a vector of mass­level democratization dif­
fusion (Perez­Armendariz and Crow 2010). The relation­
ship embedded in the democratization–migration nexus 
(Ruland et al. 2009), however, is more complex in terms 
of showing and disentangling it than that in the already 
complex development–migration nexus (Kapur 2010).
Pfutze (2012; 2014) claims that economic transfers have 
an effect on political outcomes. He argues that economic 
remittances contribute to increases in household incomes 
that “make clientelism unambiguously more costly and, 
therefore, reduce turnout for the party engaging in clien-
telistic arrangements”. In this way migration promotes the 
“quality of democracy” in the sending country. He uses 
Mexico as an example. 
Migrants affect political behavior in the country of ori­
gin in many ways, by sending money and cultural goods, 
and with their different interpretation of everyday behav­
ior. The challenge for researchers is to distinguish the spe­
cific impacts, in this case the remittances of democratic 
values and norms, which should stand apart, following 
Pfutze, from the monetary ones.
Depending on the institutional quality of the country 
of destination, the effect can be positive or negative: in all 
cases the perceptions of migrants will be different from 
the perceptions of non­migrants. Examples from very 
diverse areas come to the conclusion that migrants and 
return migrants are more critical and demanding in terms 
of rights, in Mali (Chauvet et al. 2016)15, Mexico (Perez­Ar­
mendariz and Crow 2010), the Philippines (Rother 2009) 
and Cape Verde (Batista and Vincente 2011). 
In the past research focused only on the effect on devel­
oping countries’ democratic systems. However, the end of 
the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall has created an 
interesting area of research in countries closer to Western 
Europe, for instance Poland. Grabowska and Engbersen 
(2016) showed for Poland that, in the first migration waves 
at the beginning of the 19th century, migration helped in 
creating a secular social space. Here citizens assembled in 
non­religious spaces for the first time. Remittances from 
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migrants brought back the desire for a democratic society. 
Ahmadov and Sasse (2016) studied, for Poland, the effect 
of integration on political participation in the country of 
destination and involvement with the diaspora. By using 
a large dataset on the voting behavior of Poles living in 
U.K., but geographically dispersed in the country, along 
with interviews of Polish migrants in the U.K. and their 
families at home, they established that shorter stays were 
linked to higher electoral engagement, while longer stays 
were associated with lower electoral engagement. There­
fore, integration in the country of destination results in 
less political involvement in the origin country. The local 
economic development and the size of the Polish commu­
nity have a negative effect on political engagement for the 
first of these characteristics and a positive one for the sec­
ond. Interviews reinforce the results and show the need 
for a more flexible understanding of political participa­
tion, which include the desire on the part of parents to 
root children in their Polish heritage. This probably has 
wider implications for research on the cultural dimension. 
Economic researchers have also sought a causal link 
between democracy and migration remittances. The first 
paper at the macro level by Spilimbergo (2009) provided 
evidence that foreign­trained students promoted democ­
racy at home if their foreign education was acquired in 
a democratic country. He does not identify the mecha­
nism that spurs this effect, but many channels work in the 
acquisition of norms and values while abroad: access to 
foreign media, willingness to preserve foreign networks, 
etc. Finding the channel is even more difficult than iden­
tifying the effect, of course, because the data used do not 
distinguish between students returning home and those 
still abroad. Even if the evidence is considered convinc­
ing, the research has a limited control over endogene­
ity. There is the possibility that migrants who are more 
sensitive to democratic values move to more democratic 
countries and for that reason, transfer democratic values 
because they already support a more democratic regime. 
In a similar vein Mercier (2016) points to a positive cor­
relation between political leaders  who studied abroad in 
high­income OECD countries and the change in the score 
of democracy in their country during their tenure. Thus 
not only migration policy but also education policy can 
shape the democratic transition of countries and the two 
are intertwined.
The research at the aggregate level that tries, with 
most conviction, to find a causal relation between migra­
tion and democratic institutions is that by Docquier et 
al. (2016). They use four measures: political rights as well 
as civil liberty (Freedom House); economic freedom of 
the world (Simon Fraser Institute); and Polity 2 indica­
tors (Polity IV Project). Their graph (Figure 4.7) shows an 
upward trend in the four institutional indicators and in 
emigration rates, and is very suggestive.
They have an unbalanced panel from 1980 to 2010, with 
seven observations for each country and a larger cross­ 
section that includes OECD and non­OECD countries. The 
results, of both the cross­section (only for 2000) and those 
in the time series dimension, show a strong link between 
emigration rates and three democratic indicators that 
proxy de facto democracy. The last index, Polity IV, which 
proxies de jure democracy, is rarely significant. These 
results, instead of weakening the interpretation of polit­
ical remittances brought back by migrants, strengthen it 
because the de facto norms are the relevant ones for social 
well­being: the de jure norms, while important, are fre­
quently outside the control of citizens, and therefore they 
are less relevant for the progress of social and civic life 
in the origin society. Also, the non­significant result for 
highly skilled migrants supports a transfer of everyday life 
norms that can be appreciated by citizens at all levels, and 
not just a transfer among the elites.
The last and very convincing contribution to this broad 
scenario is the Moldovan case study by Barsbai et al. 
(2016). They use the results of Moldovan elections at the 
regional level and find that the regions where emigration 
to Europe prevailed over emigration to Russia had lower 
votes for the former Communist Party. 
Conclusion
This brief survey shows that migrants play a very import­
ant role in shaping the values of society in their coun­
tries of origin. These values affect many aspects of the 
lives of individuals, families, and society as a whole. It is 
very difficult to distinguish the role of the migrant from 
the role of the diaspora, which is likewise made up of 
migrants. It is also difficult to disentangle the role played 
by migrants from that played by government policies, for 
instance through cultural diplomacy activities, which are 
directed at the same objective. Still, it is clear that staying 
as a student or as a worker in more democratic countries, 
where women have more rights and thus a more indepen­
dent role, has an effect upon the lifestyle of the foreigner 
and offers a different model of participation in society. 
For example, migrants see societies where women have 
more rights and hence more independence, which allows 
them to pursue education and employment and to have 
fewer children. These facts are too often disregarded in 
the debate on migration, whereas they should become 
an important feature in the integration strategy of asy­
lum seekers in the host countries, given all the beneficial 
effects that can be transferred to their home countries.
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T hroughout this Assessment Report, we have empha-sized how the policy regimes for asylum, labor migration, and other forms of immigration (family 
unification, education) are inextricably linked. Short-term 
challenges arise due to the large recent inflow of asylum 
seekers, whereas long-term challenges relate to the uneven 
success, across and within EU member states, of current 
immigrants’ economic and social integration. These chal-
lenges, combined, need to be understood against the back-
Recommendations:  
A comprehensive strategy  
to manage asylum and  
immigration in the EU Lead author: Matthias Lücke
Work with host countries toward partnerships for 
refugees: The international community covers the 
financial cost of hosting refugees, while host  
countries grant refugees a secure legal status, 
access to public services, and the right to work
The EU and its member states should do more to fulfil their 
moral and legal responsibility (under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention) to protect refugees worldwide. They should 
work toward partnerships for refugees with low- and mid-
dle-income host countries that involve increased financial 
support by the EU (and other donors) to offset the fiscal 
cost of hosting refugees, combined with a commitment by 
host countries to grant a secure legal status to refugees and 
promote their social and economic integration. 
Addressing this responsibility involves a dual challenge. 
First, global funding for humanitarian assistance to ref-
ugees is unpredictable and often falls short of needs. The 
EU and its member states should contribute more and also 
allow the responsible UN entities (especially the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
World Food Programme) more flexibility in the use of 
European funds. Adequate humanitarian assistance to ref-
ugees would help to ensure decent living conditions for 
refugees in their host countries and reduce incentives for 
secondary movements by refugees, including irregular 
migration to the EU. 
Second, many refugee situations are protracted and ref-
ugees live in the host country for many years. Most ref-
ugees do not live in camps, but are dispersed among the 
local population. Therefore, they may compete with resi-
dents for limited public services and infrastructure, such 
as education, health care, housing, water, and sanitation. 
The EU and its member states should ensure that support 
for host countries is not limited to humanitarian assis-
tance for refugees, but extends to development assistance 
for public investment so that the needs of refugees and res-
idents can be provided for.
Participate in the resettlement of reconized  
refugees when countries of first asylum face  
large inflows of refugees
Financial burden sharing for hosting refugees goes a long 
way toward sharing responsibility for the protection of 
refugees equitably. However, when large numbers of refu-
gees arrive in small host countries or refugees have special 
needs that cannot be met locally, there is a case for reset-
tling refugees from countries of first asylum to more suit-
able host countries. 
Such resettlement is typically organized for recognized 
refugees through UNHCR. EU member states should 
offer larger quotas for resettlement in line with their fiscal 
capacity and the absorptive capacity of their labor mar-
kets. As the number of asylum seekers who arrive directly 
in the EU has declined sharply since early 2016, some of 
the reception capacities that have been freed up could be 
used for orderly resettlement.
Explore the use of humanitarian visas for 
refugees with a prima facie case for  
international protection when there is no 
established resettlement scheme
Third-country resettlement works only if refugees are 
received by a country of first asylum and later selected for 
resettlement based on their vulnerability, typically under 
UNCHR auspices. Yet, not all persecuted individuals may 
be able to reach a safe country of first asylum. It would be 
helpful if such individuals could seek protection in EU 
member states while they are still in their home country 
or in a transit country – without having to travel to the 
EU irregularly, typically at considerable risk to their lives. 
While full asylum procedures cannot be conducted out-
side the EU, member states could issue humanitarian visas 
for those with a robust prima facie case for protection so 
they can travel to Europe safely and apply for asylum in 
the respective member state.
ground of conditions in migrants’ countries of origin, labor 
market and education policies in EU member states, and the 
processes that drive public attitudes toward immigrants. 
Our specific recommendations for actions should 
therefore be viewed, and critically debated, as part of a 
comprehensive strategy that involves interlocking ele-
ments covering the relevant policy areas. This is where we 
hope to start our dialogue with stakeholders at the EU and 
national levels.
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Both third-country resettlement and humanitarian 
visas for prima facie refugees would focus EU efforts on 
protecting the most vulnerable refugees and reduce the 
existing bias in the composition of asylum seekers in the 
EU toward those who are rich enough to pay people smug-
glers and physically strong enough to travel under ardu-
ous conditions.
Work with countries of origin and transit  
to curb irregular immigration to the EU  
by would-be labor migrants
Irregular immigrants to the EU from many countries 
of origin, including in West Africa, have only a slight 
chance of being recognized as refugees. Even so, many 
view an asylum application as their best chance of liv-
ing and working in the EU. For most such would-be labor 
migrants, irregular travel to the EU is expensive and risky, 
particularly if they travel along the central Mediterra-
nean migrant route through Libya. If they fail to obtain 
a legal status in the EU, they face the choice of returning 
to their home country (voluntarily or otherwise) and los-
ing the money that they have invested in their migration, 
or remaining in the EU illegally, with irregular work and 
typically a precarious existence.   
The EU and its member states should continue to 
work with countries of origin and transit to help them 
strengthen border security, combat people smuggling, 
and curb irregular migration. Access to objective infor-
mation about travel risks and the lack of economic oppor-
tunities for irregular immigrants in Europe should be 
facilitated. Migrant support centers along major migrant 
routes may help migrants to return to their countries of 
origin voluntarily. Regarding the central Mediterranean 
migrant route, the focus should be on preventing irreg-
ular migrants from reaching Libya because of the dan-
gerous conditions there. Partner country authorities may 
find it easier to cooperate with the EU in curbing irreg-
ular migration if EU member states simultaneously cre-
ate opportunities for legal migration for individuals with 
adequate language skills and vocational qualifications (see 
below).
In the long run, design and implement an  
incentive-compatible, EU-wide regime for external  
border security, asylum, and the economic and 
social integration of refugees
Even if partnerships for refugees with host countries and 
cooperation with countries of origin and transit to curb 
irregular immigration are successful, some asylum seek-
ers will continue to reach the external border of the EU. 
As long as there are no controls on the internal borders 
within the Schengen area, a comprehensive asylum sys-
tem at the EU level is required that allocates responsibility 
for asylum-related policies to EU institutions and member 
states in an incentive-compatible manner. Otherwise, asy-
lum seekers will seek to move to those EU member states 
that offer the most favorable conditions. At the same time, 
member states will have a strong incentive to worsen recep-
tion conditions for asylum seekers to the point where they 
are no longer attractive destinations. Such a race to the bot-
tom would not be compatible with member states’ interna-
tional obligations or humanitarian standards generally. 
The challenge of setting up a comprehensive asy-
lum system at the EU level is complex because asylum- 
related policies are interlinked, with large spillovers 
across different areas. For example, if too little effort 
and financial resources are put forward to ensure that 
refugees enjoy decent living conditions in their primary 
host countries, large secondary refugee movements may 
ensue (as from Turkey to Greece and further to other 
EU member states in late 2015 and early 2016). Simi-
larly, if asylum procedures are superficial and accep-
tance rates high (or rejected asylum seekers are not 
deported because of the associated emotional and finan-
cial costs), incentives for irregular immigration will be 
strengthened and more irregular immigrants will likely 
require support with their economic and social integra-
tion in the host country. 
The present ‘Dublin’ system places most responsibil-
ity for receiving asylum seekers and hosting refugees with 
the EU member state of first arrival. There is little finan-
cial burden sharing and the existing schemes for redistrib-
uting asylum seekers among member states are not func-
tional. This approach is not compatible with the principle 
of intra-EU solidarity – nor, incidentally, with the princi-
ple of international responsibility sharing that we empha-
size at the global level (see above). Even so, the Dublin sys-
tem is largely incentive-compatible as long as there is (at 
least) a credible threat that intra-Schengen borders will be 
closed to asylum seekers, should countries of first arrival 
try to ‘wave on’ new arrivals instead of registering them 
and processing their claims. 
Proposals by the European Commission to enforce 
more responsibility sharing by member states have been 
unsuccessful largely because they are neither compre-
hensive nor incentive-compatible. For example, the pro-
posed scheme to redistribute asylum seekers among mem-
ber states would imply an open-ended commitment by 
‘inland’ member states to receive most arriving asylum 
seekers. While this approach would in principle be equi-
table, inland member states may be concerned that they 
have little effective control over whether ‘enough’ effort 
is made to limit irregular immigration by working with 
neighborhood countries to secure the external EU border 
or to combat people-smuggling. At the same time, mem-
ber states on the external border may be tempted to reduce 
their efforts in the field of border security because the 
benefits – in terms of receiving and hosting fewer asylum 
seekers – would flow mostly to inland member states. Very 
likely, a much larger EU role in border security, funding 
the hosting of refugees by member states (and additional 
revenue for the EU – see below) would be required to ren-
der a mandatory redistribution scheme workable.
As we have argued with respect to the global gover-
nance of refugee protection (see above), sharing the finan-
cial burden of receiving asylum seekers and hosting refu-
gees would go a long way toward equitable responsibility 
sharing. Financial burden sharing is particularly relevant 
in the context of the multilevel governance system con-
stituted by the EU and its member states (‘fiscal federal-
ism’): the implementation of policy interventions may be 
delegated to the regional units that are most suitable for a 
particular task (for example, member states on the exter-
nal border in the case of border security), whereas the 
financial burden is borne by all member states (and their 
tax-paying populations) according to their ability to pay 
(gross contributions to the EU budget are approximately 
proportional to member states’ total GDP).
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It seems clear that a comprehensive EU asylum system 
will involve the EU institutions not only in setting the 
ground rules, but also in funding asylum-related policies 
on a much larger scale and in implementing selected poli-
cies on the ground to assure the quality of service delivery. 
The spillovers across different policies as well as the public 
good nature of many asylum-related expenditures call for 
centralized financing and control over implementation: 
from helping to protect refugees outside the EU to secur-
ing and managing the external EU border, search and 
rescue missions in the Mediterranean, receiving asylum 
seekers and processing applications, and supporting the 
economic and social integration of recognized refugees. 
The additional tasks to be taken on by the EU inevita-
bly require additional revenue, which, in turn, will require 
a unanimous decision by EU member states. Therefore, 
a consensus among EU member states is necessary for a 
comprehensive reform of the asylum system, making it a 
long-term proposition. In the short to medium run, the 
EU and member state authorities should emphasize more 
modest reforms that can be implemented within the exist-
ing EU budget and through voluntary contributions by 
member states in different areas. 
In the short to medium run, share financial and 
logistical responsibilities for asylum-related  
policies more equitably among EU member states 
and establish monitoring and peer review  
of member state contributions
Individual member states already contribute voluntarily 
to many tasks that would ideally be centralized at the 
EU level. Significant progress can be made by increas-
ing such voluntary contributions and coordinating more 
effectively among member states. For example, individual 
member states already participate in humanitarian assis-
tance to refugees through UN organizations for their own 
(presumably, in part, altruistic) reasons. The necessary 
increase in funding at the global level (see above) may ini-
tially come from higher contributions from member state 
budgets, without necessarily involving the EU. 
Another example of a member state helping to head 
off a potentially challenging refugee situation is Poland 
offering employment opportunities to many Ukrainian 
labor migrants, who might otherwise seek to escape civil 
war and economic deprivation at home by seeking pro-
tection in Western Europe. While not directly compara-
ble, both humanitarian assistance and liberal access to 
employment opportunities are important contributions 
to helping individuals affected by persecution and vio-
lence. It would be helpful for EU member states to set up a 
process of monitoring and peer review that acknowledges 
such different contributions while encouraging member 
states to further increase their contributions in response 
to where the need is greatest and in a manner that is polit-
ically feasible, given the circumstances of each country. 
While a mandatory reallocation of asylum seekers 
among member states has proved impossible to imple-
ment effectively (see above), there is a strong case for more 
financial and logistical burden sharing with those mem-
ber states where asylum seekers first arrive. In particular, 
it would be useful to extend the current ‘hotspot’ approach 
to include EU-managed reception centers in member 
states on the external border where asylum seekers would 
remain until a decision is made on their application. The 
cost of operating hotspots could be borne by the EU bud-
get or through voluntary contributions by inland member 
states that could also provide personnel and logistical sup-
port to help process asylum claims. 
Asylum seekers would be registered at hotspots and 
could be returned there if they chose to move on to other 
member states. Hence, there would be no need to pre-
vent secondary movements of asylum seekers by closing 
the Schengen area internal borders. Asylum seekers with-
out valid claims for protection would be returned to their 
countries of origin from the hotspots. This would be par-
ticularly important on the central Mediterranean migrant 
route, where most asylum seekers are not recognized as 
refugees. 
In the current political climate, any effective resettle-
ment of refugees – from EU member states on the external 
border to inland member states or from third countries to 
EU member states – will likely have to be voluntary. This 
need not prevent a more equitable sharing of responsibil-
ity among EU member states: more support for non-EU 
countries that host refugees and cooperation with neigh-
borhood countries to curb irregular immigration into the 
EU will ensure that the number of recognized refugees in 
the EU remains low. If they cannot be hosted by the mem-
ber states of first arrival, the hotspot approach should give 
other member states confidence that protection has been 
granted and the individuals have been vetted in line with 
EU regulations. The proposed monitoring and peer review 
of member states’ contributions to protecting refugees 
would be a suitable forum for inland member states to vol-
unteer quotas for intra-EU resettlement of such refugees.
Expand opportunities for legal labor migration  
to EU member states from third countries
While working to close the ‘back door’ of irregular immi-
gration into the EU, EU member states should further 
open the ‘front door’ of legal labor migration by creat-
ing more legal employment opportunities for non-EU cit-
izens. This would be in addition to opening the front door 
by resettling some refugees from non-EU countries in EU 
member states. Migration to the labor market (rather than 
the welfare state) typically benefits not only immigrants 
through higher incomes than at home, but also countries 
of origin through financial and other remittances. By con-
trast, the economic impact on host country residents is 
usually small – mostly positive on aggregate, but nega-
tive for those workers who compete directly with immi-
grants. Such legitimate distributional concerns may be 
addressed through targeted immigration policies and, 
more broadly, through policies that promote economic 
and social inclusion for those affected by economic or 
technological change.
Beyond providing economic benefits to migrants and 
(through remittances) to their countries of origin, legal 
employment opportunities in the EU would also become 
an important element of the policy frameworks with the 
countries of origin and transit that are necessary to curb 
irregular migration to the EU. Political support for such 
agreements on the part of the country-of-origin govern-
ments and populations cannot be taken for granted. By 
offering significant legal employment opportunities, EU 
member states would signal their interest in construc-
tively managing migration, rather than merely shutting 
out irregular immigrants.  
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Opportunities for legal immigration in the EU already 
exist for many high-income individuals, typically with 
tertiary education. Efforts to expand legal immigration 
could usefully focus on individuals with sufficient lan-
guage and vocational skills to succeed in the labor mar-
kets of EU member states. To avoid a brain drain on the 
countries of origin, vocational training may be set up by 
EU member states in countries of origin where skills are 
taught that are useful both at home and abroad. Typi-
cally, some trainees will remain in their countries of ori-
gin where their new skills will increase the skill level of 
the workforce. 
In the EU, labor migration from non-EU countries is a 
competency of the member states. Therefore, each member 
state would decide individually what employment opportu-
nities to offer to non-EU citizens, what language and voca-
tional skills to require so that immigrants do not become 
a fiscal burden or residents suffer undue competition in 
the labor market, what training opportunities to offer in 
potential migrants’ countries of origin, etc. Member states 
will want to consider their overall labor market situation 
and skill shortages as well as possible distributional effects. 
What would be crucial is for member states together to offer 
a package that creates strong incentives for potential emi-
grants in developing countries to invest in their language 
and vocational skills, rather than in irregular migration.
A related question is whether asylum seekers whose 
applications have been rejected should be allowed to 
‘change track’ and remain in the destination country if 
they are well integrated into the labor market. The pos-
sibility of such a track change would be a strong incen-
tive for all asylum seekers to invest in destination-spe-
cific human capital right from the start, maximizing their 
chances of successful labor market integration. At present, 
many are held back because their legal status in the desti-
nation country remains uncertain for several years, result-
ing in lost opportunities. At the same time, if unsuccessful 
asylum seekers enjoy privileged access to the labor market 
relative to other non-EU citizens, that may create unde-
sirable incentives for more irregular immigration. Nav-
igating that trade-off may require EU member states to 
find pragmatic humanitarian solutions for those already 
in the country for a prolonged period, without creating a 
firm expectation of labor market access on which poten-
tial irregular migrants could base a migration decision.
Address long-standing shortcomings in  
immigrant integration to promote social inclusion 
while facilitating the labor market integration  
of recently arrived refugees
Across the EU, the economic and social integration of immi-
grants who have arrived here during the last half century is 
quite uneven. Overall, employment rates are broadly simi-
lar to those of local workers for male immigrants, who typi-
cally arrive as legal labor migrants, but substantially lower for 
female immigrants who often come to the EU through fam-
ily unification. Refugees – who come in search of protection 
rather than in response to labor demand – take much lon-
ger to find employment. Unemployment is higher for immi-
grants than for local workers, especially among refugees and 
immigrants through family unification, whereas incomes 
tend to be lower. Thus, some immigrant groups are at risk 
of social exclusion, with detrimental consequences for their 
well-being and that of future generations. 
Integration policy faces the dual challenge of reduc-
ing social exclusion among immigrants (and others) who 
are already in the EU, and promoting the economic inte-
gration of newly arriving immigrants to prevent further 
social exclusion. Large investment in labor market inte-
gration and education for immigrants (along with other 
individuals at risk of social exclusion) will be required, 
with a particular focus on recent refugees. While some 
EU member states already employ a plethora of labor mar-
ket interventions, the multitude of programs and lack of 
coordination can be overwhelming, particularly for recent 
immigrants unfamiliar with the local language and insti-
tutional environment. Personalized guidance and coun-
seling have a key role to play in enabling immigrants to 
navigate the system and to reduce matching frictions 
when they (finally) search for a job.
Work with European society at large to sustain  
a political culture centered on respectful debate 
and evidence-based policy-making
Finally, public attitudes toward immigrants and immigra-
tion are not only important drivers of immigration poli-
cies in European democracies, but also, indirectly, affect 
integration outcomes. When immigrants perceive a large 
proportion of the host population as hostile, they are likely 
to reduce their destination-specific investment and efforts 
toward integration. Thus, negative attitudes may translate 
directly into worse integration outcomes. 
Many individuals in the host population who are skep-
tical toward immigration are not primarily concerned 
about how their own real incomes will be affected by addi-
tional immigration, but by a perceived risk of a negative 
effect on their peer group – with the peer group defined 
by ethnicity rather than, say, commitment to civic values. 
In addition, anti-immigration attitudes may be hardened 
by the absence of positive contact with immigrants, polar-
ized political debates, particularly in the ‘echo cham-
bers’ of social media, and media coverage that stigmatizes 
immigrants as an out-group. Conversely, positive contact, 
respectful political debate, and objective media coverage 
promote more balanced views. 
Among European citizens, a negative attitude toward 
immigration often coincides with a negative attitude 
toward European integration. This observation high-
lights many citizens’ ethnicity-based identities as well 
as their desire to see their own ethnic group ‘in control’. 
Hate crimes against immigrants have soared not only in 
high-immigration Germany and Sweden, but also in the 
post-Brexit U.K. 
Increasingly, relevant civil society actors will need to 
stand together and uphold democratic principles and civic 
values to safeguard an undistorted political process and 
public debate about contentious issues, including asy-
lum and migration policies. In this context, we believe 
that experts (including MEDAM researchers) can use-
fully contribute by providing unbiased information and 
analysis.
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